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ABSTRACT 
 
DERIGAN A. SILVER: National Security and Transparency:  
The Legal Frameworks and Factors Federal Courts Use to Balance Competing 
Democratic Values 
(Under the direction of Ruth Walden) 
 
Although following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, D.C., the U.S. government took numerous and extraordinary steps to 
increase secrecy in the name of national security, government secrecy was not created by 
the war on terror.  The tendency of those in power to suppress information that might be 
dangerous, damaging, or politically embarrassing is part of our political heritage, long 
predating the rise of democracy.  In the United States, however, secrecy conflicts with the 
cherished democratic values of freedom of expression and government transparency.  
This dissertation examines the legal, theoretical, and public policy arguments used by 
federal courts when they address conflicts between government secrecy and freedom of 
expression or transparency.   It explores how federal courts identify the main legal issues 
present in a case, or “frame” the case, and the legal factors—such as precedent, framers’ 
intent/originalism, or textualism—they use to reach or justify their conclusions.   
The research concludes the majority of national security cases are as much—if not 
more—about separation of powers issues as they are about balancing the First 
Amendment with national security.  The opinions often discuss the inherent power of the 
courts vis-à-vis the executive or legislative branch or grapple with how much deference 
the courts should give to the executive branch when dealing with national security 
 iv 
 
information.  This is particularly true in post-publication punishment and access cases, 
areas in which the U.S. Supreme Court has not established a jurisprudential regime strong 
enough to cross into national security information cases.  In addition, while the research 
supports previous scholarship that has emphasized the importance of precedent in judicial 
decision making, the cases also demonstrate that jurists often use First Amendment and 
democratic theory to support or justify their decisions.  This is particularly true in 
situations in which the courts cannot rely on textual analysis or framers intent.  Finally, 
the dissertation posits that the ability to frame cases and selectively rely on some legal 
factors or rhetorical devices while ignoring others gives the courts a great deal of 
flexibility to mold law regarding national security information as they see fit. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In the years following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, D.C., the U.S. government took numerous and extraordinary steps to 
increase secrecy in the name of national security.  Although some authors assert that the 
administration of President George W. Bush was notably secretive even before the 
attacks,1 in the last few years the government has created secret military tribunals,2 
ordered court proceedings closed to the public,3 claimed executive privilege in a wide 
variety of situations,4 increased the use of the state secrets privilege to prevent the
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror: The Bush 
Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 479, 484-89 (2006) (arguing 
that “[a]lthough the events of 9/11 certainly accelerated the tight-lipped nature of the Bush administration, 
the first nine months of the Bush presidency were notably more secretive than [President] Clinton’s”); Peter 
M. Shane, Social Theory Meets Social Policy: Culture, Identity and Public Information Policy After 
September 11, 2 ISJLP i, iv (2006) (contending that it has “widely been observed, [that] the Bush 
administration’s pursuit of increased secrecy was very much in evidence prior to the September 11 attacks 
and is rooted in its expansive view of plenary executive authority”); Adam Clymer, Government Openness 
at Issue as Bush Holds on to Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at A1 (cataloging instances of increased 
government secrecy before and after September 11, 2001). 
   
2 Military Order, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,” 
66 Fed. Reg. 57833-57836, Nov. 13, 2001. 
 
3 Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge of the United States, Memorandum: Cases Requiring Special 
Procedures, Sept. 21, 2001, available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf. 
 
4 See, e.g., Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); George W. Bush, Memorandum: 
Disclosures to Congress, Oct. 5, 2001 (limiting disclosure of information to Congress), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/10/gwb100501.html; George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney 
General: Congressional Subpoena for Executive Branch Documents, Dec. 12, 2001 (arguing for an 
expansive application of the executive privilege doctrine), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-1.html; PFIAB PLAYS SECRECY GAMES, 
Federation of American Scientists, SECRECY NEWS, vol. 2002, no. 77, Aug. 15, 2002 (describing the Bush 
administration’s refusal to reveal members of the Presidential Foreign Intelligence Board, even though 
board membership is public information), available at 
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2002/08/081502.html. 
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 disclosure of national security information in court proceedings,5 blocked access to the 
records of former presidents,6 refused to provide documents in response to congressional 
inquiries,7 kept secret the National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance of citizens,8 
reclassified previously unclassified documents,9 created additional exemptions to the 
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for critical infrastructure information,10 and 
banned media coverage of the arrival of the bodies of military personnel killed in the Iraq 
War.11  The U.S. government classified 11.3 million documents in 2002 and 14.2 million 
the next year.12  By 2004 the federal government created 15.6 million classified 
documents, or 81 percent more than in 2000, the year before the terrorist attacks.13  
Whether this increased government secrecy is a sincere effort by well-meaning but 
                                                 
5 William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallito, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POLI. SCI. Q. 85, 86 
(2005).  The state secrets privilege, a judicial creation, is most often used by executive branch officials in 
civil court cases to protect against subpoenas, discovery motions and other judicial requests for 
information.  See United States v. Reynolds 345 U.S. 1 (1953) for the genesis of the privilege. 
 
6 Exec. Order No. 13,233 (2001) “Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act,” 66 Fed. Reg. 
56025-56029. 
 
7 See, e.g., The FBI’s Handling of Confidential Informants in Boston: Will the Justice Department Comply 
with Congressional Subpoenas? Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxmen, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform) (noting that Justice Department had recently indicated it would no longer be 
complying with congressional request for documents pertaining to criminal investigations, whether open or 
closed). 
 
8 James Risen & Walter Lichblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2005, at A01. 
 
9 Kirtley, supra note 1, at 495. See also Scott Shane, U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1. 
 
10 6 U.S.C. § 214(a)(1)(A) & (E) (2005). 
 
11 Dana Milbank, Curtains Ordered for Media Coverage of Returning Coffins, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2003, 
at A23. 
 
12 David Nather, Classified: A Rise in ‘State Secrets,’ 63 CQ WEEKLY 1958, 1960 (2005). 
 
13 Kenneth Jost, Government Secrecy, 15 CQ RESEARCHER 1007, 1008 (2006). 
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overzealous officials to protect the nation or an intentional abuse of power to manipulate 
public debate, the amount of secrets the U.S. government is keeping should be alarming 
to anyone concerned with self-government.   
However, as alarming as this trend might be, government secrecy was not created 
by the war on terror.  It is as old as government itself.   The tendency of those in power to 
suppress information that might be dangerous, damaging, or politically embarrassing is 
part of our political heritage, long predating the rise of democracy.  However, once the 
relationship between the governed and government began to change—once those in 
power were viewed as receiving the right to govern through the consent of those they 
governed rather than by divine right or military power—the conflict between government 
secrecy and transparency took on new meaning.14   
Under new ideas proposed by social contract philosophers and liberal democratic 
theorists,  government secrecy was seen as conflicting with self-government because it 
prevented a fully informed electorate from making fully informed decisions. 15  Focusing 
on the role a free press plays in a democracy, historian Fredrick S. Siebert wrote, “As 
democratic forms superseded the ancient relationship between the government and its 
constituents, the press as a necessary corollary took on an extra-legal function, that of an 
informant and a watch-dog of public affairs.”16  While not as old as secrecy, transparency 
is also part of our political heritage.  As one scholar noted, transparency in government 
                                                 
14 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776 (1965). 
 
15 See generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (2006).  Concerned primarily with the protection 
of individual rights and the maintenance of a democratic system of government, liberal democratic theory 
is the dominant philosophical tradition in U.S. political thought.  See id. at 56-95. 
 
16 SIEBERT, supra note 14, at 10. 
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was promoted in the classical liberalism of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Jean-
Jacques Rousseu as well as the moral philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel 
Kant, the political and ethical philosophers who had the greatest impact on western 
democracy.17   
Yet even in a democratic society, transparency and the benefits it brings must be 
balanced with an important countervailing interest: the occasional, legitimate need for 
government secrecy.  Even authors who warn that a predilection for secrecy poses a 
threat to the First Amendment acknowledge that a certain amount of secrecy is necessary 
in the areas of executive privilege, foreign affairs, and national security.18  Secrecy in 
these areas is seen as a necessary tool to advance legitimate functions of government 
under democratic theory.  As one scholar noted, in Lockean philosophy government’s 
central purpose is to protect each individual’s rights against invasion and to protect “the 
entire society from having the rights of its members robbed from them by another 
nation’s war-launching invasion.”19  First Amendment theorists also generally agree that 
two essential ingredients of a healthy democracy are a free press and national security.20  
Thus, under democratic theory, both government secrecy and transparency have their 
places.  However, sometimes it is very difficult—perhaps impossible—to have one 
without jeopardizing the other.   
                                                 
17 Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 896 (2007). 
 
18 E.g., David H. Topol, Note, United States v. Morison: A Threat to the First Amendment Right to Publish 
National Security Information, 43 S. C. L. REV. 581, 593 (1992). 
 
19 Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The Presumption in Favor of 
Liberty Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (2007). 
 
20 See, e.g., infra notes 62-98 and accompanying text. 
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Such conflicts raise extremely important questions all democratic societies must 
answer.  How should the conflicts be settled?  Which branch of government is best suited 
to address concerns over government secrecy?  What rationales should be use to reach—
or ex post facto justify—decisions?  What is the proper balance between government 
secrecy and transparency?  Does the proper balance change with societal conditions?  In 
America, the federal court system is often called upon to balance these two important 
interests and decide which interest shall carry the day.21  This dissertation explores the 
reasoning and justifications used by courts to answer questions about conflicts between 
transparency and secrecy.   
The dissertation examines the legal, theoretical, and public policy arguments used 
by federal courts when they address the conflict between government secrecy and 
transparency.  Using traditional qualitative legal research methods, it explores the legal 
frameworks and factors federal courts employ in deciding cases involving challenges to 
government secrecy based on national security interests.  That is, the dissertation 
examines both how federal courts identify the main legal issues present in a case, or 
“frame” the cases, and the legal factors—such as precedent, framers’ intent/originalism, 
or textualism—they use to reach or justify their conclusions.  In addition, the dissertation 
compares national security/transparency cases to a parallel area in order to offer a 
“control” set of cases.  Because some scholars have argued that national security is, or 
should be, a unique area of information control or judicial decision making, it is 
important to compare national security information cases to a similar set of cases in 
which national security is not an issue.  Therefore, first, each chapter explores how courts 
                                                 
21 Even when courts defer to the executive in areas of national security or rule that an issue is a political 
question rather than one that can be adjudicated, they are answering the question of what branch of 
government should balance government secrecy and transparency.   
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frame the conflict between secrecy and transparency in cases involving national security 
and identifies the factors used by the courts to reach and justify their decisions.  Next, 
each chapter compares the frameworks and factors used in national security/transparency 
cases to those in judicial process/transparency cases.  Thus, the dissertation describes 
how courts balance transparency and national security and compares the frameworks and 
factors used to an area of law that does not involve national security in order to provide a 
deeper understanding of the courts’ decisions and the perhaps unique nature of national 
security information cases. 
 
Literature Review 
There are three broad categories of literature that inform this study: first, 
scholarship on liberal democratic theory and the First Amendment; second, political 
science and legal literature on the need for and important functions of government 
secrecy and on the relationship between secrecy, transparency, and democratic theory; 
and, third, research on judicial decision making.   
 
Liberal democratic theory and the First Amendment 
This section of the literature review first briefly outlines the development of social 
contract theory and liberal democratic theory from their religious foundations in pre-Civil 
War England.  Next, it traces the influence of this tradition on the writings of John 
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, popularly known as “Cato,” who ultimately “became the 
voices for democratic government and free press for America.”22  Finally, it addresses 
scholarship on the First Amendment and government secrecy.  The purpose of this 
                                                 
22 DAVID A. COPELAND, THE IDEA OF A FREE PRESS 83 (2006). 
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section is to explain the role of government secrecy and transparency under liberal 
democratic theory, briefly explore the development of these concepts through British and 
American history, and document their influence on First Amendment theory and doctrine. 
The term social contract describes a broad class of philosophical theories 
addressing the implied agreements by which people form nations and maintain a social 
order.23  Social contract theory provides the rationale behind the historically important 
notion that legitimate state authority must be derived from the consent of the governed.  
According to political scientists David Boucher and Paul Kelly, civil contractarianism is 
“that form of social compact, whether historical or hypothetical, whose role is either to 
legitimize coercive political authority, or to evaluate coercive constraint.”24  The “first 
and most obvious element” of social contract theory is that the foundation of any 
authentic body politic is a pact or agreement made by and between all individuals who 
are to compose it.25   
Social contract theory forms the foundation of modern liberal democratic theory.  
Concerned primarily with the protection of individual rights and the maintenance of a 
democratic system of government, liberal democratic theory is the dominant 
philosophical tradition in U.S. political thought.26  Social contract and classic liberal 
                                                 
23 See generally THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 
1994); JULES STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSENT (1978).  Social contract theories 
fall into three broad categories: moral theories, civil theories, and constitutional theories.  David Boucher & 
Paul Kelly, The Social Contract and Its Critics: An Overview in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO 
RAWLS 1, 1 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 1994).  
  
24 Boucher & Kelly, supra note 23, at 4.   
 
25Murray Forsyth, Hobbes’s Contractarianism, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS 35, 37 
(David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 1994).  
 
26 See generally HELD, supra note 15. 
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democratic theory can both be traced, at least partially, to the works of John Locke,27 who 
had perhaps more influence on the formation of America’s government and its protection 
of free expression than any other political philosopher.28   Liberal democratic theory, in 
particular, provided the “philosophical foundation” for our society’s comprehensive 
understanding of speech rights.29  Thus, social contract and democratic theories are 
important when considering transparency and government secrecy in the United States 
because together they serve as the foundation for the American concepts of free speech 
and free press.     
Perhaps the most important development that triggered new ways of thinking 
about the proper form of government was the Protestant Reformation.  The development 
of the social contract—a concept first proposed by religious groups such as the 
Levellers—was intrinsically linked to the emergence of the twin ideas of man’s ability to 
reason and the equality of human beings first proposed during the Reformation.30  The 
Levellers, named for their belief in a society in which all were equal or “level,” are 
particularly important to the development of the social contract as outlined in this 
research because of their early and enthusiastic support for press freedom.   
                                                 
27 See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 
1980) (1690). 
 
28 COPELAND, supra note 22, at 91. 
 
29 Laura Stein, Understanding Speech Rights: Defensive and Empowering Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 26 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 102, 104 (2004). 
 
30 COPELAND, supra note 22, at 79. Copeland concluded that while the Levellers advocated the social 
contract before John Locke and other political philosophers, the true origin of the social contract was “the 
covenantal agreement employed by the Puritans, where they joined together in commitment to God and to 
each other in gathered churches.”  Id.  For a full discussion of the religious foundations of the social 
contract in general and the influence of the Levellers on the social contract and the idea of a free press, see 
id. at 77-83.  See also Forsyth, supra note 25, at 37. 
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Historian Leonard W. Levy credited Leveller leaders, such as John Lilburne, 
William Walwyn and Richard Overton, as being the facilitators of the first great outburst 
of democratic thought in history.31  Levy wrote that almost all Leveller tracts of the 1640s 
contained passages condemning censorship and arguing that freedom of speech and the 
press were essential elements of both a free government and individual liberty.32   
Siebert credited Lilburne, Walwyn and Overton with a number of original contributions 
to political theory in England, including the need for a written constitution, the 
importance of limited governmental powers, the benefits of separation of political powers 
and, finally, freedom of the press.33  Siebert concluded that the Levellers were significant 
not only for being one of the first groups to argue for press freedom but also one of the 
most eloquent and powerful.  He wrote, “Nowhere in the literature of liberty can be found 
a more comprehensive or more logical statement of the argument for liberty of the press” 
than the Levellers’ petitions to Parliament.34 
Unfortunately for the Levellers, England was not ready to embrace their radical 
ideas.  Historians David Copeland, Levy and Siebert all concluded that the ideas 
proposed by Lilburne, Walwyn and Overton did not catch on with Parliament or the 
common man.  As Siebert noted, Parliament’s response to Lilburne’s argument for liberty 
of the press was to charge him with treason although he was eventually released because 
a jury refused to convict him.35  Copeland noted that even though the Levellers continued 
                                                 
31 LEVY, supra note 14, at 91. 
 
32 Id. 
 
33 SIEBERT, supra note 14, at 200.   
 
34 Id. at 201. 
 
35 Id. at 87. 
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to write, their work “could not convince most Britons, upper, middle or lower class, that a 
level society was in the country’s best interests.”36  Ultimately, civil war and the 
establishment of Cromwell as the military dictator of the country drowned out the 
Levellers’ calls for a free press.  However, the radical ideas of the group would influence 
a different group of writers, political philosophers who eventually had a profound impact 
on the foundation of American government.  
Thomas Hobbes defined his concept of the social contract in Leviathan, his 
treatise on government.37  Written in 1651, eleven years after he fled England for France 
because of his support for the monarchy prior to the English Civil War, Leviathan 
established Hobbes as “the first great theorist of the social contract.”38  His 
conceptualization of the social contract was “the dramatic culmination of a step-by-step 
process of developing human rationality.”39  Like most political theorists of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,40 Hobbes began his arguments by hypothesizing 
about the state of nature, writing that prior to the establishment of governments, man 
existed in a state of nature that was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”41  To avoid 
                                                 
36 COPELAND, supra note 22, at 89. 
 
37 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (1651).  The title refers to Job 41 in which 
Leviathan is a sea monster.  See id. at 27. 
 
38 Forsyth, supra note 25, at 35. 
 
39 Id. at 43. 
 
40 See C.B. Macpherson, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT vii, viii (C.B. 
Macpherson, ed., 1980) 1690.  “Every political theory which sets out to justify or advocate a particular 
system of government . . . must rest on an explicit or implicit theory of human nature.  The theorist must 
show, or assume that human beings who will have to submit to and operate the desired system do need it 
and are capable of running it.  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this was done by postulating a 
supposed natural condition of mankind, or a “state of nature, from which men had historically or would 
necessarily move by some sort of agreement into political of civil society.”  Id. 
 
41 HOBBES, supra note 37, at 76. 
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harm and the risk of death, man willingly entered into the social contract and formed 
government.42  At the heart of Hobbes’s notion of the social contact was an act by which 
a multitude united for safety and protection.43  Hobbes wrote that a commonwealth, or 
government, is formed “when men, coming together voluntarily, agree, every one with 
every one, that they will obey whatever man or assembly the greater part, by their votes, 
shall give the right of bearing the person of them all.”44   
Like Hobbes, Locke wrote that the establishment of political institutions followed 
a state of nature45 in which man had natural rights.  Locke was also concerned with what 
form a legitimate government should take and how to establish the conditions necessary 
for peace and security.  However, unlike Hobbes, Locke was also greatly concerned with 
individual liberty, and the social contract he argued for in Second Treatise of 
Government, first published in 1690,46 was vastly different than the one proposed by 
Hobbes.  Although Locke never mentioned Hobbes or Leviathan by name, the Second 
Treatise explicitly rejected the idea that people could only find peace and tranquility by 
                                                 
42  The Hobbesian state of nature is not the description of a particular historical period or a generalization of 
historical tendencies that attempts to describe how most states materialize.  It is a hypothetical “thought 
experiment” designed to examine issues related to the relationship between individuals and the state.  See 
HELD, supra note 15, at 60; Forsyth, supra note 25, at 44.  
 
43 HOBBES, supra note 37, at 106-26. 
 
44  Id. at 110. 
 
45 Locke, like Hobbes, introduced the state of nature not as a historical condition, but as a logical 
abstraction given the nature of man.  
 
46 LOCKE, supra note 27.  Locke’s work was originally published as one volume, Two Treatise on 
Government, but the Second Treatise was meant to be a self-contained work.  The First Treatise was 
directed against the divine right of kings as argued by Sir Robert Filmer.  See Macpherson, supra note 40, 
at viii (noting that “Locke, having as he thought demolished Filmer in the First Treatise, simply summed 
that matter up in the first paragraph of the Second before going on to his positive case for limited 
government.  Locke himself drew attention to the self-contained nature of the Second Treatise by inserting, 
apparently during the first printing . . . a new title for the Second . . . ‘An Essay Concerning the True 
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government.’”). 
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subjecting themselves to the dictates of a single indivisible authority.47  Copeland noted 
that while Locke and Hobbes agreed that people needed to form a social contract, Locke 
emphasized the rights of individuals within the collective and proposed a society based 
on the consent of the governed.48    
Locke focused on the restriction of state power to create private spheres of civil 
liberty.  Locke based his understanding of the social contract on the pre-existing rights of 
the individual, which were retained even when the individual entered into the collective.  
Hobbes, the first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed contract theory, gave the 
right to censor subversive writings to the government, whereas Locke did not.  Although 
Hobbes wrote of the natural rights of man, he was clear that anything that might usurp the 
commonwealth or cause it to be disbanded was morally wrong.  To Locke, because 
government existed solely based on the consent of the governed, the government could 
not take away pre-existing rights, such as the right to free expression.  Siebert argued that 
to Locke a free and open press was the best way to guarantee citizens protection from 
government tyranny that may impinge on these natural rights.49  According to Copeland, 
it was on this point that revolutionary America rejected Hobbes and looked instead to 
Locke for his blend of individualism and common concern.50   
                                                 
47 LOCKE, supra note 27, at 8. 
 
48 COPELAND, supra note 22, at 91. 
 
49 SIEBERT, supra note 14, at 261. 
 
50 COPELAND, supra note 22, at 90.  See also HELD, supra note 15, at 59 (stating “Locke…signals the clear 
beginnings of the liberal constitutionalist tradition, which became the dominant thread in the changing 
fabric of European and American politics from the eighteenth century.”) 
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According to Copeland, by 1730 Americans had adopted the idea of the social 
contract.51  Copeland based his argument on the work of a group of writers he referred to 
as the “newspaper polemicists,”52 who “took the concepts of Milton, Locke and others 
and synthesized their thinking for all levels of society that had access to what they 
wrote.”53  Chief among these was “Cato,” the pseudonym of John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon.  According to Copeland, while most Americans in the middle of the eighteenth 
century would not have heard of John Locke, they would have known of Cato.54  
Beginning in 1720, Trenchard and Gordon published a series of essays focusing on 
Locke’s idea of government being founded on the consent of the governed and John 
Milton’s marketplace of ideas concept.  The essays first appeared in the London Journal, 
and by 1723 the two had written 138 essays.55   
Law professor David A. Anderson credited Cato with helping to develop the idea 
that the press played a structural role in a democracy by introducing the phrase “bulwark 
of liberty” to the framers of the Constitution.56  According to Anderson, the phrase—a 
                                                 
51 Id. at 88. 
 
52 See id. at  95-102.  It is important to note that Copeland did not contend that the average American 
colonist was familiar with the political writings of Hobbes or Locke.  Instead he argued that “the new ideas 
promoted by Thomas Hobbes, John Milton, John Locke, John Lilburne, John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, 
and other English writers were woven into people’s understanding of basically all aspects of life.   Most 
people in England and America might not have realized that they were being influenced and guided by 
these [free press] apologists, or even known their names, but the people who shaped the direction of 
England and the American colonies surely did.”  Id. at 76. 
 
53 Id. at 94. 
 
54 Id. at 95. 
 
55 Id. at 97. 
 
56 David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV 455, 491 (1983). 
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metaphor for the ability of the press to provide a check on government—was first used in 
one of Cato’s essays and became widely popular and quoted.57    
Cato touted freedom of speech, not for its own sake, but for its value in 
combating governmental oppression and tyranny. . . .  That Cato described 
speech, not press, as the bulwark of liberty apparently was not important 
to those who borrowed the metaphor.  The early press clauses drew 
heavily on both the phrase and the idea.58   
 
Anderson concluded, “[A] press clause was necessary, not to induce the press to provide 
a check on government power, but because it was universally assumed that the press 
would indeed provide such a check and that government therefore would seek to suppress 
it.”59 
This interpretation of the function of the press depicts a government system in 
which the people must have information in order to both effectively govern themselves 
and keep their government accountable.  Based on the work of Locke and subsequent 
political theorists, liberal democratic theory encompasses two fundamental concerns: 
first, the protection of individual autonomy and, second, the maintenance of political 
systems that allow citizens to engage in democratic self-government.60  Thus, to 
democratic theorists, speech rights are both an important individual liberty and a way to 
promote self-governance.61 
Perhaps the most famous modern First Amendment theorist to argue that freedom 
of expression was essential to self-governance was Professor Alexander Meiklejohn.  To 
                                                 
57 Id. 
 
58 Id. at 491-92. 
 
59 Id. at 491. 
 
60 See HELD, supra note 15, at 77-79. 
 
61 Stein, supra note 29, at 105. 
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Meiklejohn the primary purpose of the First Amendment was to ensure that all political 
speech relevant to democratic debate be heard.62  Meiklejohn addressed the question of 
whether the clear and present danger doctrine, or any other test, could constitutionally 
sustain legislation punishing political speech on the grounds of national security 
concerns.63  He concluded that the First Amendment “established an absolute, unqualified 
prohibition of the abridgement of the freedom of speech.”64  However, Meiklejohn 
extended this absolute protection only to speech related to self-government.  Meiklejohn 
wrote that the purpose of protecting political speech was to “give to every voting member 
of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those 
problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.”65  Meiklejohn 
relied heavily on the concept of the social contract to develop his ideas of free speech 
protected by the U.S. Constitution.66  He argued the First Amendment was best 
understood in relation to the overall function of the Constitution as a means to establish 
self-government.67  Because the overall purpose of the Constitution was to establish a 
                                                 
62 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 21-27 (1948).   
 
63 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 20 (1948).  See also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 62, at 28-
56 for further discussion of the clear and present danger test. 
 
64 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 62, at 20.    
 
65 Id. at 88-89.  Meiklejohn argued that the absolute language of the First Amendment granted absolute 
protection solely to political speech.  Id. at 1-27.  For development of the argument that this limitation is 
appropriate, see Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the 
Substance and Limits of the Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).  
 
66 E.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 62, at 14 (describing the nature of the “compact” that created the “body 
politick” in the United States). 
 
67 Id. at 15 (arguing the phrase “We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, 
and secure blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution of 
the United States of America” should be viewed as the controlling words of the Constitution, and that all 
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democratic form of government, the purpose of the First Amendment was to facilitate 
public participation in government.  Meiklejohn’s focus on self-government is echoed in 
the works of other scholars and in Supreme Court decisions.  As law professor Lillian 
BeVier wrote, in First Amendment theory, there is “one area which both commands 
widespread agreement and is derived from constitutional structure: the core first 
amendment value is that of the democracy embodied in our constitutionally established 
processes of representative self-government.”68   
Meiklejohn also emphasized the role of the listener, or the person who was to 
receive the information.  What was important to him was not that everyone had a right to 
speak or to be heard, but that all ideas worth hearing were heard. The meaning of the 
First Amendment, he contended, was derived from the necessity of citizens to have 
access to all relevant ideas so that they could engage in effective self-government.  This 
required that all political speech relevant to democratic debate be heard, even if that 
information was deemed to be dangerous to national security.69   
Unlike Meiklejohn, most other First Amendment theorists have taken more 
nuanced approaches to national security and transparency and have called for a balance 
between the two.  Vincent Blasi, for example, advocated for a great deal of protection for 
the press, but limited this protection when national security was involved. 70  Blasi 
                                                                                                                                                 
other provisions of the document should find their “legitimate scope and meaning only as they conform to 
the one basic purpose that the citizens of this nation shall make and shall obey their own laws”).  
 
68 Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 
68 CAL. L. REV 482, 502 (1980). 
 
69 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 62, at 25.  Meiklejohn famously compared the democratic communication 
process to a town meeting, arguing that at such a meeting what is paramount is not that everyone is allowed 
to speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.  Id. 
 
70 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977). 
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primarily advocated a free press as a check on the government.  He wrote that the First 
Amendment should be given “preferential” treatment when evidence of government 
misconduct was presented by the press, but it was also important to balance government 
secrecy with a free press. 71   
According to Blasi, by providing information to the public—especially 
information the government does not want revealed—the press plays an important role in 
revealing governmental abuses, incompetence, and malfeasance. 
But for the tradition of a free press, the crimes and abuses of Watergate 
might never have been uncovered. . . .  In the last decade, the First 
Amendment has had at least as much impact on American life by 
facilitating a process by which countervailing forces check the misuse of 
official power as by protecting the dignity of the individual, maintaining a 
diverse society in the face of conformist pressures, promoting the quest for 
scientific and philosophic truth, or fostering a regime of “self-
government” in which large numbers of ordinary citizens take an active 
part in political affairs.72  
 
Blasi traced the source of his powerful new First Amendment value to the long history of 
public officials abusing their political trust73 and noted that the writings and speeches of 
both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson viewed the liberty of the press in terms of its 
checking value.74  
 Blasi was clear that the checking function was directly tied to the press’s role as 
an institution.  Blasi argued that the “inevitable size and complexity” of modern 
government called for “well-organized, well-financed, professional critics to serve as a 
                                                 
71 Id. at 609-11. 
 
72 Id. at 527. 
 
73 Id. at 529-32. 
 
74 Id. at 535-38. 
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counterforce to government.”75  To Blasi, the press was important in a democracy for its 
ability to serve as a professional critic and its capacity to disseminate information to the 
public.76 Thus, Blasi argued the checking function of the press as an institution would 
support claims against government control of information.77   
However, Blasi also wrote that there were situations in which the checking 
function must give way to government secrecy.  Blasi said that although classification 
systems can have the effect of covering up government wrongdoing, they also can serve 
legitimate government interests.78  While Blasi wrote that it was difficult to imagine 
sufficient justification for any order that would prohibit a source under government 
control from having contact with the press, he also noted that not all restrictions on 
communication between sources under government control and reporters were 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.79  Blasi reasoned that because punishment of 
“leakers” should be thought to raise serious First Amendment concerns under the 
checking value, punishment would be consistent with the checking value only if the 
disclosure of information could “be shown to create a serious risk of harm to the 
implementation of government policy.”80   
                                                 
75 Id. at 541. 
 
76 Id. 
 
77 Id. at 566. 
 
78 Id. at 608. 
 
79 Id. 
 
80 Id. at 609.  Scholars such as law professor Paul Gowder have noted that a utilitarian approach is the 
common mode for analyzing the legal dilemmas that are raised by government secrecy in a democratic 
state.  Gowder wrote that the academic and legal discourse on government secrecy is “overwhelmingly 
produced in the mode of utilitarian expediency.”  Paul Gowder, Secrecy as Mystification of Power: 
Meaning and Ethics in the Security State, 2 ISJLP 1, 2 (2006).  
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Like Meiklejohn, famed First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson also wrote 
that a system of free expression is necessary as a method of securing participation by the 
members of a democratic society in political decision making.81  Freedom of expression 
“in the political realm is usually a necessary condition for securing freedom elsewhere,” 
Emerson noted. 82  To meet the core objective of democratic government, individuals—or 
their representatives in the press—need access to information.  This would suggest that 
any system of free expression designed to advance political communication would 
necessarily have to protect the gathering of information.  As BeVier noted, “It is a truism 
that we cannot responsibly exercise our franchise unless we have sufficient knowledge 
about governmental affairs, operations, and polices to make informed choices.”83  
Therefore, in addition to advocating a broad First Amendment theory, Emerson wrote 
specifically about the relationship between democracy, government secrecy and access to 
information in his work on the public’s “right to know.”84   
The general term “right to know” or “right to receive information” can refer to 
numerous concepts, including both the audience’s right to receive expression and the 
right to gather information for dissemination to the public.85  The public’s general right to 
                                                 
81 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878 (1963). 
 
82 Id. 
 
83 BeVier, supra note 68, at 483.  BeVier noted that while a right to know does encompass many of the 
same principles as the right to publish, it is in principle a different type of right.  See id. at 498 (writing “the 
failure of government to take affirmative action to remove the impediment caused by denial of access 
cannot be credibly argued to be the constitutional equivalent of punishment or censorship without ignoring 
important and traditionally significant differences between what are in fact two very disparate forms of 
governmental activity”).    
 
84 Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 3 (1976). 
 
85 See William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression, SUP. CT. REV. 303, 307 n. 
14 (1988) (arguing that “[i]t is important to distinguish the right to receive expression from the right to 
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be informed about the operations of the government, the right to compel the government 
to produce records and documents, and the right to access government meetings and 
judicial proceedings can all be considered different aspects of a general “right to know.”  
As it relates to this research, the right to know is the right of the people “to have access to 
information controlled by the government”86 so that they might be better informed in 
order to better participate in self-government.87  In this sense, the term “right to know” 
has been a traditional rallying cry for scholars, journalists and public interest groups 
arguing for a right of access to government information.88     
Emerson defined the right to know as “the right to read, to listen, to see, and to 
otherwise receive communications . . . and the right to obtain information as a basis for 
transmitting ideas or facts to others.”89  He described the right as “obscure” and noted that 
although the Supreme Court had, on a number of occasions, recognized the right to know, 
it had also failed to “give weight” to the right on occasion.90  Although Emerson appeared 
to be a vocal advocate of the right to know, it is important to note that there are a number 
                                                                                                                                                 
gather information, although both combine in the right to know”).  The focus of Lee’s article was only 
those First Amendment cases where the Court considered the audience’s rights as part of its analysis.  Id. 
 
86 BeVier, supra note 68, at 484 n. 10.  See also, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 860 (1974) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
 
87 The right to compel the government to produce records is embodied in the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).  The statute allows individuals to obtain federal agency records.  5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2005).    
 
88 See generally HERBERT M. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1999). 
 
89 Emerson, supra note 84, at 2. 
 
90 See id. at 3 (contrasting the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 
(1965) (holding citizens have a right to receive foreign communist propaganda), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding the right to read or see pornography in the privacy of the home), and Red Lion 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (contending  that “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”) with Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding 
restrictions n travel to Cuba) and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (refusing to acknowledge a 
right to hear a foreign lecturer who had been denied a visa)). 
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of contradictions in his writings, and he greatly limited the amount of information that 
should be available to the public. 
Early in his article on the right to know, Emerson stated the right should be given 
near absolute protection.  Emerson’s reason for adopting this strict standard—when other 
First Amendment doctrines called for balancing tests—was “the right to read, listen, or 
see is so elemental, so close to the source of all freedom, that one can hardly conceive of 
a system of free expression that does not extend it full protection.”91  Emerson appeared 
to advocate that a great deal of information should be available to citizens. 
One would seem to be on solid ground, therefore, in asserting a 
constitutional right in the public to obtain information from government 
sources necessary or proper for the citizen to perform his function as 
ultimate sovereign.  Furthermore, this right would extend, as a starting 
point, to all information in the possession of the government.  It is hard to 
conceive of any government information that would not be relevant to the 
concerns of the citizens and taxpayers.92  
 
In addition, Emerson also wrote that in a democracy the government should have no 
power to control the dissemination of information by its employees and former 
employees through leaks, books, speeches and articles except in the “narrow sense of 
conveying sensitive national defense information to a foreign country with intent to injure 
the United States.”93  Again, Emerson cited the concept of self-government to justify his 
argument.  He was concerned that granting the government the ability to control leaks 
allowed it to control information, which in turn would allow it to control public debate 
and cover up questionable government practices.94  Finally, Emerson also argued that one 
                                                 
91 Id. at 7. 
 
92 Id. at 16. 
 
93 Id. at 18. 
 
94 Id. 
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branch of government should not, as a general principle, be able to keep information from 
another branch.  He argued that “the power of Congress to force the executive to produce 
materials necessary to the congressional function cannot be doubted.”95   
 However, as noted above, despite this strong rhetoric in favor of access to 
government sources and information, Emerson wrote that “some exceptions would have 
to formulated” to any theory of the right to know.96  Although he contended that “[i]n 
theory these exceptions should be scrupulously limited to those that are absolutely 
essential to the effective operation of government institutions,” he listed an extremely 
wide range of information that could be kept secret by government, including “sensitive 
national security data” and information that would protect “the right of executive officials 
to receive full and frank advice from subordinates and colleagues—that is, executive 
privilege.”97  Emerson was willing to grant exemptions to information related to tactical 
military movements, design of weapons, operation of espionage or counterespionage, 
diplomatic and collective bargaining negotiations, criminal investigations, uncompleted 
litigation, trade secrets, executive privilege, and individual privacy.98  Emerson made no 
attempt to reconcile the contradictions in his arguments, nor did he provide a framework 
for balancing competing interests. 
In sum, for hundreds of years philosophers and scholars have recognized the 
relationship between self-government and transparency.  Social contract theory and 
liberal democratic theory exerted a strong influence on both the framers of the U.S. 
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96 Id. at 16. 
 
97 Id. at 16-17. 
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Constitution and later First Amendment philosophers.  Scholars almost always tie 
justifications for government transparency to notions of democracy.  They advocate 
transparency as means to advance self-government as well as a tool for checking abuses 
of power by those selected to govern.  However, the literature also reflects a 
countervailing emphasis on the occasional need for government secrecy, and even the 
most ardent supporters of a right to know recognize limitations and exceptions.  The 
following section of the literature review explores these exceptions and reviews existing 
scholarship on transparency, national security, and the judiciary.   
 
Government secrecy and national security 
Much of the scholarship on government secrecy and national security is 
normative rather than empirical.  Authors typically argue for greater transparency and 
judicial intervention or for government secrecy and judicial deference.  The purpose of 
this section is to review this literature both to provide a foundation for the current 
research and to demonstrate that this body of work is lacking an empirical analysis of 
court decisions relating to national security and transparency.  The section first examines 
literature on the types of information that can or should be kept secret.  Second, it 
discusses scholarship that has examined current statutes designed to protect national 
security information, has suggested new statutes to protect information, or has addressed 
First Amendment issues related to applying statutes to the press or government 
employees.  Finally, it reviews literature that has examined the role of the judiciary in 
deciding conflicts between national security and transparency. 
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Although there were some objections by various framers, the Constitution itself 
was drafted in secret.99  The Constitution has one textual reference to secrecy.  Article I, 
section 5, states: 
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time 
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require 
Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any 
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth those Present, be entered on the 
Journal.100  
 
However, there is no evidence the founding fathers discussed whether the First 
Amendment imposed any limitations on the power of the government to keep information 
secret.101  According to Benjamin S. DuVal Jr. there was little discussion of the First 
Amendment aspects of government secrecy until late in the twentieth century.102   
DuVal noted that although the Supreme Court said relatively early in the century 
that the government could prevent publication of “the sailing dates of transports or the 
number and location of troops,”103 it was not until 1971 that the High Court ruled on the 
press’s ability to publish classified government documents in the famous Pentagon 
Papers Case, New York Times v. United States.104  In that case, the Supreme Court, on a 
6-3 vote, set a very high standard for preventing the press from publishing government 
information.  In a per curiam opinion accompanied by nine concurring and dissenting 
                                                 
99 For a further discussion of the decision to draft the Constitution in secret, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 
(2003); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
489, 522 (2007). 
 
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 
101 See generally DANIEL HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1981). 
 
102 Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 581-82 (1986). 
 
103 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
 
104 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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opinions, the Court refused to grant the government’s request for an injunction to prevent 
the New York Times and the Washington Post from printing a classified study of U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam.  The Court held that any government attempt to prevent 
publication carried a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.105  However, in dicta, 
some of the justices indicated that the newspapers could be prosecuted under the 
Espionage Act even if the government could not prevent them from publishing the 
documents.106  Today, more than thirty-five years after the Pentagon Papers Case, how 
the judiciary should deal with attempts to punish the publication of national secrets is still 
debated.  DuVal wrote: “Despite a rapidly growing body of case law, . . . the Court’s 
decisions fail to deal in any comprehensive fashion with the issue.  More seriously, the 
Court has failed to come to grips with the distinctive character of the secrecy issue.”107   
Scholarship has noted that notwithstanding the Court’s strong language 
condemning prior restraints in the Pentagon Papers Case national security concerns often 
outweigh any arguments in favor of transparency or free expression.  Frederick Schauer 
                                                 
105 Id. at 713 (per curiam) “‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a 
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’  The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of 
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’ The District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in the New York Times case and the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not 
met that burden. We agree.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 
106 Id. at 735 (White, J., concurring) (stating, “The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions potentially 
relevant to these cases”); id. at 743 (Marshall, J., concurring) (writing that Congress has given the 
executive branch the power to punish the receipt, disclosure, communication, and publication of “certain 
documents, photographs, instruments, appliances, and information” related to state secrets); id. at 752 
(Burger, J., dissenting) (stating, “I am in general agreement with much of what Mr. Justice White has 
expressed with respect to penal sanctions concerning communication or retention of documents or 
information relating to the national defense”); id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was left 
undecided whether “the newspapers are entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding the 
seemingly uncontested facts that the documents, or the originals of which they are duplicates, were 
purloined from the Government’s possession and that the newspapers received with knowledge that they 
had been feloniously acquired”);  id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (writing, “I also am in substantial 
accord with much that Mr. Justice White says, by way of admonition, in the latter part of his opinion”). 
 
107 DuVal, supra note 102, at 582. 
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wrote: “The interest in the security of the nation is often thought to be a trump card in 
free speech disputes.  Whatever the strength of the Free Speech Principle, a threat to 
national security is commonly held to be a danger of sufficient magnitude that the interest 
in freedom of speech must be subordinated.”108  Professor of public policy Alasdair 
Roberts stated, “Arguments for more open government that are powerful in other 
circumstances seem insubstantial, or even reckless in matters of national security.”109  
Eric E. Ballou and Kyle E. McSlarrow argued that while government secrecy might clash 
with the important American values of open government, an educated and enlightened 
people, and an unfettered press, it was a necessary evil.110  Roberts warned that the 
tendency to defer to secrecy was especially strong in times of fear and uncertainty: 
Many well-established democratic states, facing uncertain but potentially 
fundamental threats to their security, resort to the use of extraordinary 
police powers and an assertion of executive authority. . . .  In moments of 
crisis, when the severity of the threat remains uncertain, it is difficult for 
citizens to resist these calls for stronger state powers.111   
 
Polling research supports these points, suggesting that when access issues are framed as 
matters of national security, public support for openness drops.112   
Law professor Cass Sunstein argued that in America this tendency is more 
pronounced now than before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when Americans 
entered “a new and frightening geography where the continents of safety and danger were 
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forever shifted.”113  Sunstein posited that the intense emotions of September 11 caused 
people to focus on adverse outcomes rather on their likelihood.114  This focus, which 
Sunstein called “probability neglect,” allows political actors to promote attention to 
problems that may not deserve public concern and to enact laws and promote policies that 
may not be in the best interests of the public.115   
Currently, according to law professor Heidi Kitrosser, the ability of the executive 
to keep information secret manifests itself in both “a staggeringly large (and growing) 
system of information classification and in case-by-case refusals to disclose information” 
sought by Congress, the courts, or persons or agencies empowered by Congress to seek 
information.116  In 1997, the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 
Secrecy reported that there were five categories of information that the president could 
keep secret: (1) national defense information; (2) information concerning foreign affairs 
and diplomatic service; (3) information developed by law enforcement agencies; (4) 
proprietary information related to commercial advantage; (5) personally private 
information.117  Only the first two categories are relevant to this dissertation and will be 
discussed here. 
 Military information, including contingency plans, the nature, location and 
characteristics of weapons, and the strength and deployment of forces in peace and war, 
                                                 
113 Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61, 61 (2002). 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 Id. 
 
116 Kitrosser, supra note 99, at 491.  See also, Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the 
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is often listed as information our society needs to protect.  At the core of this type of 
information lie military plans that have not yet been fully executed.118  Another secrecy 
concern related to national security is the protection of intelligence information, including 
raw data, information-gathering methods, sources and covert operations.119  Disclosure of 
the identities of agents and sources impairs the ability of the government to gather 
information120 and endangers lives.121     
 Scientific and technological information related to national security may be 
information with exclusively military applications, information with both military and 
civilian applications, or information with no known military application.122  One of the 
principal justifications for restricting information regarding military technology is to 
prevent other governments from using that technology against the United States.123  For 
example, there has always been a great deal of concern over the publication of 
information related to atomic and nuclear weapons, even when the information did not 
come from the government.124  Commentators have also argued that secrecy is important 
in conducting international affairs and diplomacy.  In Pentagon Papers, Justice Potter 
                                                 
118 DuVal, supra note 102, at 591. 
 
119 Id. at 598; Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 110, at 805. 
   
120 E.g., Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 110, at 801.  Ballou and McSlarrow reported that during the 
summer of 1974, the Central Intelligence Agency was forced to abandon an attempt to retrieve a Soviet 
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122 For a discussion of academic research on biosecurity in the context of federal secrecy policy, see Brian 
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Stewart asserted: “[I]t is elementary that the successful conduct of international 
diplomacy . . . require[s] both confidentiality and secrecy.  Other nations can hardly deal 
with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their 
confidences will be kept.”125 
Scholarship supporting the executive branch’s power to keep information secret 
focuses on the president’s need for candid advice and for great, almost unconditional, 
deference to the executive in matters of national security and foreign policy.126  
According to Adam M. Samaha, “Effective executive power and the president’s 
commander-in-chief status sometimes depend on discretion to withhold information from 
general circulation.  Deliberation, diplomacy, and military victory can be jeopardized 
when the executive cannot control information.”127  Mark J. Rozell argued that the ability 
of the executive to keep information secret is supported by history, emphasizing the 
writings and behavior of the Framers of the Constitution, who envisioned a strong 
executive with the capacity to keep secrets.128 
There are currently a number of statutes designed to protect information related to 
national security information.  A large body of the normative scholarship has addressed 
the nature of these statutes and discussed First Amendment issues related to them.  For 
                                                 
125 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 
126 See generally MARK J. ROZELL,  EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND 
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127 Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 
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example, Judge Richard A. Posner has been highly critical of current U.S. law in his 
academic writings, arguing that no federal statutes constituted an effective prohibition of 
dissemination of properly classified material.129  Posner concluded that because the 
Espionage Act of 1917130 requires that the individual has reason to believe information he 
passes on could be used to injure the United States or advantage a foreign nation, it could 
not be used to punish the press.131  In addition, Posner concluded that no other statutes 
explicitly authorize punishing journalists for the publication of illegally leaked classified 
information.132  Unlike Posner, DuVal found that the Espionage Act, “while arguably not 
so intended, can be read to cover a reporter who knowingly publishes a classified 
document.”133  However, in the end, DuVal concluded the Espionage Act “is of uncertain 
applicability against disclosures made for the purpose of public debate.”134 
Ballou and McSlarrow analyzed the case for creating a new, comprehensive 
statutory solution that would allow criminal punishment of the press for the possession 
and publication of classified information.135  While the authors concluded that Congress 
may proscribe the disclosure of national security information without infringing on First 
Amendment rights,136 current laws are too narrow in their definitions and do not provide 
                                                 
129 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 
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130 18 U.S.C. § 793-798 (2005). 
 
131 POSNER, supra note 129, at 108. 
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133 DuVal, supra note 102, at 671. 
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adequate means to stop the leaking of national security information.137  “Under current 
United States law, the federal government is largely unable to prevent or to punish 
leaking and publishing of classified government information,” they wrote.138  Although 
Ballou and McSlarrow focused much of their attention on expression by government 
employees, they also addressed cases involving the press.  Regarding post-publication 
punishments, the authors concluded that while the Supreme Court has never decided such 
a case, Haig v. Agee139 suggested that with the proper statutory tools the government 
could impose post-publication sanctions on the press without offending the First 
Amendment.140  William E. Lee explored the link between the manner in which 
journalists obtain information and the First Amendment’s protection of the information’s 
publication.141  Lee concluded that courts usually regard information-gathering 
techniques as irrelevant when analyzing the constitutionality of prior restraints, but they 
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139 453 U.S. 280 (1981).  The issue in Haig was the Secretary of State’s revocation of the passport of Philip 
Agee, a former Central Intelligence Agency employee, on grounds that his activities in foreign countries 
had caused serious damage to national security and the foreign policy of the United States.  Agee and his 
collaborators repeatedly publicly identified individuals and organizations located in foreign countries as 
undercover CIA agents, employees, or sources.  The Court held that revocation of Agee’s passport was not 
a violation of his First Amendment right to criticize the government.  Id. at 308-09 (stating, “Agee's 
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engaged in criticism of the Government does not render his conduct beyond the reach of the law.”).  For a 
discussion of Haig, see infra pp. 162-66.  
 
140 Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 110, at 845-47.  See also id. at 847 (noting, “Where a prior restraint of 
disclosure of national security information is sought, the Pentagon Papers decision imposes on the 
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do consider how information was obtained when considering post-publication 
punishments.142   
A body of scholarship has examined the complex relationships between 
government secrecy, political theory and democratic processes and institutions.  Political 
scientists Robert M. Pallitto and William G. Weaver examined presidential secrecy and 
its effect on democracy.143  They concluded that changes to the institution of the 
presidency were resulting in vast changes in American democracy.  “Increasingly, our 
governmental institutions are unable to hold the president accountable for actions 
undertaken in secret in the name of national security. In a subtle but sweeping way, this 
failure is working detrimental changes in our federal governmental institutions.”144  Their 
research focused on three issues: first, the increasing institutionalization of executive 
secrecy—“how massive presidential power accrued to permit a wide range of 
questionable activity without fear of congressional oversight or judicial interference”; 
second, the abdication of judicial responsibility for oversight of the executive branch and 
the failure of the judiciary to maintain the separation of powers called for in the 
Constitution in the area of national security; and finally, the inability of Congress as an 
institution to maintain oversight and control of executive national security activity.  The 
two argued, “[A]ggressive action to control executive branch abuse of secrecy should not 
come from Congress but from the courts, which are in a position to provide the scrutiny 
necessary to discourage presidential abuse of secrecy powers.” 145  However, the authors 
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143 ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW (2007). 
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focused most of their discussion on separation of powers issues rather than examining 
issues related to the role of freedom of expression in a democracy.  Although the authors 
did note the importance of transparency when briefly discussing “institutions necessary to 
support a robust democracy,”146 they did not delve into theories of democracy, what 
transparency means, its value to the public, or the role of the press in providing 
information to the public. 
Political science literature has also developed the concepts of shallow and deep 
secrecy to help explore issues of political accountability and secrecy in a democracy.  A 
“shallow secret” is a secret whose existence is known although the secret itself remains 
unknown.  A deep secret is a secret whose very existence is a secret.147  Heidi Kitrosser 
argued that the notions of shallow and deep secrecy are useful because of the importance 
of maintaining political accountability when secrecy is necessary.  Kitrosser used the 
concepts of deep and shallow secrecy to examine executive privilege and the role of the 
judiciary in settling disputes between the other two branches of government.  She 
concluded, “Secrecy in government sometimes is a necessary evil, but secrecy within the 
political branches must, to be legitimate, remain a politically controllable tool of the 
people.”148  Based on the Constitution’s special treatment of information and historical 
examples of abuses of executive secrecy, Kitrosser was highly critical of judicial 
deference to the executive in areas of national security information, and she argued for a 
much a stronger role for the judiciary in determining secrecy issues. 
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Kitrosser also wrote about the special role information has in the constitutional 
framework and the function of information in democratic theory.149  Kitrosser contended 
that information and information control have very special constitutional significance:150 
“[I]nformation is not, for constitutional purposes, like any other tool of power.  Rather, 
constitutional analysis suggests that government secrecy, while sometimes necessary, 
must be kept on a tight leash to prevent it from becoming a tool of tyranny.”151  However, 
as noted, Kitrosser focused on the political checking function of the separate branches of 
government rather than on the press: 
[C]onstitutional text and structure suggest a faith in openness between the 
political branches and between such branches and the people.  At the same 
time constitutional structure, text, and history also suggest an 
understanding that government secrecy sometimes is a necessary evil.  
Ultimately, text, structure, and history suggest the means of reconciling 
these points is to ensure that any government secrecy remain a politically 
controllable tool of the people and their representatives. Specifically, text, 
structure, and history suggest that, to keep government secrecy within the 
ultimate control of the people and hence non-tyrannical, the very fact of 
such secrecy must remain shallow and politically checkable.152 
 
Samaha addressed the issue of leaks and confidential news sources in a 
democratic system.153  Samaha described the press as playing a role in “an active 
informal system of information access” that makes transparency possible.154  Samaha 
contended that because courts are usually “happy” to protect the dissemination of truthful 
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information about the government by the press, the press provides an important tool for 
government officials to disseminate information to the public.155  Samaha asserted that 
the press was an institution of democracy that advanced self-government and worked as a 
check on governmental power.  Although Samaha did not delve into the case law at any 
depth, he did note that laws concerning investigative reporting and source confidentiality 
or protection for government employees who leak information to the press are important 
components of any system of public access to information in a democracy.156   
Law professor Mark Fenster presented an analysis of open government laws that 
included a discussion of liberal democratic theory but reached very different conclusions 
than Weaver and Palitto, Kittrosser or Samaha.157  Fenster was highly critical of current 
laws, the press and the judiciary’s role in transparency.  Noting that “contemporary 
transparency advocates typically draw connections between their efforts and liberal 
democratic theory,”158 he examined “transparency theory” and its relation to self-
government.  He concluded that conceptions of transparency fail to take into account “the 
complexities of bureaucracy, communication, and the public.”159  According to Fenster, 
because transparency proponents and open government laws are overly broad, they are 
forced to concede a substantial set of exceptions to disclosure when confronted with 
information regarding national security.160 
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As opposed to scholars such as Pallitto and Weaver and Kitrosser who focused on 
the need for political accountability and judicial checks on the executive, Fenster 
suggested an alternative focus on laws that required context-specific determinations of 
when information must be disclosed that focused on a cost-and-benefit analysis of open 
government.161  He argued, “To calibrate an optimal practice of open government, 
transparency theory must abandon equating the best government with the one that is the 
most open—or, more precisely, with the one that appears most open on the face of its 
formal commitment to transparency requirements.”162   
Fenster contended that government information should be made available only 
when “normative and consequential” governmental gains outweigh the “costs” of 
disclosure.  To Fenster, the costs of transparency included “harm to national security, 
military actions, and law enforcement,” the inhibition of “deliberative decision making,” 
“the administrative costs incurred through opening meetings and disclosing documents,” 
and the “reputation costs (and perhaps legal liability)” incurred by public officials from 
“the disclosure of failed or unpopular policies and decisions.”163  In addition, unlike 
Pallitto and Weaver and Kitrosser who all called for greater judicial oversight, Fenster 
concluded that because the judiciary had proven ineffective in resolving access issues, 
conflicts between secrecy and transparency would best be settle through political 
means.164  Fenster argued that conflicts between transparency and secrecy would be best 
served by “more effective open government laws [that] would create and vest authority in 
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non-judicial institutions that can develop expertise in overseeing informational disputes 
between members of the public and government agencies.”165   
Finally, Fenster was highly critical of the press’s role in transparency.  Fenster 
noted that media institutions are “gatekeepers of information that select and present news 
within organizational, professional, economic, and ideological constraints.”166  He further 
contended that because a media company’s objectives are to seek financial gain, compete 
with each other, and further political objectives, this often keep news organizations from 
informing the public.167 
These objectives, and the discipline that attempting to meet them imposes, 
may in some instances lead news organizations to serve as a conduit of 
information that would help create an informed deliberative public.  But 
more often, they will incline the media towards creating and finding 
political scandal rather than focusing on and explaining political issues 
and development[s], and towards producing depoliticized, risk-averse, and 
entertainment-focused content.  Contemporary politicians and officials 
recognize these tendencies and exploit them by strategically disclosing 
“information” through coordinated public relations campaigns that 
produce pre-packaged, tightly controlled “news.”168 
 
Thus, Fenster concluded, “Merely requiring disclosure of more information might have 
little effect in the face of efforts to manipulate such information through false or 
misleading statements.”169   
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In sum, there is a great deal of literature that has examined government secrecy in 
the area of national security.  However, as noted much of this scholarship is normative 
rather than empirical.  While numerous authors have suggested the judiciary should treat 
government secrecy differently than it currently does, little research actually examines 
judicial decision making in the area of national security.  The purpose of this dissertation 
is to move beyond normative discussions of secrecy and toward empirical observations of 
judicial decision making in the area of government secrecy and national security 
information.  Rather than argue for or against judicial intervention or analyze statutes or 
scrutinize them under First Amendment standards, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine how the judiciary decides cases involving the need to balance transparency and 
free expression against government secrecy and national security.  Therefore, the last 
portion of this literature review addresses political science and legal literature related to 
the judicial decision making process. 
 
Judicial decision making 
Faced with the difficult task of balancing transparency with national security, 
judges are called upon to make decisions and to interpret and create law that affects the 
flow of information in our democracy.  How judges reach those decisions and what 
factors influence them are thus important to determining how the balance is struck 
between openness and secrecy.  Most of the scholarship on judicial decision making is 
based on one of two presumptions: that the law decides cases—the legal model—or that 
the policy preferences of individual judges best predict and explain courts’ decisions—
 39 
 
the attitudinal model. 170 This section of the literature review briefly outlines the legal 
model, the attitudinal model and scholarship that attempts to take into account both the 
jurisprudential and political elements of the judicial decision making process. 
According to legal scholars Lee Epstein and Joseph F. Kobylka, legalism assumes 
that jurists derive rules from precedents, statutes and the Constitution and then apply 
them to specific cases to reach decisions.171  Mechanical jurisprudence, also called legal 
formalism, holds that there is one “correct” answer to a legal question, which can be 
“discovered” by a judge.172  This approach views judges as “reasoning from determinate 
premises to determinate results.”173  Mechanical jurisprudence was a popular theory in 
the legal literature and law schools prior to and right after the beginning of the twentieth  
century.  However, according to constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, while 
Supreme Court opinions are still written in the style of mechanical jurisprudence, few, if 
any, scholars still hold this view of legal decision making.174  According to Chemerinsky, 
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mechanical jurisprudence was “put to rest” by the legal realists of the early twentieth 
century.175 
One aspect of interpreting the law under the legal model is plain meaning or 
textualism.  Plain meaning or textualism dictates that the meaning of the Constitution and 
statutes should be construed from the “plain meaning of the words.”  A texualist 
approach to decision making holds that justices should create no new rights that are not 
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.  The key problem with relying on plain 
meaning is that, as Segal and Spaeth pointed out, English as a language lacks specificity 
and many words in the Constitution and Bill of Rights are not explained in great detail.176  
For example, what does the word “liberty” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
mean?  What is “cruel and unusual” punishment?  Chemerinsky noted that interpreting 
textual provisions “inevitably requires value choices as to their meaning.”177  In addition, 
Chemerinsky noted that the Supreme Court often decides cases in which there are no 
textual provisions to interpret.178  For example, Chemerinsky wrote that the Court has 
been asked to decide if executive privilege exists and, if so, its scope without any 
reference to such a privilege in the Constitution.179  Plain meaning interpretations also 
encounter problems because statutes, like the Constitution, do not always do a perfect job 
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explaining what is covered by a term.180  These problems have led some scholars to 
conclude that it is difficult to use plain meaning or textualism to reliably predict Supreme 
Court decisions.  In addition, because the meaning of a word is subject to multiple 
interpretations, it is possible that plain meaning or textualism is simply a tool used to 
advance policy preferences.181   
Closely tied to textualism is another variation of the legalism known as 
“originalism” or original intent.  Under originalism judges should construe statutes and 
the Constitution “according to the preference of those who originally drafted and 
supported them.”182  According to Chemerinsky, originalism has the appeal of making it 
seem that judicial decisions are not based on judges’ personal preferences but rather are 
solely the product of following the framers’ wishes.183  Current Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia has offered a variant of this idea, which he has described as “original 
meaning.”  According to Scalia, jurists should focus on the practices at the time of the 
framing or attempt to discern what a rational person at the time of the framing of the 
Constitution would have taken the words of the Constitution to mean.184  As with 
textualism, originalism holds that judges should add no new rights to the Constitution that 
were not expressly intended by the framers.   
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A number of scholars have made compelling cases against originalism, pointing 
out problems with using originalism or legislative intent to predict and explain judicial 
decisions. 185  First, the judiciary is often presented with novel situations that the framers 
of the Constitution—or other lawmakers—would not have had to consider.186  For 
example, it would be difficult to determine exactly what the framers would have thought 
of wire tapping or bloggers because neither existed at the time of the framing of the 
Constitution.187   
Second, for many reasons it is difficult to determine exactly whose intent should 
be controlling.  Chemerinsky noted that originalism inherently involves judges making 
decisions “about who counts as a Framer, what they thought and at what level of 
abstraction to state their views.”188  There were multiple framers of the Constitution, and 
obviously, it is highly unlikely that all of them had the exact same intent in mind when 
they crafted provisions of the Constitution.  Segal and Spaeth wrote: 
[W]ho were the Framers?  All fifty-five of the delegates who showed up at 
one time or another in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787?  Some 
came and went.  Only thirty-nine signed the final document.  Some 
probably had not read it.  Assuredly, they were not all of a single mind.  
Apart from the delegates who refused to sign, should not the delegates to 
the various state conventions that were called to ratify the Constitution 
also be counted as Framers?189 
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Because there were multiple framers with various views of the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights, judges are able to strategically use originalism to advance their policy 
preferences and insulate their decisions from criticism.190  For example, Pamela Corley, 
Robert Howard and David Nixon found that justices often cited the Federalist Papers to 
come to divergent conclusions.191  According to Corley, Howard and Nixon’s content 
analysis of Supreme Court decisions, justices used strategic citations to the Federalist 
Papers to advance policy preferences, insulate the Court from criticism and controversy, 
and sway their colleagues on the bench.192  The research of John Gates and Glenn Phelps 
demonstrated that justices used the arguments of the same framer, James Madison, to 
come to divergent conclusions in the same case.193  Gates and Phelps showed that in the 
same case, Marsh v. Chambers,194 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Associate Justice 
William Brennan both cited writings by Madison to justify their conclusions. 
Brennan went to some length to argue that the views of Madison the elder 
statesman were more historically valid than the views of Madison the 
congressmen. This difference was significant because Chief Justice 
Burger’s majority opinion, utilizing an intentionalist reading of the First 
Amendment, had noted with favor Madison’s legislative actions.195 
 
Gates and Phelps concluded that citing “Madison the framer” or “Madison the legislator” 
or “Madison the elder statesmen” all supported different results and the justices’ strategic 
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citation to historical support was driven largely by their “competing visions of a 
constitutional order.”196   
Finally, using original intent to discern the meaning of laws is difficult because of 
the lack of debate surrounding the actual meaning of the laws.  According to Anderson, 
Congress never debated the merits or meaning of the First Amendment197 and the final 
wording of the Amendment was decided upon by the First Senate, which did not keep a 
record of its meeting.198  Although Justice Scalia argued that his judicial philosophy of 
“original meaning” corrected many of the problems associated with originalism and 
constitutional interpretation, it is as difficult to know what a “rational person” would have 
thought about a particular legal concept as it is to know what any particular framer would 
have thought.199  Like the Constitution itself, statutes are enacted by groups rather than by 
a single legislator.  It is impossible to say what the overriding intent behind a statute was 
or even if all the motivations for passing a statute were the same.  This problem has been 
brought up in a First Amendment context by at least one justice, Scalia.  In stinging 
criticisms of the Lemon Test, an Establishment Clause test that calls for a law to be 
struck down if it does not have a secular purpose, Scalia pointed out that a great number  
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of motivations are behind decisions to pass statutes.200   
 A third aspect of the legal model of judicial decision making is rooted in the legal 
concept of stare decisis, which means “stand by the decision” and holds that basing 
decisions on precedent allows for the law to develop a quality of connectedness and 
appearance of stability.  Precedent can appear to be a powerful predictor of judicial 
decisions.  According to Segal and Spaeth, the frequency with which courts based  
decisions on precedent far surpasses any other aspect of the legal model.201  The Court 
often appears to be very reluctant to overturn precedent, and at times the justices go to 
great lengths to avoid doing so.202  According to Segal and Spaeth’s research, the 
Supreme Court overruled its own precedents only 128 times between 1953 and 2000, a 
period of time during which the Court ruled four times as many statutes 
unconstitutional.203  Chemerinsky contended: “The rhetorical force of precedent is seen in 
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how the Court writes its opinions when it does overrule earlier decisions.  The Court 
describes the earlier rulings as aberrations and its current interpretation as the long-
standing approach, even when that is not at all the case.”204  In addition, when the Court 
does overturn precedent, Segal and Spaeth’s research has shown it is often done mirabile 
dictu, or on the basis of a different precedent.205  Chemerinsky also noted that opinions 
are written to appear consistent with precedent even when they are not.206  For example, 
in the First Amendment case Brandenburg v. Ohio207 the Court clearly tried to present the 
incitement test used in the case as being well established law when, in fact, Brandenburg 
created a new standard.208 
There are a number of other weaknesses inherent in trying to predict judicial 
decisions based solely on precedent.  Spaeth and Segal’s research on precedent and stare 
decisis concluded that dissenting justices, even ones who elsewhere wrote of respecting 
precedent, rarely switched sides in later cases to support earlier majority opinions.209  
Rather, the justices continued to support their losing positions.  In addition, in almost all  
cases there is some precedent to support either side of a case. 210  Segal and Spaeth wrote: 
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Because the facts in two appellate cases invariably differ, and the degree 
of factual similarity and dissimilarity between any two cases involves 
intensely personal and subjective judgment, judges may pick and choose 
among precedents to find those that accord with their policy preferences, 
while simultaneously asserting that these are also the ones that best accord 
with the facts of the case at hand.211 
 
Furthermore, judges are able to distinguish precedent without having to actually overrule 
a precedent.  All a judge must do is assert that the facts of the present case differ from the 
facts of the precedent.  Judges often spend the first part of a decision discussing why the 
present case is similar to or different from preceding cases or alternative lines of 
precedent.  Chemerinsky wrote, “A significant portion of almost every Supreme Court 
opinion is about how the decisions fit within, and flow from, the earlier case.”212    
    In sum, while “legalism” is the primary way courts frame and explain their 
opinions and is often the focus of political science and legal scholarship, the legal model 
of judicial decision making has numerous weaknesses as a predictive and explanatory 
tool.  Noting these weaknesses, positivist legal scholars have put forth a competing model 
of judicial behavior that assumes the personal policy preferences of jurists can explain 
most, if not all, of their decisions. 
The attitudinal model was described by Segal and Spaeth as a combination of 
legal realism, political science, psychology and economics.213  Legal realism, first 
advanced in the early twentieth century, held that law is vague, internally inconsistent, 
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and revisable.214  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was one of the first jurists to suggest 
that law was not a formal process of neutral application or logical deduction but a process 
of choosing among competing values.215  Karl Llewellyn wrote that legal realism 
recognizes that “the law is in flux” and “moving,” and that judges create law.216  Segal 
and Spaeth, building upon legal realism and the work of Glendon Schubert,217 have 
consistently argued that policy preferences are the only factor that needs to be considered 
when attempting to predict and explain Supreme Court decision making.  In 2002 they 
argued, “Simply put, Rehniquist votes the way he does because he is extremely 
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal.”218 
Influenced by legal realists and applying “notions of rationality” developed in 
economics to judicial decision, scholars such as Spaeth and David Rhode put forward a 
number of reasons why Supreme Court justices are in an excellent position to make 
decisions based solely on policy preferences. 219  Segal and Spaeth wrote, “The Supreme 
Court’s rules and structures, along with those of the American political system in general, 
give life-tenured justices enormous latitude to reach decisions based on their personal 
policy preferences.”220  First, Supreme Court justices are politically isolated.  They are 
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granted lifetime appointments, and while they can be impeached, one has never been 
removed from office.221  Second, justices cannot be overruled and have little fear of their 
policy preferences being overturned by the actions of one of the other branches of 
government.  According to Segal and Spaeth, the fractured nature of Congress makes 
statutory changes unlikely once the Court has ruled, and the supermajority requirement 
for adoption of constitutional amendments makes passing one extremely difficult, as 
evidenced by the relatively few that have passed in the last 200-plus years.222  Third, 
because the Supreme Court can choose its own docket, it has a great deal of power to 
control which cases it will hear.  According to Segal and Spaeth, this gives justices the 
ability to advance their policy making in cases of their choosing.223  In addition, Segal 
and Spaeth noted that the Supreme Court does not typically decide routine cases that have 
obvious answers.  This lets the justices decide cases on personal or extra-legal factors.  
Finally, Segal and Spaeth argued that the justices typically do not have any goals of 
higher office.224  The power, prestige, intellectual stimulation, and relatively easy 
workload of a modern justice make the job a highly desirable one, and few would want 
any other job in or out of government. Although the absence of some of these factors may 
inhibit the policy making ability of lower court judges, the attitudinal model does not 
suggest that lower court judges do not attempt to advance their policy preferences, only 
that they may be more constrained in doing so than Supreme Court justices.   
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Although a great deal of empirical research supports the ability of the attitudinal 
model to predict and explain judicial decisions,225 the model has numerous weaknesses.  
First, scholars have suggested that the attitudinal model critiques a legal model that is no 
longer widely held by anyone: the mechanical jurisprudential model.226  As noted, 
although Court decisions are still written in this style, few hold that it is still the model 
that represents legal thinking.  Second, critics have contended that Segal and Spaeth’s 
work not only attacks a model of legalism that is no longer widely accepted but also that  
their experimental designs purposefully set up legal model “straw men” that are easy to 
knock down and do not accurately represent the influence of the law on the Court.227  For 
example, while political scientist Gregory Caldeira generally supported the work of Segal 
and Spaeth, he also argued that the two adopted an extreme version of competing 
explanations for judicial behavior and did not “set up any realistic competitor to their 
model of decision making.”228   
 Several scholars have argued that in reducing complex observations down to 
easily measurable variables, the attitudinal model does not accurately capture the 
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complex influence of legal factors on judicial decision making.  Prior to his work with 
Spaeth, Segal’s research on search and seizure cases identified several legal and fact 
pattern variables that influenced the Court’s decisions.229  Similar work has been 
conducted on First Amendment topics.  Political scientist Kevin T. McGuire conducted 
the same type of research using obscenity cases and measuring individual justices’ 
decisions.230  McGuire concluded that “case-specific variables,” such as the level of 
governmental participation, the methods of obscenity control, claims made by the parties, 
and the presence of amici curiae could be used to determine the outcome of cases and the 
opinions of individual justices.231  He wrote: “The analysis demonstrates that decision 
making in obscenity litigation is quite complex.  We find variables from across a broad 
range of predictors contributing to the explanatory capacity of the model.”232  Other 
research has also shown the influence of amici briefs on the Court,233 the importance of 
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the solicitor general’s role as an amicus curiae or as a litigant,234 and the influence of oral 
arguments on decision making.235   
 Still other research has shown that the attitudinal model does not allow for 
complex goals or strategic voting.  It ignores the role of strategic voting to obtain a 
majority, coalition building, leadership by the chief justice, or other factors related to 
advancing individual justices’ interests.236  In addition, critics have argued that the 
attitudinal model fails to take into account both internal and external judicial restraints 
and other institutional considerations.  Scholars note that the Court as an institution has it 
own rules and procedures that impact decisions, and the Court is only one part of the 
government and must consider the behavior, wants, and desires of the other branches of 
government.237  Finally, research has documented the influence of public opinion on 
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Court decisions.238  All of this research suggests that while individual policy preferences 
are important, even at the Supreme Court level other factors influence decisions as well. 
Thus, while both legalism and the attitudinal models have strengths, both fall 
short of providing a comprehensive model that totally explains and predicts judicial 
decision making.  Other models, which combine many considerations, advance more 
complex and compelling explanations of judicial behavior.  As noted, research suggests 
that other factors, both internal and external, may work to shape or constrain courts’ 
decision making.  This scholarship presents the idea that judges are both political and 
jurisprudential.     
As early as 1964, Martin Shapiro was suggesting that judges make their decisions 
against a unique backdrop.239  Shapiro developed the concept of “political jurisprudence,” 
the idea that courts are part of the political structure but that the courts differ from other 
policy making institutions because their unique relationship with the law affects decision 
making.  Unlike the other branches of government, judges must offer reasons for their 
decisions, and these decisions must “fit” the law as judges see it.  Political scientists Jack 
Knight and Lee Epstein240 and legal scholar Howard Gillman241 have argued that even at 
the Supreme Court level, freedom from review does not prevent the justices from erecting 
constraints that shape their decision making.  Gillman was highly critical of much of the 
political science literature, writing that behavioralist research has been so internalized by 
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many political scientists that it is considered “common sense” in the discipline that 
Supreme Court justices are promoters of policy preference and not interpreters of law.242   
Scholars such as Gillman contend that because law plays a unique role in the 
judicial system, judicial decisions cannot be understood without addressing this role.243  
Justices must be viewed as lawyers, who were trained to approach problems in a specific 
way and to find solutions to those problems by thinking about the law.  While judges may 
use aspects of legalism—such as precedent, original intent, and texualism—to ex post 
facto justify their policy preferences, these factors may also be a unique influence on the 
mindset of justices and work as a constraint on policy making.  Epstein and Kobylka 
wrote: 
Interpretation, the giving of meaning to disembodied rules, is clearly 
colored by the perspective of the interpreter; rules are not self-defining.  
However, judges are attorneys and attorneys are schooled in the law, 
therefore—while individual jurists may interpret its commands 
differently—to the extent that they take it seriously, law shapes their 
decisions.244 
 
According to Gillman, researchers who approach judicial decision making with a focus 
on the law “do not reject behavioralist descriptions of decision-making patterns, but they 
insist that behavioralists should not infer that these patterns mean an absence of legal 
motivations unless they have additional independent evidence that judges are basing 
decisions on considerations not warranted by law.”245   
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Political scientists Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer and Epstein and 
Kobylka conducted research suggesting that while judicial attitudes are important, the 
law still influences judicial decision making.  According to Richards and Kritzer, the 
law’s role in judicial decision making at the Supreme Court level is best understood as 
structures created by the justices.  They wrote, “[C]ourts, including the Supreme Court, 
are different [than legislative bodies], and part of this difference is the role of law in 
decision making.”246  Richards and Kritzer argued that even at the Supreme Court, where 
justices have a great deal of freedom to enact their policy preferences without restraint, 
law still mattered. 
[L]aw is created to serve a purpose, and people go along with the 
institution if they see its purpose as worthwhile or if they are otherwise 
constrained by the institution.  If the adherents of a pure attitudinal model 
wish to reduce law to nothing more than attitudes formally stated, the 
attitudinal model becomes tautological; attitudes drive decisions because 
every decision is made on the basis of attitudes.  Our position is that 
attitudes influence the development of law, but law can also affect the 
decisions of the Court, and these effects are not purely attitudinal.247 
 
Like legal realists, Richards and Kritzer viewed the law as a human construct and 
used the term “jurisprudential regime” to refer to “a key precedent, or a set of related 
precedents, that structure the way in which the Supreme Court justices evaluate key 
elements of cases in arriving at decisions in a particular legal area.”248  For example, 
Richards and Kritzer cited the First Amendment content neutrality doctrine as an example 
of a jurisprudential regime that demonstrates “the influence of law.”  Such regimes 
govern that area of law until the Court changes regimes.  According to Richards and 
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Kritzer, justices engage in a generalized process of reasoning about their decisions and 
base decisions on their policy preferences, the preferences of the other justices and 
political actors.  Judges then must justify their decisions with arguments that makes sense 
within the current state of the law and can be justified to others.  
In a comprehensive study of abortion and death penalty cases, Epstein and 
Kobylka examined the influence of the law on justices by exploring changes in 
constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court.249  To their surprise, Epstein and 
Kobylka found that the way legal arguments were framed by litigants had an effect on 
Supreme Court decision making.250  While Epstein and Kobylka noted that Supreme 
Court decisions are most definitely a product of the makeup of the Court and influenced 
by the political climate, they concluded that “it is the law and legal arguments as framed 
by legal actors that most clearly influence the content and direction of legal change.”251   
Chemerinsky suggested that judicial opinions are best understood as rhetoric, or 
“reasoned arguments intended to persuade.”252  He argued that Supreme Court decisions 
are meant to convey important message to fellow justices, the other branches of 
government, lower courts and the public, and these messages are conveyed in the rhetoric 
of law.253  Opinions, Chemerinsky wrote, are the central aspect of American 
constitutional law and focusing on opinions as rhetoric helps to understand and appraise 
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the Supreme Court’s work.254  Opinions are written to make results appear to be 
determinate and value-free, rather than indeterminate and value-based; consistent with 
precedent, even when they are not; and to make decisions seem restrained, rather than 
activist.  On the other hand, dissents criticize decisions as activist and not restrained.255  
Although Chemerinsky wrote about the Supreme Court and focused solely on 
constitutional law, he also argued that many of the same characteristics that applied to the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations also applied to lower courts and statutory 
interpretation.256     
In First Amendment cases, judges often rely on rhetorical devices to justify 
decision making.  The legal framework courts use to balance First Amendment interests 
with national security concerns can affect the outcome of judicial decision making.  For 
example, in First Amendment cases, judges often rely on First Amendment theory to 
reach decisions and justify arguments.  For example, in a 1996 study, legal scholar W. 
Wat Hopkins found that when the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor was used as part of 
the rationale in a majority or plurality opinion as opposed to dicta or hyperbole, the U.S. 
Supreme Court consistently ruled in favor of the free speech interest.257  Individual 
justices referred to the marketplace concept in seventy majority or plurality opinions and 
ruled in favor of free speech interests in all thirty-one cases in which the metaphor was 
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part of the rationale for the Court’s ruling.258  This was true despite the fact that the 
justices consistently referred to the metaphor without a citation or cited a reference to a 
previous case that, in turn, provided no citation for the metaphor.259   
Anderson has written of the importance of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical shifting 
between protecting “free speech,” “free expression,” and “free press.”260  Although a 
majority of the Supreme Court has never interpreted the Press Clause to have a meaning 
independent of the Speech Clause, the existence of the Press Clause influences 
interpretations.261  For example, Anderson argued that in cases such as Near v. 
Minnesota,262 Lovell v. City of Griffin,263 and Branzburg v. Hayes,264 sections of opinions 
that reference “the press” do so to signal strong protection for the press as an institution, 
which is not the case when the Court refers to freedom of expression.265  Anderson has 
also contended that the “insidious” substitution of the term “the media” for “the press” in 
legal discourse was an indication of diminished protection. Anderson argued that the 
substitution of the media for the press “may have begun merely as an acknowledgement 
that the press had outgrown its print origins, but it has had the effect of stripping away the 
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historical and rhetorical reverences that attached to ‘the press’ and replacing it with the 
more neutral, or perhaps even negative, connotations of ‘the media.’” 266 
 The above research makes apparent that understanding how courts come to 
decisions is a complicated affair.  While legal formulism has been rejected by most of the 
scholarly community, there is a great deal of disagreement over the influence of the law 
on judicial decision making.  The assertions of positivist legal scholars that law has 
nothing to do with decisions at the Supreme Court level—and only slightly more to do 
with decisions at lower levels—have been challenged on a number of fronts.  The 
research of political scientists and law professors who attempt to examine the way law 
structures, inhibits and influences the decisions of judges presents compelling 
descriptions and explanations of the judicial decision making process.  Research indicates 
that the way issues are framed by the courts and litigants, aspects of legalism, and case-
specific variables influence the decisions of individual judges and affect the outcomes of 
cases.  In addition, research suggests that individual cases create patterns and regimes 
that influence the way similar cases are treated.  The purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine the influence of some of these factors on cases involving conflicts between 
transparency and/or free expression and government secrecy based on national security.  
Based on the research outlined above, a number of broad research questions were 
developed for the project. 
 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and analyze the theoretical, legal and 
public policy variables that influence judicial decisions involving conflicts between 
                                                 
266 Id. at 506. 
 60 
 
transparency and national security.  In addition, the dissertation compares decisions in 
these cases to decisions in cases involving access to the judicial process in order to 
determine if courts are using a different approach to balancing national security and 
transparency than they are to balancing concerns related to the effective operation of the 
judicial system and transparency.  It will examine how courts frame and define the 
conflicts and the arguments and citations courts use to justify their conclusions in both 
types of cases.  While this will not definitively answer whether national security 
information is—or should be—a unique area of the law, it will shed light on the approach 
the courts are taking.  The dissertation also seeks to determine which factors appear to be 
most influential under various conditions.  In order to achieve this purpose, the following 
research questions are addressed:   
RQ1: In cases involving a conflict between transparency and/or free expression 
and government secrecy based on national security concerns, how do courts frame 
the conflict between transparency and secrecy? 
RQ2: In cases involving a conflict between transparency and/or free expression 
and government secrecy based on national security concerns, what factors do 
courts consider? 
RQ3: How do the frameworks and factors used by courts differ from those used 
by courts in cases involving a conflict between transparency and effective 
operation of the judicial system? 
RQ4: Do any patterns or trends emerge from the analysis of how courts frame 
conflicts between transparency and/or free expression and government secrecy?  
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Are any patterns or trends evident in the way courts use legal, theoretical and 
public policy variables to justify their decisions? 
 
Method and Limitations 
 The ability of the government to control information related to national security 
has been examined by the judiciary in several types of cases.  Broadly categorized, these 
include cases that have addressed the ability of the federal government to keep national 
security information secret and cases that have addressed the government’s ability to 
punish the unauthorized disclosure of such information.  A total of twenty-one cases 
involving national security and transparency spanning the years 1959 to 2007 were 
identified and analyzed.  These cases were compared with seventeen U.S. Supreme Court 
cases involving transparency and the judicial process.   
Chapter two of the dissertation analyzes cases in which the government sought to 
impose prior restraints on the press or government employees to prevent dissemination of 
national security information.  First, it examines two cases involving the press, followed 
by six cases involving government employees.  Next, it examines three recent cases in 
which the constitutionality of certain provisions of the USA Patriot Act have been 
considered.  Finally, these cases are compared to five Supreme Court cases that have 
dealt with prior restraints imposed by the judiciary.  Chapter three examines the only 
three federal cases identified that have dealt with attempts to impose post-publication 
punishments on the press or government employees for the dissemination of national 
security information.  The conclusion of the chapter compares these cases to the six 
Supreme Court cases that have dealt with post-publication punishments of information 
releated to judicial proceedings.  Chapter four discusses cases that have dealt with a 
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variety of access issues.  First, it examines six federal cases that have dealt with access to 
national security information.  Next, it discusses four cases that have dealt with access to 
locations dealing with national security.  Finally, in the conclusion of the chapter, these 
cases are compared to six Supreme Court cases that have dealt with access to judicial 
proceedings and documents.  Chapter five summarizes the findings of the research and 
identifies a number of patterns and trends in the case law analyzed in the four preceding 
chapters. 
Cases for analysis were identified using Westlaw Key Number and the KeySearch 
system.  Westlaw is an online database of legal documents maintained by the West 
Publishing Company.  KeySearch organizes all legal issues into thirty topics, which are 
broken down into subtopics.  The resulting list of cases was then manually searched to 
identify cases related to the research.  In addition, any additional citations in the cases 
identified through the Westlaw Key Number system were reviewed to determine if they 
were relevant to the study.   
National security/transparency cases for chapter two were identified by using Key 
Numbers 92k1525, “Prior Restraints,” and 393k41, “Duties of Officers and Agents and 
Performance Thereof.”  Cases for chapter three were identified by using Key Number 
92k2038 k. “Freedom of Speech, Expression, Press, Civilian Employees,” and a KeyCite 
search on United States v. Morrison,267 a case involving the conviction of government 
employee Samuel Morrison under sections 793(d) and (e) of the Espionage Act for giving 
national security information to the British magazine Jane’s Fighting Ships.  National 
security/transparency cases for chapter four were identified using Key Numbers 402k37, 
                                                 
267 844 F.2d 1057 (4th 1988). 
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“Powers of the Executive,” and 402k48.1, “Access to Secrets or Classified Information; 
Security Clearances.”  Judicial/transparency cases were identified using Key Number 
92K2087, “Freedom of Speech, Expression and Press, Judicial Proceedings in General, 
Access to Proceedings,” and Key Number 92K2089, “Freedom of Speech, Expression 
and Press, Judicial Proceedings in General, Court documents and records,” Key Number 
92K2093, “Freedom of Speech, Expression and Press, Judicial Proceedings in General, 
Publicity Regarding Proceedings,” and Key Number 92k2119, “Freedom of Speech, 
Expression and Press, Judicial Proceedings, Contempt.”   
Building on Chemerinsky’s suggestion that a great deal can be learned about law 
by viewing opinions as communications from courts,268 opinions were analyzed using the 
concept of “framing” to answer RQ1.  Framing, as defined in the communication 
literature, focuses on which issues are presented and how they are presented.269  
According to Robert Entman, to frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communication context in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem or issue definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation” for an issue.270  Within the legal context, Epstein and 
Kobylka described the process of framing as the arguments judges hear and make.271  
McGuire and Barbara Palmer noted there is a difference between the cases courts decide 
                                                 
268 Chemerinsky, supra note 173, at 209.   
 
269 See, e.g., TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING AND 
UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT (1980); Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward a Clarification of a Fractured 
Paradigm, 43 J. COMM. 51 (1993); Douglas M. McLeod & Benajmin H. Detenber, Framing Effects of 
Television News Coverage of Social Protest, 49 J. COMM. 3 (1999).  
 
270 Entman, supra note 269, at 52. 
  
271 EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 171, at 302. 
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and the issues they decide.  They wrote: “[C]ases simply provide the framework in which 
issues are addressed. . . .  [T]he cases themselves do little more than provide a kind of 
legal architecture for the principles of law that they represent.”272 Supreme Court justices, 
as well as lower court judges, have the ability to determine which specific issues to 
resolve in a case and thus frame the issues, that is, determine which issues or problems 
are the salient ones.273  As McGuire and Palmer noted, because of “the malleability 
inherent in questions of law,” there is often a difference between the issues courts are 
asked to decide and those they ultimately choose to decide.274  Therefore, opinions will 
be examined to determine how judges frame or identify the core legal question(s), 
principle(s) of law, or issue(s) of a case.  
Based on the existing literature on judicial decision making, the following 
definitions will be used to identify justifications based on the legal model.  Rationales 
and justifications will be noted for their frequency and their appearance in majority or 
dissenting opinions.   
 Textualism, according to Gates and Phelps, is “characterized by an appeal to the 
plain meaning of the words.”275  Therefore, references in opinions to the meaning 
of words, including the use of legal or regular dictionaries to interpret the 
                                                 
272 Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
691, 692 (1995). 
 
273 S. Sidney Ulmer, Issue Fluidity in the U.S. Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND 
RESTRAINT 691 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lambe eds., 1982). 
 
274 McGuire & Palmer, supra note 272, at 691.  According to McGuire and Palmer, courts can expand the 
issues in a case—termed issue discovery—as well as ignore issues raised by either side—known as issue 
suppression.  Id. at 692. 
 
275 Gates & Phelps, supra note 193, at 248. 
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meaning of words in the Constitution or statues, will be identified as the use of 
texualism.      
 Originalists hold the view that original intent, or original meaning, is authoritative 
in interpreting the Constitution.276  Gates and Phelps defined intentionalist 
arguments as those that relied on some understanding of some authoritative work 
of an original framer.277  Based on earlier work by law professor James G. 
Wilson,278 Corley, Howard and Nixon identified a number of “originalist” 
citations used by courts.  These include the Federalist Papers, Story’s 
Commentaries, Hamilton’s works, Madison’s papers, and Kent’s 
commentaries.279  In addition, Wilson argued that references to historical events 
and studies constitute originalist interpretations.280  Therefore, originalist 
justifications as they relate to constitutional interpretations will be identified by 
references and citations to the intent of the framers or other important historical 
documents such as the Federalist Papers.  Intentionalist justifications as they 
relate to statutory interpretation will be identified by references to legislative 
intent or the legislative record. 
 While almost every opinion has multiple citations to previous cases, a rationale 
will be categorized as being based on precedent when a court clearly justifies its 
                                                 
276 SCALIA, supra note 184. 
 
277 Gates & Phelps, supra note 193, at 248. 
 
278 James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court’s Use of the Federalist Papers, 1985 BYU 
L. REV. 65, 129-35 (1985). 
 
279 Corley, Howard & Nixon, supra note 190, at 330. 
 
280 Wilson, supra note 280, at 68. 
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holding by primarily citing to a precedent as controlling or discusses the role of 
precedent in the decision making process.  In addition, because judges can deviate 
from precedent by distinguishing a precedent or limiting a precedent in principle 
or avoid following precedent in the present case by declaring the reasoning as 
being contained only in dicta,281 these rationales will be discussed in this category 
as well. 
In addition, because judicial opinions often rely on rhetorical devices to reach or 
justify decision making two factors were developed based on the use of rhetorical 
arguments related to First Amendment theory and liberal democratic theory.  Arguments 
and justifications in opinions that discussed the role of the First Amendment in self-
government or as a check on government or invoke other values of freedom of expression 
in a democracy were categorized as “First Amendment theory.”  Arguments and 
justifications that discussed the structure of government, democracy, the relationships 
between the people and government, or the duty of the government to provide for 
national security in a democracy will be classified as democratic theory.  Finally, other 
factors used sporadically by the courts that did not fit into any of the factors outlined 
above were described as closely as possible in the language used by the courts. 
This dissertation has several limitations.  First, the primary purpose of the study is 
to identify justifications stated by courts when they balance transparency and secrecy.  
Therefore, no attempt will be made to compare case outcomes to the political ideologies 
or ideological preferences of the judges.  It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to test 
the attitudinal model.  Second, because cases were identified using the Westlaw Key 
                                                 
281 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 170, at 82-84 (arguing that even if a court confronts a situation with only a 
single line of precedent it “has devices that enable it to deviate from what has been decided in the past”). 
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Number system, cases identified were only those that Westlaw editors labeled as 
addressing the appropriate legal issues.  In addition, because of the search technique, 
cases analyzed will be limited to only those that were reported in the Westlaw database.   
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
National Security Information and Prior Restraints 
 
Not long after the events of September 11, 2001, the United States government 
enacted sweeping legislation known as the USA PATRIOT Act.1  In addition to many 
other things, the Patriot Act amended § 2709 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.  Originally a 
part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, § 2709 permitted the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to subpoena records from electronic communication 
service providers upon self-certification that its request complied with statutory 
requirements.  Both prior to and after the Patriot Act amended the section, FBI demands 
for information under § 2709 were issued in the form of National Security Letters 
(NSLs).  As amended by the Patriot Act, § 2709 authorized the FBI to issue NSLs “to 
compel communications firms, such as internet service providers (ISPs) or telephone 
companies, to produce certain customer records whenever the FBI certifies that those 
records are ‘relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.’”2   In addition, § 2709(c)3 categorically 
and permanently barred NSL recipients from ever disclosing the existence of an NSL 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. 107-56.  The acronym stands for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.” 
 
2 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (hereinafter Doe I) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
2709).  Previously, the Act required section 2709 inquiries to be relevant to investigations regarding “a 
foreign power.”  As amended this standard was replaced “with a broad standard of relevance to 
investigations of terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”  Id. at 479. Compare18 U.S.C. § 2709 
(2000) with18 U.S.C. § 2709 (Supp. 2003).   
 
3 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (Supp. 2003) (“No wire or electronic communication service provider, or officer, 
employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought 
or obtained access to information or records under this section.”) (emphasis added). 
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inquiry in every case to any person—including counsel—in perpetuity, with “no vehicle 
for the ban to ever be lifted from the recipient or other persons affected, under any 
circumstances, either by the FBI itself, or pursuant to judicial process.”4  As Judge Victor 
Marrero of the Southern District of New York noted, NSLs are “a unique form of 
administrative subpoena cloaked in secrecy and pertaining to national security issues.”5  
As Judge Marrero would later note, NSLs are also powerful tools for gathering 
information, especially when issued to ISPs.6 
At some point in time prior to April 2004, an ISP, which would become known in 
court records as “John Doe,” received a NSL.7  In a document printed on FBI letterhead, 
Doe was “directed” to provide certain information to the government.  In the NSL the 
FBI “certif[ied] that the information sought [was] relevant to an authorized investigation 
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”8   Doe was 
“‘further advised’ that § 2709(c) prohibited him, or his officers, agents, or employees, 
‘from disclosing to any person that the FBI ha[d] sought or obtained access to 
information or records under’” § 2709.9   Doe was told to deliver the records 
                                                 
4 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d  at 476.   
 
5 Id. at 475. 
 
6 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (hereinafter Doe III) (“Through the use of 
NSLs, the government can unmask the identity of internet users engaged in anonymous speech in online 
discussions. It can obtain an itemized list of all of the emails sent and received by the target of the NSL, 
and it can then seek information on individuals communicating with that person. It may even be able to 
discover the websites an individual has visited and queries submitted to search engines.”). 
 
7 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475.  The Southern District of New York granted a government motion to seal 
the record of the proceedings in order to prevent the disclosure of Doe’s identity or any other fact relating 
to Doe’s role in the controversy that arose surrounding the NSL that might have identified Doe or otherwise 
interfered with the underlying FBI activities.  Although court records do not indicate when Doe received 
the NSL, Doe’s lawsuit was filed in April 2004. 
 
8 Id. at 478-79. 
 
9 Id. at 479 (quoting NSL received by Doe) (emphasis added by the court).   
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“‘personally’ to a designated individual, and to not transmit the records by mail or even 
mention the NSL in any telephone conversation.”10  However, rather than comply with 
the NSL, Doe consulted lawyers with the American Civil Liberties Union and brought 
suit in federal district court contending § 2709’s “broad subpoena power violate[d] the 
First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and that the non-
disclosure provision violate[d] the First Amendment.”11  Even though thousands of NSLs 
had been sent in the wake of 9/11, Doe’s lawsuit was the first time anyone had ever 
challenged the constitutionality of § 2709 in a court of law.12 
 In deciding the case, District Judge Marrero presented the key legal issue or frame 
as a need to balance national security with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution.  He wrote: 
Like most of our constitutional law’s hardest cases, this dispute is 
about two fundamental principles: values and limits. It centers on the 
interplay of these concepts, testing the limits of values and the values of 
limits where their ends collide. 
National security is a paramount value, unquestionably one of the 
highest purposes for which any sovereign government is ordained. Equally 
scaled among human endeavors is personal security, an interest especially 
prized in our system of justice in the form of the guarantee bestowed upon 
the individual to be free from imposition by government of unwarranted 
restraints on protected fundamental rights.13 
                                                 
10 Id. (quoting NSL received by Doe) (emphasis in the original NSL). 
 
11 Id.  
 
12 Id. at 502.   In September 2004, the Southern District of New York estimated that the government issued 
hundreds of NSLs between October 2001 and January 2003.  However, in March 2007, the Department of 
Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that according to FBI records, there were 
approximately 39,000 requests for NSLs in 2003, approximately 56,000 in 2004, and approximately 47,000 
in 2005.  The OIG also noted that the total number of NSL requests were under-reported by the FBI 
database used to prepare the report.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A 
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 120 (2007), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf.  The reported also noted that after the 
Patriot Act amendments to section 2709 there was a dramatic increase in NSLs.  The FBI reported only 
approximately 8,500 NSL requests in 2000, the year prior to passage of the Patriot Act.  Id.     
 
13 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 476.   
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In order to strike that balance, Judge Marrero called upon a wide range of precedents, as 
well as textual analysis and democratic theory.  Among the cases Marrero cited and 
discussed were several that dealt with prior restraints and national security or prior 
restraints and the judiciary.  Marrero used these precedents to guide him as he attempted 
to correctly weigh national security concerns against freedom of expression values.   The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine how those cases and others have established the 
limits of government’s ability to impose prior restraints on the press, government 
employees, or, as in those cases dealing with § 2709, ISPs, librarians and telephone 
companies.    
This chapter of the dissertation examines cases in which courts have discussed 
how to balance the First Amendment’s bar on prior restraints with national security 
concerns and identifies how courts framed the legal issues and arguments and the legal 
factors courts used to reach decisions in those cases.  First it examines two famous cases, 
New York Times Co. v. United States14 and United States v. Progressive Magazine,15 
which dealt with prior restraints aimed at preventing the publication of national security 
information.  Next, it outlines a number of cases in which courts have considered the 
constitutionality of secrecy agreements signed by employees or contractors of the United 
States government.  Finally, it explores three recent decisions related to the U.S.A. Patriot 
Act.  In addition, it compares the frameworks and legal factors courts used in these cases 
to those used by the Supreme Court in cases that dealt with prior restraints and judicial 
proceedings.   
                                                 
14 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 
15 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
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The national security-prior restraint cases primarily identified the key legal issues 
as the need to balance freedom of expression and national security or the need to  balance 
power between different branches of government, either the courts and the Congress or 
the courts and the executive branch.. In addition, many of the opinions relied on similar 
factors and frequently cited the same precedents.  Some of the cases also provide 
excellent examples of the strategic use of democratic theory, with a number of the 
opinions relying on theory to underscore the importance of national security, even in 
democratic systems of government. 
The research also demonstrates the important role framing plays in judicial 
decision making.  This can be seen in two ways.  First, because many of the litigants and 
jurists were aware of the U.S. Supreme Court’s well-established approach to prior 
restraints, those seeking to uphold government restrictions most frequently identified the 
key legal issue as something other than the constitutionality of prior restraints.  Second, 
because in some cases litigants recognized a First Amendment frame might not be strong 
enough to overcome concerns related to national security, they chose to strategically 
frame their cases in terms of separation of powers.  This approach was used in the first 
case discussed in this chapter, the famous Pentagon Papers case.    
 
Prior restraints, national security and the press 
 The seminal case dealing with prior restraints and national security, New York 
Times v. United States,16 or Pentagon Papers, was the first time the Supreme Court 
considered a case involving prior restraints and national security.  In June 1967, acting 
without then President Lyndon B. Johnson’s knowledge, Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
                                                 
16 403 U.S. 713. 
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McNamara commissioned a “massive forty-seven-volume, 7,000-page top-secret 
Pentagon study about U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.”17  The report, officially 
titled “History of U.S. Decision Making Process on Vietnam Policy,” but now known as 
the “Pentagon Papers,” was written by military officers and civilians who worked in the 
Pentagon, at universities or for the Rand Corporation.18  Approximately 4,000 pages of 
the Pentagon Papers consisted of copies of classified documents from sources such as the 
White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and the CIA.  The remainder was a historical analysis of U.S. policy based on those 
documents.19   
In early 1970, Daniel Ellsberg, who contributed to the Pentagon Papers as an 
employee of the Rand Corporation, temporarily removed the Papers from the premises of 
the Rand Corporation and made copies.20 Ellsberg subsequently leaked portions of the 
document to New York Times reporter Neil Sheehan in March 1971. On Saturday, June 
13, of that year, the Times published its first installment in a series of articles about the 
Papers.  On Monday, June 15, the federal government sought to enjoin the Times from 
further publication in federal district court.  When Judge Murray Gurfein issued a 
temporary restraining order against the Times and scheduled further arguments for 
                                                 
17 John Anthony Maltese, National Security v. Freedom of the Press: New York Times v. United States, in 
CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CLASHES OVER POWER AND LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 233, 
234 (Gregg Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2004).  The facts of the case are so widely known, a complete 
review is unnecessary here.  For a comprehensive review of the case see generally INSIDE THE PENTAGON 
PAPERS (John Prados & Maragret Pratt Porter eds., 2005).  
 
18 Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg 
Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312 (1974). 
 
19 Maltese, supra note 17, at 234. 
 
20 Nimmer, supra note 18, at 312. 
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Friday, June 18,21 Ellsberg contacted the Washington Post and subsequently provided 
that newspaper with a copy of the Pentagon Papers.  The Post published its first 
installment on the Pentagon Papers Friday morning.  In response, the government sought 
an injunction against the Post, which Judge Gerhard Gesell denied after a hearing.22  On 
June 19, in New York, Gurfein also denied the government’s request for an injunction 
against the Times.23  The government appealed to both the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Both courts 
rendered judgment on June 23. While the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, remanded the 
case to Judge Gurfein by a 5-3 vote, instructing the judge to hold further in camera 
proceedings,24 the D.C. Circuit, also sitting en banc, refused to grant the government’s 
injunction.  On June 24, around 11 a.m., the Times filed a petition for certiorari, a motion 
for accelerated consideration and an application for interim relief with the United States 
Supreme Court while the government filed its application for interim relief in the Post 
case around 7:15 p.m. the same day.25  The next day the Supreme Court consolidated the 
two cases, granted certiorari and scheduled oral arguments for 11 a.m., Saturday, June 26, 
                                                 
21 U.S. v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325 (D.C.N.Y. 1971). 
 
22 U.S. v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“The district court denied the 
preliminary injunction after a hearing. . . .  The district court found that the government failed to sustain its 
burden. Specifically, the district court directed the government to present any document from the ‘History’ 
the disclosure of which in the government’s judgment would irreparably harm the United States. . . .  The 
district court found either that disclosure of those specific documents would not be harmful or that any 
harm resulting from disclosure would be insufficient to override First Amendment interests.”). 
   
23 New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 331. 
 
24 U.S. v. New York Times Co., 444 F. 2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1971). 
 
25 New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 753 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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1971,26 only thirteen days after the initial New York Times article containing the Pentagon 
Papers was published.   
In a per curiam opinion followed by six concurring and three dissenting opinions, 
the Court refused to grant the government’s request for an injunction to prevent the 
Times, the Post or any other newspaper from publishing articles based on the Pentagon 
Papers.  Quoting and citing three previous prior restraint cases, the Court held that any 
government attempt to prevent publication came to the Court with a heavy presumption 
of unconstitutionality.27  Although the per curiam opinion was too short to delve deeply 
into legal frames other than the constitutional bar against prior restraints, in their 
concurring and dissenting opinions the individual justices outlined several different legal 
frames and relied on numerous factors to support their conclusions.   
It is important to note that the two most prominent legal issues discussed in the 
case, the First Amendment and separation of powers issues, were purposefully advanced 
                                                 
26 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 702 (1971). Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices 
Blackmun, Harlan, White and Stewart voted to grant expedited review.  Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan 
and Marshall voted to vacate the order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “except insofar as it 
affirm[ed] the judgment of the District [Court]” to discontinue the restraint imposed upon the Times and 
deny the petition for certiorari.  See also New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring) 
(“I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed 
and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when 
the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment’s continuance of the injunctions 
against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First 
Amendment.”).  
  
27 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 713 (per curiam) (“‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes 
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’ Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The 
Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.  
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in the New York Times case and the District Court for the District of Columbia and 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Washington Post case held that the 
Government had not met that burden. We agree.”) 
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by the New York Times.28  Political scientist John Anthony Maltese described the decision 
by the Times’ lawyer, Alexander Bickel, to advance the separation of powers frame in 
district court: 
Bickel assumed the [case] would get to the Supreme Court, and his 
decision to rely on the separation of powers argument was a strategic one.  
He did not worry about getting the votes of Black and Douglas—he was 
confident they would side with the Times, but he did worry about how to 
get the votes of centrist justices on the Supreme Court.  He believed that 
they would be more responsive to a narrow separation of powers argument 
than to a broad First Amendment argument.  Thus, he pointed out that 
neither the Constitution nor Congress had explicitly given the executive 
branch the authorization to sue for the injunctive relief it sought.29  
  
When the case went to the Supreme Court “[t]he Times continued to emphasize the 
separation of powers argument, while the Post rested its argument on the First 
Amendment.”30  While Bickel’s strategy ultimately proved successful, it is important to 
note that both concurring and dissenting justices focused on separation of powers issues 
to support their divergent opinions. 
Justice Hugo Black’s concurring opinion most prominently framed the case as 
dealing with the First Amendment and its absolute ban on abridging speech, although he 
did briefly invoke a separation of powers argument.  Although Black’s opinion first 
addressed the text of the First Amendment and is often cited for this reliance on 
textualism, Black also used framers’ intent to support his contention that the government 
                                                 
28 See Brief for Petitioner New York Times Co. at 2, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 
No. 1873 (1971) (“Questions presented . . . 3. Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and the 
principle of separation of powers, the Court of Appeals may adopt a standard which permits the Executive 
to obtain injunctive relief against publication by a newspaper of articles relating to public affairs, in the 
absence of any statute enacted by Congress.”) 
 
29 Maltese, supra note 17, at 241. 
 
30 Id. at 243.  Compare Brief for Petitioner New York Times Co., New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, No. 1873 (1971), with Brief of the Respondents Washington Post Company, New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, No. 1885 (1971). 
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was absolutely barred from prohibiting the newspapers’ publication of the Pentagon 
Papers, regardless of the documents’ source or contents.  Black wrote:  
Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, able men 
that they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed could 
never be misunderstood: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom . . . of the press . . . .” Both the history and 
language of the First Amendment support the view that the press 
must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without 
censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.31   
 
Additionally, Black used textualism, framers’ intent and First Amendment and 
democratic theory to attack the government’s argument that the President had the 
inherent authority to “‘protect the nation against publication of information whose 
disclosure would endanger the national security” based on “‘the constitutional power of 
the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-in-
Chief.’”32  Black wrote that the government was not relying on any act of Congress, but 
rather making a “bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that courts should take it 
upon themselves to ‘make’ a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, 
presidential power and national security.”33 After once again writing about the First 
Amendment’s “emphatic demands,” Black focused heavily on James Madison’s vision of 
the Amendment.  Black wrote, “No one can read the history of the adoption of the First 
Amendment without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was injunctions like those 
sought here that Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all 
                                                 
31 Id. at 716-17 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 
32 Id. at 718 (Black, J. concurring) (quoting Brief for the United States at 13-14, New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, Nos. 1873, 1885 (1971)). 
 
33 Id. 
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time.”34  Finally, Black evoked the First Amendment’s role in self-government and 
framers’ intent to support his final attack on the government’s position that national 
security justified prior restraints.35 
As Black had, Justice William O. Douglas framed the case in terms of the First 
Amendment questions presented by the parties.  However, Douglas also framed the case 
as dealing with separation of powers, specifically the powers of the executive branch 
under the Constitution.  To support his decision, Douglas relied on a wide range of 
factors including statutory textual analysis and legislative intent related to the Espionage 
Act, precedent, textual analysis of the Constitution, framers’ intent and democratic 
theory. 
Citing a number of his own and Black’s opinions to support his textual analysis, 
Douglas clearly stated that the wording of the First Amendment left “no room for 
governmental restraint on the press.”36  Next, after using textual analysis and legislative 
intent to determine that the Espionage Act did not apply to the case,37 Douglas turned to 
the government’s argument that the Constitution afforded it the inherent power to prevent 
                                                 
34 Id. at 719.  In addition, in a footnote Black quoted Madison in order to compare the Solicitor General’s 
arguments to the First Amendment author’s intention.  Id. at 718 n.5. 
 
35 Id. at 719 (“The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to 
abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.  The guarding of military and diplomatic 
secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic.  
The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to defend a new nation and the abuses of 
the English and Colonial Governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by providing 
that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be abridged.”). 
 
36 Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (Black, J., 
dissenting); id. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black, J., concurring); New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 
(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring)). 
 
37 Id. at 720-21 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Douglas’ statutory textual analysis focused on the ability of the 
government to punish the Times and the Post for publication after the fact under 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).    
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publication in the name of national security.  First, Douglas determined that although the 
text of the Constitution granted the executive branch “war powers,” because this power 
was tied to a state of war and Congress had not declared war, there was no need to 
discuss the extent of either the executive or legislative branch’s war powers.38  Next, 
Douglas quoted Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe39 for the proposition that 
“‘(a)ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‘heavy presumption’ 
against its constitutional validity’”40 and cited Near v. Minnesota41 to support his 
contention that the executive did not have the power to prevent publication of a 
newspaper.42  Douglas concluded by invoking both framers’ intent and democratic 
theory. 
The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the 
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing 
information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was 
adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel 
to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-
that-be. 
. . . 
Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating 
bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital 
to our national health. On public questions there should be “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open” debate.43 
                                                 
38 Id. at 721.  (Considering the President’s inherent power to block publication under his war powers, 
Douglas wrote, “The power to wage war is ‘the power to wage war successfully.’ But the war power stems 
from a declaration of war.  The Constitution by Art. I, s 8, gives Congress, not the President, power ‘(t)o 
declare War.’ Nowhere are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide therefore what leveling effect 
the war power of Congress might have.”) (quoting Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 
(1943)). 
 
39 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
 
40 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Organization for a Better 
Austin, 402 U.S. at 419). 
 
41 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 
42 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
43 Id. at 723-24 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)). 
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 Justice William Brennan’s short concurrence framed the case solely as a First 
Amendment issue and relied on precedent to emphasize his belief that “every restraint 
issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment—and not less so 
because that restraint was justified as necessary to afford the courts an opportunity to 
examine the claim more thoroughly.”44  Citing precedent, Brennan emphatically declared, 
“[T]he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press 
predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result”45 and 
“‘[t]he chief purpose of (the First Amendment’s) guaranty (is) to prevent previous 
restraints upon publication.’”46  Additionally, foreshadowing discussion in the dissenting 
opinions about restraints on speech during times of war, Brennan noted that the country 
was not technically at war and, even if it were, the government had made no showing that 
its actions were justified under the standard established in previous First Amendment 
cases.47  
  Justice Potter Stewart’s concurring opinion identified two frames or legal issues 
presented by the case.  While his opinion initially discussed the First Amendment and the 
balance between a free press and national security, ultimately, he too framed the case as 
                                                 
44 Id. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 
45 Id. at 725-26 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) and quoting Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 481 (1957) in a footnote). 
 
46 Id. at 726 (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 713). 
 
47 Id. at 726 (“Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the Nation ‘is at 
war,’ Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), during which times ‘(n)o one would question but 
that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing 
dates of transports or the number and location of troops.’ Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of 
presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would 
set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged 
that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of 
that nature.”). 
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dealing with separation of powers issues. First, Stewart discussed presidential power, 
national security and First Amendment theories related to both self-government and the 
checking function of the press.  He wrote, “In the governmental structure created by our 
Constitution, the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two related areas of 
national defense and international relations.”48  Stewart reasoned that because this power 
was “largely unchecked by the Legislative and Judicial branches” and had “been pressed 
to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age” it was especially important the 
press be allowed to act as a check on government power.49   
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in 
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive 
policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs 
may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public 
opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic 
government.  For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, 
aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First 
Amendment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be an 
enlightened people.50 
 
Next, however, Stewart cautioned that press freedom must be balanced with 
national security and discussed the power of the executive at length.  Stewart wrote that it 
was “elementary” that the “maintenance of an effective national defense require[s] both 
confidentiality and secrecy.”51  Quoting a lengthy passage from United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp52 about the power and responsibilities of the executive branch,53 as 
                                                 
48 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 
49 Id. 
  
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. 
 
52 299 U.S. 304 (1936).  
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well as constitutional structure, Stewart concluded “as a matter of sovereign prerogative . 
. . not of law” the power and responsibility to protect national security information rested 
solely with the executive branch.54  Yet despite this seeming endorsement of the 
executive branch’s national security powers, Stewart reasoned that the Court’s holding 
against the government was inevitable because Congress had enacted no law allowing for 
prior restraints.    
[I]n the cases before us we are asked neither to construe specific 
regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are asked, instead, to perform a 
function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary. . . .  
I am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the 
documents involved.  But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will 
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or 
its people.  That being so, there can under the First Amendment be but one 
judicial resolution of the issues before us.  I join the judgments of the 
Court.55 
  
Thus, although Stewart relied on constitutional interpretation while framing the case in 
terms of the executive’s power to advance national security and the role of the judiciary 
under the Constitution, he did not explicitly use textualism or originalism to support his 
conclusions.  Instead he primarily examined democratic and First Amendment theories.   
Justice Byron White’s concurring opinion also framed the case as dealing with the 
separation of power issues presented by the case and advanced by Bickel’s brief.  
                                                                                                                                                 
53 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Curtiss-Wright Exprot Corp., 
299 U.S. at 320). 
 
54 Id. at 728-30 (“If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of 
foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must 
have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to 
exercise that power successfully. . . .  [I]t is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive-as 
a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law-through the 
promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out 
its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense.”).  Stewart did note that 
Congress had the power to pass legislation that might punish the press for the publication of national 
security information after the fact and it would be the courts’ role to interpret that law. 
 
55 Id. at 730. 
 
 83 
 
Although his opinion began by echoing the per curiam opinion’s assessment that the 
government “ha[d] not satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an 
injunction against publication” under the First Amendment,56 the majority of White’s 
opinion focused on textual analysis of congressional legislation.  White’s main concern in 
the case was “the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional 
authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these.”57  White noted that 
without statutory authorization, the government’s case rested on an interpretation of the 
Constitution that gave the executive branch a tremendous amount of power, a proposition 
with which he could not agree. 
At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own 
investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent 
powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize 
remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the 
press. . . .  To sustain the Government in these cases would start the courts 
down a long and hazardous road that I am not willing to travel, at least 
without congressional guidance and direction.58 
 
After noting the difference between prior restraints and post-publication 
punishments,59 White spent the remainder of his opinion using legislative intent,60 
statutory textual analysis61 and precedent62 to determine if post-publication sanctions 
                                                 
56 Id. at 730-31 (White, J., concurring).  Despite his concurrence in the present case, White was clear that 
he did not think that all prior restraints were unconstitutional. See id. at 731 n.1. 
 
57 Id. at 731. 
 
58 Id. at 732. 
 
59 Id. at 733 (“Prior restraints require an unusually heavy justification under the First Amendment; but 
failure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a 
conviction for criminal publication.”). 
 
60 Id. at 733-34 (discussing the legislative history of the Espionage Act of 1917); id. at 740 n.9 (discussing 
the legislative intent behind 18 USC § 793(d)). 
 
61 Id. at 735-40 (discussing the text of 18 USC §§793,794, 797 and 798).  
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were appropriate under current statutory schemes.  Based on these factors, White 
concluded that the executive was not authorized to prevent the newspapers from 
publishing.  White wrote: 
It is thus clear that Congress has addressed itself to the problems of 
protecting the security of the country and the national defense from 
unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging information.  It has not, 
however, authorized the injunctive remedy against threatened publication. 
It has apparently been satisfied to rely on criminal sanctions and their 
deterrent effect on the responsible as well as the irresponsible press.63 
 
Because he focused so much on legislation, White’s opinion was less about whether the 
First Amendment prohibited prior restraints on the press and more about the question of 
whether Congress had granted the President the authority to seek an injunction. 
The final concurring opinion was written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, who also 
focused on the separation of powers frame.  From the outset of his opinion, Marshall 
wrote that the primary legal question was not whether the First Amendment barred prior 
restraints but whether the judiciary or the legislative branch had the power to make laws.  
Marshall wrote: “I believe the ultimate issue in this case is even more basic than the one 
posed by the Solicitor General. The issue is whether this Court or the Congress has the 
power to make law.”64   
Citing precedent, Marshall conceded that the President had broad authority under 
his responsibility to conduct foreign affairs and his role as commander-in-chief65 and that 
                                                                                                                                                 
62 Id. at 739 (discussing Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941)). 
 
63 Id. at 740. 
 
64 Id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 
65 Id. at 741-42 (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); 
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). 
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in some situations there might a basis for the government to invoke the equity jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court in order to “prevent the publication of material damaging to 
‘national security.’”66  However, Marshall concluded, “It would . . . be utterly 
inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers for this Court to use its power of 
contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit.”67  
Citing Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,68 Marshall wrote, “The Constitution 
provides that Congress shall make laws, the President execute laws, and courts interpret 
laws.”69  Using statutory textual analysis70 as well as legislative intent,71 Marshall 
determined that Congress had specifically declined to provide the executive branch with 
the power to stop publication by the newspapers.  For this reason, Marshall concluded the 
Court had no authority to grant the executive branch the injunction it was seeking.72  
Marshall wrote, “It is not for this Court to fling itself into every breach perceived by 
                                                 
66 Id. at 742. 
 
67 Id. 
 
68 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 
69 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579). 
 
70 Id. at 743-46 (discussing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 793). 
 
71 Id. at 745-46 (discussing legislative intent and the difference between prior restraints and post publication 
punishments) (“Even if it is determined that the Government could not in good faith bring criminal 
prosecutions against the New York Times and the Washington Post, it is clear that Congress has 
specifically rejected passing legislation that would have clearly given the President the power he seeks here 
and made the current activity of the newspapers unlawful. . . .  On at least two occasions Congress has 
refused to enact legislation that would have made the conduct engaged in here unlawful and given the 
President the power that he seeks in this case.”). 
 
72 Id. at 747 (“Either the Government has the power under statutory grant to use traditional criminal law to 
protect the country or, if there is no basis for arguing that Congress has made the activity a crime, it is plain 
that Congress has specifically refused to grant the authority the Government seeks from this Court. In either 
case this Court does not have authority to grant the requested relief.”). 
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some Government official nor is it for this Court to take on itself the burden of enacting 
law, especially a law that Congress has refused to pass.”73 
The three dissenting opinions reached different conclusions about the case than 
the majority, yet two of the three also framed the case in terms of the First Amendment 
and separation of powers.  In addition, however, the dissenting opinions focused more 
heavily on balancing the First Amendment rights of the newspapers against national 
security concerns and used a frame not discussed in any of the concurring opinions.  The 
dissenting opinions framed the case as dealing with proper judicial procedures, discussing 
the impropriety of deciding a case that had come to the Court with such great speed and 
the unknown contents of the Pentagon Papers.  Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harry 
Blackmun, both of whom would have remanded the cases,74 identified two key legal 
issues.  First, they both wrote of the need to balance national security concerns with First 
Amendment values.  Second, each discussed the haste with which the case came to the 
Court and the lack of facts about the content of the Pentagon Papers.   
Although Burger agreed with the majority that the constitutional limitation on 
prior restraints was so clear the Court rarely had to consider a case, he wrote that fact did 
not make the case simple.75  According to Burger, cases involving national security and 
free expression were always difficult because “the imperative of a free and unfettered 
press comes into collision with another imperative, the effective functioning of a complex 
modern government and specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional 
                                                 
73 Id. 
 
74 Id. at 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 761-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 
75 Id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (writing that from 1931 to 1971 there was “little occasion [for the 
Court] to be concerned with cases involving prior restraints against news reporting on matters of public 
interest”). 
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powers of the Executive.”76  While this alone made these kinds of cases difficult, Burger 
wrote that the present cases were even more difficult to decide because of their 
undeveloped nature and the Court’s lack of knowledge about the contents of the 
documents in question.  Burger wrote that contrary to the newspapers’ claims, the First 
Amendment was not absolute, and the contents of the Pentagon Papers should determine 
how much protection the Amendment provided to the newspapers. 
The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; 
they denominate this right as the public “right to know” . . . .  The right is 
asserted as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not 
an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out in his aphorism 
concerning the right to shout “fire” in a crowded theater if there was no 
fire. There are other exceptions, some of which Chief Justice Hughes 
mentioned by way of example in Near v. Minnesota. There are no doubt 
other exceptions no one has had occasion to describe or discuss. 
Conceivably such exceptions may be lurking in these cases and would 
have been flushed had they been properly considered in the trial courts, 
free from unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures.77 
 
 Quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes admonition that “[g]reat cases make bad 
laws”78 because of the sensationalism involved, Blackmun wrote that there would be no 
harm in letting the cases develop in the lower courts on a regular schedule.79  Blackmun 
then turned to the issue of balancing constitutional provisions.  “The First Amendment, 
after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution.  Article II of the great document vests 
                                                 
76 Id. 
 
77 Id. at 749. 
 
78 Id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 
400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 
79 Id. at 760-61 (“With such respect as may be due to the contrary view, this, in my opinion, is not the way 
to try a lawsuit of this magnitude and asserted importance. It is not the way for federal courts to adjudicate, 
and to be required to adjudicate, issues that allegedly concern the Nation's vital welfare. The country would 
be none the worse off were the cases tried quickly, to be sure, but in the customary and properly 
deliberative manner. The most recent of the material, it is said, dates no later than 1968, already about three 
years ago, and the Times itself took three months to formulate its plan of procedure and, thus, deprived its 
public for that period.”). 
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in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct of foreign affairs and places in 
that branch the responsibility for the Nation’s safety,” he wrote.80  
To support his argument that the First Amendment was not absolute, Blackmun 
relied on precedent.  First, he cited Near and Schenck v. United States81 for the general 
proposition that First Amendment absolutism had never commanded a majority of the 
Court.82  He then quoted Holmes’ opinion from Schenck: “When a nation is at war many 
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their 
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as 
protected by any constitutional right.’”83  Thus, while Blackmun admitted under different 
circumstances his vote might change, under the current rushed circumstance of the cases 
and his view that First Amendment rights needed to be balanced against national security 
concerns, he dissented.84 
The third dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan II, framed the case as dealing 
with separation of powers.  However, Harlan focused solely on the separation of 
presidential powers and judicial powers rather.  Although he discussed the timeline of 
events and the “difficult questions of fact, of law, and of judgment presented by the 
                                                 
80 Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 
81 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 
82 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 761(citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) and Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
 
83 Id. at 761 (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52). 
 
84 Id. at 762 (writing that it was possible that if the cases were “allowed to develop as they should be 
developed, and to be tried as lawyers should try them and as courts should hear them, free of pressure and 
panic and sensationalism, other light would be shed on the situation and contrary considerations, for me, 
might prevail”) 
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case,” to Harlan, the most important issue was the judiciary’s power to review executive 
decisions based on national security concerns.  He wrote: 
It is plain to me that the scope of the judicial function in passing upon the 
activities of the Executive Branch of the Government in the field of 
foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is, I think, dictated by 
the concept of separation of powers upon which our constitutional system 
rests.85 
 
To support this conclusion, Harlan relied upon both framers’ intent and precedent.  First, 
Harlan quoted a pre-Supreme Court appointment speech of John Marshall as well as 
statements of George Washington regarding his refusal to hand over documents 
pertaining to the Jay Treaty to Congress.86  Next Harlan relied on the rationale of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Reynolds,87 the case that created the states 
secrets doctrine.88  Harlan wrote that although “Constitutional considerations forbid ‘a 
complete abandonment of judicial control,’”89 the Court’s only roles in matters related to 
national security information were to determine if the dispute involved national security 
and that disclosure decisions were made by the proper official.90  To Harlan, beyond 
these two functions, the Court had no role.  Harlan quoted Supreme Court precedent to 
reinforce this conclusion: 
                                                 
85 Id. at 756. 
 
86 Id. at 756-57. 
 
87 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 
88 As noted in the first chapter of this dissertation, the states secret doctrine is an evidentiary privilege that 
belongs to the executive branch.  It allows the executive branch to prevent the disclosure in court of any 
evidence the executive deems detrimental to national security.  See id. at 7-10 for an explanation of the 
doctrine. 
 
89 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 757 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8). 
 
90 Id.  
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“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is 
political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and 
Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of 
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly 
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are 
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities 
nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of 
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”91 
 
Based on the executive branch’s constitutional role in matters related to national security, 
Harlan would have continued the restraints on publication and directed the lower courts 
to give the proper deference to the executive branch, a “a co-equal branch of the 
Government operating within the field of its constitutional prerogative.”92 
 Thus, although in some ways the Pentagon Papers was a highly fractured 
decision—Harlan’s opinion was the only one to gather more than one other justice—the 
opinions framed the case in similar ways. Seven of the justices—Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Burger, and Blackmun—framed the case as dealing with the 
First Amendment.  While the concurring opinions and Harlan’s dissenting opinion 
focused on different aspects of separation of powers arguments, a majority of the 
justices—Black, Douglas, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Harlan—at least addressed the 
issue, if only in a footnote.  This focus on separation of powers and the role of the 
judiciary in national security would become a theme throughout many of the following 
decisions dealing with national security and prior restraints.  While the Supreme Court 
has never addressed a case quite like the New York Times v. United States, a U.S. district 
court in Wisconsin heard a case with a similar set of facts, but a different conclusion.  
                                                 
91 Id. at 757-58 (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
111 (1948)). 
 
92 Id. at 758. 
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In 1979, The Progressive, a political magazine founded in 1909 by Wisconsin 
Senator Robert La Follette, assigned freelance writer Howard Morland to write an article 
detailing how to build a hydrogen bomb, which would eventually be titled “The H-Bomb 
Secret: How We Got It-Why We’re Telling It.”.93  The information in the article was 
prepared using environmental impact statements, books, articles, personal interviews, and 
private speculation, rather than classified information.94  According to court records, The 
Progressive commissioned the article to alert people “to the false illusion of security 
created by the government's futile efforts at secrecy.”95  The magazine argued that the 
publication would “provide the people with needed information to make informed 
decisions on an urgent issue of public concern.”96  Upon receiving a copy from a political 
science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Department of Energy 
(DOE) offered to rewrite the article in order to prevent the revelation of the process that 
triggers a hydrogen explosion.97  When The Progressive informed the DOE that it would 
be publishing the article “as-is,” the government sought a temporary restraining order 
preventing publication of the article.  On March 9, 1979, after hearing from both parties, 
a federal district court judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants, 
their employees, and agents from publishing or otherwise communicating or disclosing in 
                                                 
93 Ian M. Dumain, Seminal Issues as Viewed Through the Lens of the Progressive Case: No Secret, No 
Defense: United States v. Progressive, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1323, 1325-26 (2005). 
 
94 Id. at 1326.  The text of the article is available at http://www.progressive.org/images/pdf/1179.pdf. 
 
95 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979), reconsideration denied, 486 
F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Wisc. 1979), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 
96 Id. 
 
97 Dumain, supra note 93, at 1326.  The Progressive sent early drafts of the article to six arms controls 
experts to verify the information.  One of the experts, a graduate student at MIT, gave a copy of the article 
to a political science professor at MIT, George Rathjens, who was also a consultant for the DOE.  Fearing 
the article violated the Atomic Energy Act, Rathjens forwarded a copy to the DOE. 
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any manner any restricted data contained in the article.98  On March 26 the court held a 
temporary injunction hearing and released its opinion that day.99  
In deciding to uphold his restraining order, District Judge Robert Willis Warren 
squarely framed the key legal issue of the case as “a basic confrontation between the First 
Amendment right to freedom of the press and national security,”100 topics which Warren 
called “deep and fundamental principles of democratic philosophy.”101  Warren summed 
up the two sides of the argument: 
The government argues that its national security interest also permits it 
to impress classification and censorship upon information originating in 
the public domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such 
information acquires the character of presenting immediate, direct and 
irreparable harm to the interests of the United States. 
Defendants argue that freedom of expression as embodied in the First 
Amendment is so central to the heart of liberty that prior restraint in any 
form becomes anathema. They contend that this is particularly true when a 
nation is not at war and where the prior restraint is based on surmise or 
conjecture. While acknowledging that freedom of the press is not absolute, 
they maintain that the publication of the projected article does not rise to 
the level of immediate, direct and irreparable harm which could justify 
incursion into First Amendment freedoms.102 
 
To support his conclusion, Warren relied upon First Amendment theory, precedent, 
textual analysis of the Atomic Energy Act,103 framers’ intent and democratic theory. 
Warren’s opinion began by laying out support for each side’s claim.  First, he 
wrote that one of the most fundamental aspects of our democratic society was its 
                                                 
98 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979). 
 
99 Id. 
 
100 Id. at 995. 
 
101 Id. at 992. 
 
102 Id. at 991-92. 
 
103 42 U.S.C. § 2271-2281. 
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devotion to freedom of the speech and of the press104 and focused on precedent to 
establish the limits of First Amendment protection.  Citing the Pentagon Papers Case, 
the court noted that “any prior restraint on publication comes into court under a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity.”105  Next, however, he cited Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s dissent in Bridges v. California106 and Holmes’ opinion in Schneck v. 
United States107 for the proposition that First Amendment rights were not absolute.108  
Finally, the court emphasized the Supreme Court’s ruling in Near v. Minnesota109 that 
there was an “extremely narrow area, involving national security in which interference 
with First Amendment rights might be tolerated.”110    
Next, Warren examined the government’s interest in protecting national security 
that needed to be balanced against the Progressive’s First Amendment rights.  Summing 
up the government’s “right” in the case, as well as the problem with this “right,” in just 
two paragraphs, Warren wrote: 
Juxtaposed against the right to freedom of expression is the 
government’s contention that the national security of this country could be 
jeopardized by publication of the article. 
                                                 
104 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 992. 
 
105 Id. 
 
106 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
 
107 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 
108 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 992 (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Free 
speech is not so absolute or irrational a conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective 
protection of all the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.”) and Schneck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“The character 
of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”)). 
  
109 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 
110 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 992. 
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The Court is convinced that the government has a right to classify 
certain sensitive documents to protect its national security. The problem is 
with the scope of the classification system.111 
 
The problem Warren faced was that the information contained in the article was not 
obtained from classified government information and much of it was in the public 
domain.  Despite these facts, the court ruled that the information was indeed dangerous to 
national security.  The court gave a number of reasons for its decision.  First, the court 
found that although the article was not a “do-it yourself” guide on how to build a 
hydrogen bomb and much of the information contained in the article was already in the 
public domain, the article “could accelerate the membership of a candidate nation in the 
thermonuclear club.”112  Second, the court found “no plausible reason why the public 
needs to know the technical details about hydrogen bomb construction to carry on an 
informed debate on this issue.”113   
The court then returned to precedent, noting several reasons why New York Times 
Co. v. United States was not a controlling precedent.  Warren reasoned that the Pentagon 
Papers contained historical data, relating to events that occurred some three to twenty 
years previously.  He pointed out that in Pentagon Papers the government advanced no 
reasons why the articles affected national security except that publication might cause 
embarrassment to the United States.114  Finally, in order to differentiate the two cases, 
Warren turned to the Atomic Energy Act itself.   
                                                 
111 Id. at 992-93. 
 
112 Id. at 994. 
 
113 Id. 
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Focusing on textual analysis, the court held that the terms used in the statute—
“communicates, transmits or discloses”—clearly included publishing in a magazine.115  
In addition, the court also held that the government had shown that The Progressive had 
reason to believe that the data in the article, if published, would injure the United States 
or give an advantage to a foreign nation.  
Extensive reading and studying of the documents on file lead to the 
conclusion that not all the data is [sic] available in the public realm in the 
same fashion, if it is available at all.  What is involved here is information 
dealing with the most destructive weapon in the history of mankind, 
information of sufficient destructive potential to nullify the right to free 
speech and to endanger the right to life itself.116   
 
Finally, the court noted that the Atomic Energy Act contained statutory authorization for 
the attorney general to seek an injunction against publication117 while in Pentagon Papers 
the Supreme Court took into account the fact that Congress had not specifically 
authorized an injunction.118   
Leaving behind precedent and textual analysis, the court turned to framers’ intent 
and democratic theory.   The court wrote: 
                                                 
115 Id. at 995. 
 
116 Id. 
 
117 42 U.S.C. § 2280.   
 
118 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (Black, J., concurring) (noting that the 
government was not relying on any act of Congress, but rather making a “bold and dangerously far-
reaching contention that courts should take it upon themselves to ‘make’ a law abridging freedom of the 
press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security”); id. at 721-22 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that because Congress had not authorized prohibiting publication based on national 
security, any prohibiting would have to come from the government’s “inherent power”); id. at 730 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the Court was being “asked neither to construe specific regulations nor 
to apply specific laws”); id. at 731 (White, J., concurring) (stating that “the United States has not satisfied 
the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication . . . at least in the 
absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authorization”); id. at 742 (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (contending that it would be “utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of power for 
this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to 
prohibit”). 
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Our Founding Fathers believed, as we do, that one is born with certain 
inalienable rights which, as the Declaration of Independence intones, 
include the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The 
Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, was enacted to make those 
rights operable in everyday life.119  
 
The court used framers’ intent to reach a conclusion on how to balance national security 
with freedom of the press.  Rather than focusing on the relative values of each, however, 
Warren focused on the consequences of his decision, determining that it was safer to 
error on the side of national security.   
While it may be true in the long-run, as Patrick Henry instructs us, that 
one would prefer death to life without liberty, nonetheless, in the short-
run, one cannot enjoy freedom of speech, freedom to worship or freedom 
of the press unless one first enjoys the freedom to live.  
. . .  
A mistake in ruling against The Progressive will seriously infringe 
cherished First Amendment rights. . . .  It will curtail defendants’ First 
Amendment rights in a drastic and substantial fashion. It will infringe 
upon our right to know and to be informed as well. 
A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for 
thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is 
extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot.120 
 
While the case might have made for an important Supreme Court precedent, it 
never made it to the High Court.  After the district court’s decision, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit scheduled oral arguments for September 13, 1979.121  
Before the Seventh Circuit’s opinion was announced, The Madison Press Connection 
                                                 
119 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 995-96. 
 
120 Id.  
 
121 Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709, 709 (1979).  When The Progressive’s motion for an expedited 
hearing was denied, the magazine petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the 
Seventh Circuit to expedite the appeal.  In a per curiam opinion the Court denied the motion.  Id. 
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published a letter detailing the contents at issue in The Progressive case.122  The 
government, conceding that the secret was out, announced it was abandoning the case.123  
 
Prior restraints, national security and government employees 
While only two cases have involved prior restraints on the media in the interest of 
national security, a number of cases have considered national security-based restrictions 
on government employee speech.  In 1972, just one year after the Supreme Court ruled 
the government could not stop newspapers from publishing national security information 
in Pentagon Papers, the Fourth Circuit heard a case in which the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) sought to enjoin a former employee from publishing a proposed book in 
violation of a “secrecy agreement” and “secrecy oath.” The case focused on the 
government’s ability to prevent an employee from disclosing classified information, 
rather than information the government simply claimed was related to national security or 
could possibly be “classifiable.” 
 United States v. Marchetti124 began in March 1972 when the United States sought 
a temporary restraining order against Victor L. Marchetti, a former executive assistant to 
the deputy director of the CIA.125  Based on a secrecy agreement signed by Marchetti 
when he was hired by the CIA and a secrecy oath he took upon his retirement, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ordered Marchetti to submit to the CIA  
“any writing, fictional or non-fictional, relating to the Agency or to intelligence” thirty 
                                                 
122 Dumain, supra note 93, at 1331-32. 
 
123 Id. at 1332. 
 
124 446 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).  
 
125 Id. at 1311. 
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days in advance of release to any person or corporation and ordered him “not to release 
any writing relating to the Agency or to intelligence without prior authorization from the 
Director of Central Intelligence or from his designated representative.”126  The 
government claimed that an article Marchetti submitted to Esquire and six other 
publishers about his experience as a CIA agent contained “classified information 
concerning intelligence sources, methods and operations.”127  In addition, Marchetti had 
submitted a book proposal about his intelligence experiences to a publisher.128  Citing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pentagon Papers,129 Marchetti contended that his First 
Amendment rights prohibited the government from imposing any prior restraints upon 
him and appealed the order.130 
 In an opinion by Chief Judge Clement Haynsworth, who later would be 
nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court by Richard M. Nixon but not confirmed by the 
Senate,131 the Fourth Circuit held that the secrecy agreement Marchetti signed was 
“constitutional and otherwise reasonable and lawful.”132  In his opinion, Haynsworth 
identified many of the same legal questions that the Supreme Court discussed in New 
York Times v. United States.  The court framed the case mainly in terms of balancing 
                                                 
126 Id. 
 
127 Id. at 1313. 
 
128 Id. 
 
129 Id. (“Marchetti claims that the present injunction is barred by the Supreme Court decision in the 
Pentagon Papers case because the Government has failed to meet the very heavy burden against any system 
of prior restraints on expression.”). 
 
130 Id. at 1311. 
 
131 See Dean J. Kotlowski, Trial by Error: Nixon, the Senate, and the Haynsworth Nomination, 1 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 71 (1996). 
 
132 Marchetti,446 F.2d at 1311. 
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freedom of speech and government secrecy, discussing the government’s “right to 
secrecy.”  However, near the end of his opinion, Haynsworth discussed separation of 
powers issues as well.  To support his conclusion that Marchetti could be prohibited from 
disclosing information, Haynsworth focused heavily on precedent and, to a lesser extent, 
on the text of the Constitution and originalism.   
 Although Haynsworth acknowledged the case implicated Marchetti’s First 
Amendment rights, he began by quoting and citing a number of Supreme Court cases to 
point out that freedom of speech was not absolute.  First, as Judge Warren would later do 
in Progressive, Haynsworth quoted Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Bridges v. 
California133 to contend that although freedom of speech was valuable in a democratic 
society, there were other competing interests that were equally as important.134  Second, 
Haynsworth quoted Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Roth v. United States135 to 
establish that, despite its absolute language, the First Amendment was not intended to 
“protect every utterance” and it was important to consider the intent behind the 
Amendment.136  Finally, the opinion cited a number of prior restraint cases to show that 
threats, bribes, extortion, the publication of military information during times of war, 
                                                 
133 314 U.S. 242 (1941). 
 
134 Marchetti, 446 F.2d at 1314. (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 293) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Because 
freedom of public expression alone assures the unfolding of truth, it is indispensable to the democratic 
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135 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 
136 Marchetti, 446 F.2d at 1314. (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 483) (“[I]t is apparent that the unconditional 
phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent 
this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech.  At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as 
libel law, but there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the 
protection intended for speech and press.”) (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)). 
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speech by prisoners, and the publication of racially discriminatory housing 
advertisements were not fully protected by the First Amendment.137 
 Haynsworth next used textualism, precedent and originalism to support his 
argument that the government had a “right to secrecy.”  First, he cited the text of the 
Constitution, writing, “Gathering intelligence information and the other activities of the 
Agency, including clandestine affairs against other nations, are all within the President’s 
constitutional responsibility for the security of the Nation as the Chief Executive and as 
Commander in Chief of our Armed forces.”138  Next he turned to two precedents cited in 
New York Times v. United States — United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.139 and 
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.140 — to demonstrate 
that the Supreme Court had recognized the government’s “need for secrecy,”141 as well as 
a third, E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States,142 which had upheld the constitutionality of a 
government secrecy agreement with “a private contractor who claimed the right to 
                                                 
137 Id. at 1314-15.  The court cited NRLB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-19 (1969) (threats, 
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139 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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divulge the details of a torpedo to other potential customers.”143  Focusing on 
constitutional text and original intent to bolster his citation of precedent, Haynsworth 
concluded, “Although the First Amendment protects criticism of the government, nothing 
in the Constitution requires the government to divulge information.”144 
 Having established both the limits of the First Amendment and the government’s 
“right to secrecy,” Haynsworth then appeared ready to balance Marchetti’s First 
Amendment claim against the government’s interest in keeping him quiet.  However, 
Haynsworth determined that because the CIA’s secrecy agreement was “entirely 
appropriate”145 and “the Government’s need for secrecy in this area lends justification to 
a system of prior restraint against disclosure by employees and former employees,”146 the 
secrecy agreement in and of itself was enforceable because by preventing him from 
divulging only classified information the agreement was not a violation of Marchetti’s 
First Amendment rights.147  Thus, although he discussed the need to balance freedom of 
expression and government secrecy, in the end, Haynsworth found no need to do so. 
However, Haynswroth also concluded that because First Amendment rights were  
                                                 
143 Marchetti, 446 F.2d at 1315 (quoting E.W. Bliss Co., 248 U.S. at 46). 
 
144 Id. at 1315-16.  Haynswoth quoted with approval a lengthy passage from a law review article about the 
Pentagon Papers case by Columbia University law professor Louis Henkin.  See Louis Henkin, The Right 
to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273-74 
(1971) (contending that both history and the text of the Constitution demonstrated that“[f]rom our national 
beginnings, the Government of the United States has asserted the right to conceal and, therefore, in 
practical effect not to let the people know.”). 
 
145 Id. at 1316. 
 
146 Id. at 1316-17. 
 
147 Id. at 1317. 
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“involved,” Marchetti was entitled to judicial review.148  Yet, in another twist, 
Haynswoth then invoked a separation of powers frame to assert there was “no practical 
reason” for judicial review.  Based on the text of the Constitution,149 as well as on 
practical concerns related to the ability of judges to determine what information might 
harm national security,150 Haynsworth concluded the only questions fit for a judge to 
answer were “whether or not the information was classified and, if so, whether or not, by 
prior disclosure, it had come into the public domain.”151 
 Interestingly, it was this final section of Haynsworth’s opinion that elicited a 
response from Judge James B. Craven, Jr.  Although Craven concurred in the judgment 
of the court, in contrast to Haynsworth’s assertion that the judiciary had no role to play in 
the classification of information, Craven was not willing to defer totally to the executive 
branch.  Craven discussed the First Amendment’s role in self-governance and the 
public’s “right to know.”   
[H]owever difficult the adjudication of the reasonableness of a secrecy 
classification, I cannot subscribe to a flat rule that it may never be 
attempted. The “right to know” is in a period of gestation.  I think that the 
people will increasingly insist upon knowing what their government is 
doing and that, because this knowledge is vital to government by the 
people, the “right to know” will grow. I am not yet ready to foreclose any 
inquiry into whether or not secrecy classifications are reasonable. To 
                                                 
148 Id. (“[S]ince First Amendment rights are involved, we think Marchetti would be entitled to judicial 
review of any action by the CIA disapproving publication of the material. Some such review would seem 
essential to the enforcement of the prior restraint imposed upon Marchetti and other former employees. See 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51(1965).”) 
 
149 Id. (contending that because Article II § 2 conferred broad powers on the President in the conduct of 
national defense, the decision to classify information was not a role for the judiciary). 
 
150 Id. (“There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial review of secrecy classifications. . . .  The 
courts, of course, are ill equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve 
effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in that area.”). 
 
151 Id. at 1318. 
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protect those that are does not require that we also protect the frivolous 
and the absurd.152 
 
Despite Craven’s concurrence, Haynsworth’s argument that the judiciary was ill-
suited to deal with classified information again won a majority of votes four years later 
when the same three judges of the Fourth Circuit heard arguments in Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc. v. Colby,153 the “sequel” to Marchetti.  In that case, Haynsworth focused heavily on 
separation of powers issues and the practical problems associated with the judiciary and 
national security information. 
 After the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Marchetti, Marchetti and John Marks, a 
former employee of the State Department who had also signed a non-disclosure 
agreement, prepared a manuscript for Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.  After reviewing the 
manuscript, the CIA required the deletion of 339 items said to contain classified 
information.  After reviewing the items with Marchetti and his lawyer, the CIA agreed 
that all but approximately 168 of the deletions could be published.154  Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., Marchetti and Marks brought action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, seeking an order that would permit the publication of the 
remaining contested items. On motion of the defendants, William Colby, then Director of 
the CIA, and Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, the case was transferred to the 
                                                 
152 Id. at 1318-19 (Craven, J., concurring). 
 
153 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 
154 Id. at 1365.  The opinion states that initially 339 items contained classified information.  However, 
“after a conference with Marchetti and his lawyer, the CIA agreed to release 114 of the deletions. Later 
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statement that there were 139 items the CIA still claimed were classified, the court wrote that there were 
“168 deletion items upon which the CIA stood fast.”  It is unclear where this apparent discrepancy in 
numbers comes from. 
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Eastern District of Virginia, “where the Marchetti case had been tried and where it could 
come before the same judge who had tried Marchetti.”155 
 After being presented at trial with evidence related to the CIA’s review of 
Marchetti’s manuscript, the district judge ruled that the CIA was making “ad hoc” 
decisions about whether the information in the manuscript was classified without any real 
proof that the information was properly classified.156  In short, the judge believed that the 
standards established by the Fourth Circuit in Marchetti to protect Marchetti’s and 
Mark’s First Amendment rights required the government to show “strict proof” that 
material was classified information.157  Although the trial judge admitted that much of the 
information in the manuscript might be sensitive, he ruled that such information was not 
properly classified until “a classifying officer makes a conscious determination that the 
governmental interest in secrecy outweighs a general policy of disclosure and applies a 
label of ‘Top Secret’ or ‘Secret’ or ‘Confidential’ to the information in question.”158 
Shifting its stance slightly from Marchetti, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
judiciary had a somewhat larger role in classification decisions than it had previously 
indicated.  Although Haynsworth claimed the court was adopting a new standard,159 in 
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157 Id. at 1366-67. 
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159 The court claimed that in Marchetti it was primarily relying on the principle that classification decisions 
were not reviewable by the judiciary, but that it would now rely upon the FOIA amendments.  Id. at 1367.  
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subject to judicial review. See EPA v. Mink, 401 U.S. 73 (1973).  The October 1974 amendments to the 
Freedom of Information Act introduced new considerations.”) 
 
 105 
 
reviewing the trial court’s decision Haynsworth again framed the case in terms of 
separation of powers issues and argued for a great deal of deference to the executive 
branch.  He also explicitly refused to reconsider any First Amendment claims.160  While 
Haynsworth discussed legislative intent, textual analysis and some precedent, his opinion 
once again relied upon what he saw as practical problems associated with the inability of 
the judicial branch to handle classified information.  To Haynsworth, courts were neither 
capable of keeping information safe nor competent to know what information should be 
classified. 
Based on textual analysis and the legislative intent behind amendments to the 
Freedom of Information Act161 that provided for judicial review of classification 
decision,162 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the deletion of items by the CIA from the 
manuscript “should be suppressed only if they are found both to be classified and 
classifiable under the Executive Order.”163  However, Haynsworth wrote that the 
government only needed to “show no more than that each deleted item disclosed 
information which was required to be classified in any degree and which was contained 
in a document bearing a classification stamp.”164  It did not need to show when the 
information was classified, who classified it, “nor was it necessary for the government to 
                                                 
160 Id. at 1370 (“We decline to modify our previous holding that the First Amendment is no bar against an 
injunction forbidding the disclosure of classifiable information.”). 
 
161 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).  
 
162 Knopf, 509 F.2d 1362 at 1367.  (“The legislative history makes it clear that the Congress intended to 
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disclose to lawyers, judges, court reporters, expert witnesses and others . . . sensitive but 
irrelevant information in a classified document in order to prove that a particular item of 
information within it had been classified.”165  In addition, Haynsworth wrote that it was 
not even necessary for the government to show the information was actually secret or had 
been properly classified.  Rather the government need only show that the information was 
potentially classifiable.166   
To support these conclusions, Haynsworth focused once again on the abilities of 
the judiciary to deal with national security information.  Justifying his decision that the 
government did not have to show the actual documents or potentially sensitive 
information to the court, Haynsworth wrote:  
It is not to slight judges, lawyers or anyone else to suggest that any such 
disclosure carries with it serious risk that highly sensitive information may 
be compromised. In our own chambers, we are ill equipped to provide the 
kind of security highly sensitive information should have. The national 
interest requires that the government withhold or delete unrelated items of 
sensitive information, as it did, in the absence of compelling necessity.167 
 
Thus, although Haynsworth initially appeared to change his stance and seemed inclined 
to rule that a more stringent judicial review of classification decisions was appropriate, 
the standards he set forth did little to strengthen the role he established for the judiciary in 
Marchetti.  Haynsworth still believed that the judiciary’s only role was to verify that the 
executive vouched for the fact that the information was classified or classifiable.  In 
addition, Haynsworth still refused to frame the case in terms of Marchetti’s First 
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Amendment rights or the public’s need for information in order to engage in effective 
self-government. 
  In 1980, the Supreme Court heard similar arguments in Snepp v. United States,168 
a case involving proceeds from a book published by a former CIA agent, Frank W. Snepp 
III.  In 1968, as an express condition of his employment with the CIA, Snepp signed a 
non-disclosure agreement similar to the one Marchetti had signed.  The agreement stated 
that Snepp would not “divulge classified information and not . . . publish any information 
without prepublication clearance.”169  When Snepp published a book based on his 
experiences without submitting it to the Agency for review, the government brought suit 
seeking a declaration that Snepp had breached his contract, an injunction requiring Snepp 
to submit all future writings to the CIA prior to publication, and an order imposing “a 
constructive trust for the Government’s benefit on all profits that Snepp might earn from 
publishing his book.”170  Both the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Snepp had breached a valid contract.171  
However, while the district court both enjoined future breaches of Snepp’s agreement and 
imposed a constructive trust on Snepp’s profits from his book, the Fourth Circuit held 
that “the imposition of a constructive trust was improper and that the government’s sole 
remedy for breach of the contract should be the recovery of compensatory and punitive 
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damages as the proof may support and as a jury may assess.”172  The Fourth Circuit based 
its decision on its findings that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and that the government did not claim any classified material 
was ever published.173  Thus, the appellate court held that while Snepp had violated his 
contractual duty174 and the government could sue for breach of contract in order to win 
both nominal and punitive damages,175 a constructive trust was inappropriate because 
Snepp’s fiduciary duty176 to the government only extended to his agreement not to 
publish classified information.177 
 In a per curiam opinion issued by a six-member majority,178 the Supreme Court 
rejected the Fourth Circuit’s decision as well as its framing of the case in terms of 
                                                 
172 Snepp, 595 F.2d at 935. 
 
173 Id. 
 
174  “A duty arising under a particular contract” or “[a] duty imposed by the law of contracts.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 543-44 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
175 Although punitive damages are not normally available in a breach of contract suit, because the court 
found that Snepp had deliberately misled the government about his intention to submit his manuscript for 
prepublication review, punitive damages were appropriate.  Snepp, 595 F.2d at 937 (“From the evidence, a 
trier of the fact could well conclude that defendant's actions, and the government's reliance thereon, 
amounted to deceit, so that defendant’s breach of contract has implications of a tort where punitive 
damages may be assessed.”). 
 
176 “A duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary (such as a lawyer or 
corporate officer) to the beneficiary (such as a lawyer’s client or a shareholder); a duty to act with the 
higherst degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interest of the other person.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 543-44 (8th ed. 2004). 
   
177 Snepp, 595 F.2d at 936 (“[B]oth . . . the language of that contract and the circumstances under which it 
was made [indicate the] contract does create a fiduciary relationship with regard to the duty not to disclose 
classified material. But we do not think, having regard to the defendant's first amendment right to publish 
unclassified information, that the contract, even in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, 
creates any fiduciary relationship to submit writings for prepublication review which do not disclose 
classified information.”).  
 
178 The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist. 
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Snepp’s First Amendment right to publish unclassified information.179 In fact, the 
majority only mentioned the First Amendment once in its entire opinion.  In a footnote, 
the Court noted that Snepp’s contention that his contract was unenforceable as a prior 
restraint on speech was in conflict with the Court’s previous decisions that had made it 
clear a substantial government interest allowed the government to impose “reasonable 
restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First 
Amendment.”180  In Snepp’s case this was represented by the government’s compelling 
interest in “protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security 
and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign 
intelligence service.”181   
After summarily dismissing any First Amendment issues presented by the case, 
the majority framed the case in terms of breach of trust/contracts law and the need for 
government secrecy.  To support its decision the Court relied primarily on practical 
considerations related to the CIA’s need to keep information secret and  the agency’s 
need to protect the appearance of confidentiality.  Citing no cases other than Marchetti 
and Adolf A. Knopf, the Court began with a lengthy discussion of the CIA’s need for 
secrecy and the inability of a single agent to determine what information—classified or 
unclassified—might harm national interests.182   Based on this the Court concluded, 
“Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent’s violation of his obligation to 
                                                 
179 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 
180 Id. at 766 n.3 (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 
(1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); id., at 844-48 
(Powell, J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972)). 
 
181 Id. 
 
182 Id. at 511-13. 
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submit writings about the Agency for prepublication review impairs the CIA’s ability to 
perform its statutory duties.”183  Turning to practical considerations, the Court held that 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision left the government “with no reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security.”184  The Court wrote: 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that the Court of 
Appeals left it without losing the benefit of the bargain it seeks to enforce.  
Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an award of punitive 
damages might force the Government to disclose some of the very 
confidences that Snepp promised to protect.  The trial of such a suit, 
before a jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency’s highly confidential 
affairs.  Rarely would the Government run this risk.185 
 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, issued a strongly 
worded dissent.  Framing the case in terms of the First Amendment and judicial powers, 
Stewart disagreed with the majority’s unwillingness to discuss Snepp’s First Amendment 
claims as well as its use of legal factors.  He wrote, “The uninhibited character of today’s 
exercise in lawmaking is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable principles 
that favor a more conservative approach to this case.”186  Stewart began his opinion by 
attacking the legal factors the majority cited to support its case.  Stewart wrote: 
The Court’s per curiam opinion seems to suggest that its result is 
supported by a blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts.  But 
neither of these branches of the common law supports the imposition of a 
constructive trust under the circumstances of this case.187 
 
                                                 
183 Id. at 512. 
 
184 Id. at 514. 
 
185 Id. at 514-15. 
 
186 Id. at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 
187 Id. at 517-18.  
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Next, Stewart differentiated Snepp’s fiduciary duty to protect classified information from 
his contractual duty not to publish unclassified information without prior approval.  
Because Stewart found that Snepp had violated his contractual duty, but not his fiduciary 
duty, he turned to contract law and invoked Snepp’s First Amendment rights. 
 Stewart equated Snepp’s secrecy agreement with other contracts “designed to 
ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies with his duty not to disclose or 
misuse confidential information,” such as non-compete covenants.188  Based on 
precedent, Stewart wrote that such covenants were only enforceable under the “rule of 
reason,” which required “that the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a 
legitimate interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidentiality), that the 
employer’s interest not be outweighed by the public interest, and that the covenant not be 
of any longer duration or wider geographical scope than necessary to protect the 
employer’s interest.”189  Stewart wrote that although the CIA, like any employer, had an 
interest in protecting confidential information, this interest had to be balanced with 
Snepp’s First Amendment rights and his interests in securing work as an author, as well 
as the public’s interest in a proper accommodation that would preserve the intelligence 
mission of the Agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified information.”190   
Based on his analysis of contract law and the “rule of reason,” Stewart concluded  
                                                 
188 Id. at 519. 
 
189 Id. (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng.Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711)). 
 
190 Id. at 520. 
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that because the government’s restriction was so harsh191 an equity court might find the 
contract unenforceable.192  In addition, he criticized the Court’s reliance on precedents 
because the First Amendment right to publish both classified and unclassified 
information national security information was at issue and the Court had never decided 
such a case.193  Stewart continued, “Moreover, even if such a wide-ranging prior restraint 
would be good national security policy, I would have great difficulty reconciling it with 
the demands of the First Amendment.”194  Finally, in his conclusion, Stewart invoked the 
First Amendment’s role in self-government and took the majority to task for 
underestimating the impact of the Court’s ruling.  He wrote: 
[T]he Court seems unaware of the fact that its drastic new remedy has 
been fashioned to enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen’s right to 
criticize his government.  Inherent in this prior restraint is the risk that the 
reviewing agency will misuse its authority to delay the publication of a 
critical work or to persuade an author to modify the contents of his work 
beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior 
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy burden on the 
censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It would take more than the Court 
has written to persuade me that that burden has been met.195 
                                                 
191 Citing a number of cases out of the Fourth Circuit, Stewart concluded that a prior restraint of such wide 
scope and indefinite duration would make most similar covenants unenforceable.  Id. at 520 n.9 (citing 
Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 283 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding void under 
Virginia law a covenant with no geographical limitation); Am. Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Carrier, 500 F.2d 
1269, 1279 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding void under North Carolina law a covenant with no durational or 
geographical limitation); E. L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding void 
under Maryland law a covenant with no durational or geographical limitation)).   
 
192 Id. at 520. 
 
193 Id. at 520 n.10 (“The Court correctly points out that the Government may regulate certain activities of its 
employees that would be protected by the First Amendment in other contexts.  Ante, at 765, n. 3. But none 
of the cases it cites involved a requirement that an employee submit all proposed public statements for 
prerelease censorship or approval. The Court has not previously considered the enforceability of this kind 
of prior restraint or the remedy that should be imposed in the event of a breach.”). 
 
194 Id. at 522. 
 
195 Id. at 526.  In a footnote, although Stewart admitted he was not prepared to rule that the contract was 
unenforceable, he contended that the issue deserved to be decided by the Court after a full briefing.  In 
addition, he cited Pentagon Papers and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), a case 
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In later years, the D.C. District Court and D.C. Court of Appeals had the 
opportunity to further refine its approach to government confidentiality agreements.  In 
1983, the D.C. Circuit again reviewed the government’s prepublication requirements 
when Ralph W. McGehee, a former CIA officer, challenged the constitutionality of the 
CIA’s “classification and censorship scheme” and the “propriety, under that scheme,” of 
classifying portions of an article he wrote for The Nation.196  Unlike Snepp, McGehee 
had submitted his manuscript for review.  However, at the time McGehee submitted his 
article for review, the CIA employed three classification levels, and McGehee objected to 
information in his manuscript being categorized as “Secret,” the middle level of 
classification between “Top Secret” and “Confidential.”197  Thus, unlike Snepp, McGehee 
v. Casey did not involve an agent who did not abide by his secrecy agreement, but rather 
was a challenge to “the constitutionality of the CIA’s substantive criteria and scheme for 
deciding how to classify, and thereby censor, writings of former agents.”198 
As Brennan had done in Snepp, the D.C. Circuit presented the case as dealing 
with both the need to balance freedom of speech with national security and separation of 
powers.  Discussing a number of precedents related to the speech rights of government 
employees,199 the court articulated two “consistent themes” found in the cases.  Quoting 
                                                                                                                                                 
involving the judiciary and prior restraints, to support his contention that the government’s restriction 
would at the very least be considered unconstitutional in other situations.  Id. at 526 n.17. 
 
196 McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 
197 Id. at 1140.  At the time McGehee submitted his article to the CIA, classification decisions were 
governed by Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (June 28, 1978). 
 
198 Id. at 1141. 
 
199 In addition to Snepp the court discussed Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); CSC v. Letter Carries, 
413 U.S. 548 (1973); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 
U.S. 563 (1968). 
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Brown v. Glines,200 a case involving a First Amendment challenge to an Air Force 
regulation that prohibited service members from soliciting signatures for petitions, 
Circuit Judge Patricia Wald wrote, “First, restrictions on the speech of government 
employees must ‘protect a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of 
free speech.’”201  Next, she said, “[T]he restriction must be narrowly drawn to ‘restrict 
speech no more than is necessary to protect the substantial government interest.’”202  In 
addition, citing precedent and using originalism, Wald concluded that courts should show 
“a sensitivity to the special institutional needs of particular governmental services, such 
as the military and the foreign intelligence services.”203  Thus, the court relied on Brown 
and Snepp to determine that the government had not just a substantial interest but also a 
compelling interest in keeping national security information secret and ruled that the 
CIA’s classification scheme was not unconstitutional.204   
The court next considered what standard of judicial review of CIA decisions was 
appropriate.  Again adopting a balancing frame, Wald began by clarifying just what type 
of right the court was addressing.  Citing precedent, Wald reasoned that because 
McGehee was disseminating information already in his possession his rights were 
“stronger” than they would be under a FOIA analysis of an individual’s right to gather 
                                                 
200 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
 
201 McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1142 (quoting Brown, 444 U.S. at 349). 
 
202 Id. (quoting Brown, 444 U.S. at 355). 
 
203 Id. at 1142 n.11 (citing Brown, 444 U.S. at 354; Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511; New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936);  The Federalist No. 64, at 434-36 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (“So often and so 
essentially have we heretofore suffered from want of secrecy and dispatch [in international negotiations], 
that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective if no attention had been paid to those 
objects.”)). 
 
204 Id. at 1143.   
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information.205  However, although Wald stated McGehee had a “a strong first 
amendment interest in ensuring that CIA censorship of his article results from a proper 
classification of the censored portions,”206 she also noted that because no court order in 
the case “constitute[d] a prior restraint in the traditional sense,”207 the court would not 
place as heavy of burden on the government as the Supreme Court did in the Pentagon 
Papers.208  Having established the strength of McGehee’s First Amendment claims, Wald 
articulated a balancing test based on the need for the court to defer to the expertise of the 
CIA in matters of national security with the role of the courts in protecting individual 
rights.  Wald wrote that courts must adhere to a standard of review that both “afford[ed] 
proper respect to the individual rights at stake while recognizing the CIA’s technical 
expertise and practical familiarity with the ramifications of sensitive information.”209  
Based on this standard, the court concluded that “reviewing courts should conduct a de 
novo review of the classification decision, while giving deference to reasoned and 
detailed CIA explanations of that classification decision”210 and “must . . . satisfy 
themselves from the record, in camera or otherwise, that the CIA in fact had good reason 
                                                 
205 Id. at 1147.  The court reasoned that the “difference between seeking to obtain information and seeking 
to disclose information already obtained raises McGehee’s constitutional interests in this case” and noted 
that there was traditionally no “right of access to non-public government information. For this proposition 
the court cited Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978); id at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring); Saxbe v. 
Washington Post, Inc., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 831-32 (1974). 
  
206 McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1147 (emphasis in original). 
 
207 Id. 
 
208 Id. at 1148 n.22.  (“If the CIA did seek judicial action to restrain publication, it would bear a much 
heavier burden.”) (citing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. 
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).  
 
209 Id. at 1148. 
 
210 Id.  
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to classify, and therefore censor, the materials at issue.”211  According to the court, this 
approach would ensure both a proper balance between First Amendment rights and 
national security as well as a balance between the CIA’s tasks of protecting of national 
security and maintaining the secrecy of sensitive information and the judiciary’s task of 
protecting individual rights.  To support this conclusion, the court turned to First 
Amendment theory, citing the role of free speech in self-government.212  After applying 
these standards and examining the affidavits of the parties in camera, the court concluded 
that the CIA had properly classified the information in question.213 
In addition to Wald’s discussion of First Amendment theory in the court’s 
opinion, a “separate statement” by Wald discussed the First Amendment implications of 
the case.  Wald’s statement specifically focused on the right to know as supporting the 
checking function of the First Amendment.214  Wald emphasized that while the court’s 
decision reflected current law, it did not take into account the right to know and was not  
                                                 
211 Id. 
 
212 Id. at 1149.  (“Considering that ‘speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government,’ and that the line between information threatening to foreign policy and 
matters of legitimate public concern is often very fine.”) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-
75 (1964) and citing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). 
 
213 Id. 
 
214 Id. at 1150 (Wald, J., special statement) (“I write separately to stress . . . that neither the agency’s nor 
our analysis takes account of any separate public right to know critical albeit classified facts about the 
activities of our intelligence agencies. . . .  [I]t seems important in view of recent revelations about past 
indiscretions in the name of national security, for some governmental institution, if not the classification 
system itself, to conduct such a balance.”).  See also Weaver v. U.S. Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1444-56 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., dissenting) (“emphatically” dissenting by arguing that the government must 
show proof of serious harm to national security in order to justify reasonable infringements upon a 
government employee’s First Amendment rights). 
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necessarily the best balance between national security and self-government.215  Thus, by 
1983, focusing on balancing both the First Amendment and national security and the role 
of the judiciary and the executive branches had become common in these cases. Indeed, 
these frames were again used by the D.C. District Court in 1988 when it considered two 
federal employees’ unions’ challenges to government non-disclosure agreements.  
 In National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States216 the National 
Federation of Government Employees and the American Federation of Government 
Employees sought to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of provisions of federal 
government employment forms that contained agreements that imposed civil sanctions on 
federal employee for making unauthorized disclosures of “classified” or “classifiable” 
government information.217  In addition to other challenges, the labor unions argued that 
the use of the term “classifiable” was unconstitutional.218  Again framing the case as 
dealing with the need to balance freedom of expression with national security, District 
Judge Oliver Gasch wrote, “At the heart of this case is a constitutionally inherent conflict 
between the obligation of the Executive to safeguard national security information and 
                                                 
215 Id. (“Economic and criminal sanctions against agents who violate the preclearance and agency 
classification scheme are justifiable. But with no mechanism in the system for balancing the public’s right 
to know with possible risks to security, those sanctions can also result in the permanent loss of information 
critical to public debate. Our decision today, reflecting current restraints on our authority, cannot and does 
not fill the public’s need for such a balance.”).  In addition to the court’s opinion and Wald’s special 
statement, Senior Circuit Judge George MacKinnon wrote a separate concurrence.  MacKinnon wrote that 
while he was in general agreement with the court’s opinion, there was “an essential difference between 
upholding the secrecy agreement . . . and a case where the government might seek a prepublication 
injunction of the same information.”  Id. (MacKinnon, J., concurring).  
 
216 695 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1988).  
 
217 Id. at 1197. 
 
218 Id. at 1198.  Although the three agreements in question used different language, the term “classifiable” 
was common to all three.  For a full discussion of the language of the agreements and the various changes 
the agreements underwent prior to the trial, see id. at 1197-99.   
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the rights of citizens to speak freely and be guided by reasonably clear and narrow 
statutory proscriptions on the free speech right.”219   
Relying on Snepp, McGehee, and a series of other precedents used in McGehee, 
Gasch reached much the same conclusion as Wald.  He determined that while executive 
branch employees had “an obligation to preserve the secrecy of national security 
information”220 and the executive branch had “broad discretion to ensure” that employees 
did not disclose national security information,221 “‘restriction[s] on the speech of 
government employees must ‘protect a substantial government interest unrelated to the 
suppression of free speech’”222 and be “narrowly drawn to ‘restrict speech no more than 
is necessary to protect the substantial government interest.’”223   The district court ruled 
that while the Supreme Court had held that non-disclosure agreements did not violate the 
First Amendment rights of federal employees,224 the use of the term “classifiable” 
information in the agreements was unconstitutional.  The court held that “[i]n the absence 
of any definition, the term is far too broad to comport with the constitutional requirement 
                                                 
219 Id. at 1199. 
 
220 Id. at 1199 (citing Dep’t. of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (security clearances are issued based on 
trustworthiness of employee to protect sensitive information); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-11 
& n.6 (1980) (employee with access to “secret” information enters special trust relationship with 
government). 
 
221 Id. at 1199-1200 (citing Egan, 484 U.S.  at 824-25; CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); Cole v. 
Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956) (summary suspensions of employee in “sensitive” position was 
justifiable); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (secrecy “may be highly 
necessary” and “premature disclosure . . . productive of harmful results”). 
 
222 Id. at 1200 (quoting McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (D.C.Cir.1983) (quoting Brown v. 
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) and citing Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3). 
 
223 Id. (quoting McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1142-43 (quoting Brown, 444 U.S. at 355 and citing United States 
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’ Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580 (1973)). 
 
224 Id. at 1202 (stating the Supreme Court had unequivocally declared that “prepublication requirement[s] 
imposed upon government employees with access to classified information [are] entirely constitutional) 
(citing Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3). 
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that restraints on free speech be narrowly drawn to bar no more speech than is 
necessary.”225   
 However, in a 2007 case, the D.C. District court chose not to completely adopt 
either of the two major frames seen in the opinions above.  Although District Judge 
Emmet G. Sullivan discussed the need to balance deference to the executive with the 
judiciary’s role in protecting individual rights, he framed his opinion almost solely in 
terms of national security, focusing on the government’s power and need to keep national 
security information secret, nor did he discuss a need to balance the First Amendment 
with national security at any length.  
That 2007 case, Stillman v. CIA, involved a book about China’s nuclear weapons 
program written by Danny Stillman, a former employee of Los Alamos National 
Labrotory (LANL).226  In 2000, when Stillman submitted his manuscript, Inside China’s 
Nuclear Weapons Program, for prepublication review as required by the non-disclosure 
agreement he had signed while an employee at LANL, he was informed that the DOE, 
DOD and CIA did not want any part of his manuscript published. 227  Although the 
government subsequently released all but twenty-three passages of the manuscript, 
Stillman brought suit raising two First Amendment claims.  First, Stillman argued that the 
agencies lacked authority to prohibit him from publishing “information he obtained as a 
private citizen and not as a result of his employment at LANL or his signing of a secrecy 
agreement.”228  Stillman contended that because six of the nine trips he had made to 
                                                 
225 Id. at 1205. 
 
226 517 F. Supp. 2d 32, 33 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 
227 Id. at 35. 
 
228 Id. at 36. 
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China to visit nuclear weapons facilities and engage in discussions with Chinese 
scientists and officials took place after his retirement from LANL, the government had no 
ability to censor information he had learned as a private citizen.  Although Stillman 
retained his security clearance and admitted he was still “affiliated” with the government, 
he argued that “the information he obtained on the fourth through ninth trips was not 
obtained within the course of employment nor d[id] it fall within the scope of any secrecy 
agreement he signed.”229   Second, Stillman challenged the classification decision itself, 
claiming “that the defendants [had] failed to show that his right to publish [was] 
outweighed by a substantial government interest.”230  The court agreed with neither 
argument. 
 Discussing both of Stillman’s claims, Sullivan relied exclusively on precedent.  
Considering Stillman’s first claim, Sullivan simply noted that McGehee, Marchetti and 
Snepp had already established that “current and former government employees have no 
First Amendment right to publish properly classified information to which they gain 
access by virtue of their employment.”231  He then simply extended that to “individuals 
who maintain a security clearance and contract with the government as either an 
                                                 
229 Id. at 37. 
 
230 Id. at 36. 
 
231 Id. at 38 (citing McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.3d 1137, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he CIA censorship of 
‘secret’ information contained in former agents' writings and obtained by former agents during the course 
of CIA employment does not violate the first amendment.”); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 
1317 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Marchetti retains the right to speak and write about the CIA and its operations, and 
to criticize it as any other citizen may, but he may not disclose classified information obtained by him 
during the course of his employment which is not already in the public domain.”); Snepp v. United States, 
444 U.S. 507, 510n.3 (1980) (“[E]ven in the absence of an express [secrecy] agreement the CIA could have 
acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities 
that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment.”). 
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employee or affiliate.”232 
 Discussing the classification decision, Sullivan switched his focus to separation of 
powers issues.  Once again focusing on precedent, Sullivan began by writing about the 
CIA’s unique role in protecting national security information.  Sullivan wrote that “the 
government is entitled to substantial deference in its classification decisions”233 because 
it was in the best position to know what harm would result from disclosure,234 and the 
court was “mindful that due to the “mosaic-like nature of intelligence gathering, . . . what 
may seem trivial to the uninformed may appear of great moment to one who has a broad 
view of the scene and may put the questioned information in context.”235  Quoting 
McGehee, however, Sullivan was not willing to give complete deference to the agency. 
Despite this high level of deference, the Court will not just rubber 
stamp the government’s classification decision. To uphold the 
government's classification decision, the Court must satisfy itself “from 
the record, in camera or otherwise, that the [government agencies] in fact 
had good reason to classify, and therefore censor, the materials at 
issue.”236  
 
Thus, although Sullivan eventually ruled the government had properly classified all of the 
passages in question after he conducted an in camera review of government affidavits and 
                                                 
232 Id. 
 
233 Id. at 39 (citing Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that a 
classification decision “is a matter as to which the agency has a large measure of discretion”); McGehee, 
718 F.2d at 1149 (“[J]udicial review of CIA classification decisions, by reasonable necessity, cannot 
second-guess CIA judgment on matters in which the judiciary lacks expertise.”).  
 
234 Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“Secrecy in respect 
of information gathered by [the President’s agents] may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure 
of it productive of harmful results.”); Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (finding that 
judgments as to the harm that would result from disclosure of certain information “must be made by those 
with the necessary expertise in protecting classified information”). 
 
235 Id. (quoting McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1148-49). 
 
236 Id. (quoting McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1148). 
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the manuscript, the court at least appeared to take its role seriously.  While it would be 
impossible to truly know if the court was doing more than simply deferring to the 
government agencies, Sullivan’s opinion at least suggests that it was not. 
 As was the case with the Pentagon Papers, there was a consistent focus on 
separation of power frames as well as First Amendment frames.  From Marchetti to 
Stillman, the common thread throughout these opinions has been the judiciary’s struggle 
with what role it should play in national security issues and how much deference to give 
to the executive branch.  While some opinions have contained stronger First Amendment 
frames than others, the separation of powers frame has remained fairly consistent.  While 
the level of deference the courts give to the executive has changed, the basic question of 
how much deference has remained.  In 2004, over thirty years after the Supreme Court 
introduced these two frames in the Pentagon Papers, they continued to play an important 
role when courts began considering prior restraint issues raised by the Patriot Act. 
 
Prior restraints, national security and the Patriot Act 
 The final three cases involving prior restraint and national security all deal with 
National Security Letters (NSLs) issued under the Patriot Act.  As noted above, as 
originally amended by the Patriot Act, Title 18, § 2709(c) of the U.S. Code prohibited 
recipients of NSLs from ever disclosing to anyone that they received NSLs or that the 
FBI sought access or obtained information or records through the use of NSLs.237  When 
the Internet access firm that would become known as “John Doe” in court records 
received an NSL, it became the first—but not the last—plaintiff to contend that the 
                                                 
237 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (Supp. 2003) (“No wire or electronic communication service provider, or officer, 
employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought 
or obtained access to information or records under this section.”). 
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provisions of the Patriot Act violated the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  First, in 
Doe v. Ashcroft,238 or Doe I as it was later called in court records, the Internet service 
provided challenged § 2709 in the Southern District of New York in 2004.  Next, in 
2005, four Connecticut librarians, who were initially described in court documents as 
simply an “entity with library records,” challenged the non-disclosure provision in the 
United States District Court of Connecticut in Doe v. Gonzales,239 or Doe II.  Finally, in 
2007, in Doe v. Gonzales,240 or Doe III, the Southern District of New York heard the 
issue one more time after its decision in Doe I was remanded by the Second Circuit for 
further consideration in light of changes in the provisions made by the USA Patriot 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.  In that case, the court heard arguments 
related to several different aspects of the revised Patriot Act. 
As noted above, when Judge Victor Marrero wrote the opinion in Doe I, he 
clearly framed the issue in terms of balancing the First Amendment and national security 
concerns.  He wrote: 
National security is a paramount value, unquestionably one of the 
highest purposes for which any sovereign government is ordained. Equally 
scaled among human endeavors is personal security, an interest especially 
prized in our system of justice in the form of the guarantee bestowed upon 
the individual to be free from imposition by government of unwarranted 
restraints on protected fundamental rights.241 
 
In addition, he identified core legal issues related to the need for the judiciary to have an 
active role in balancing national security with personal freedoms.  Marrero wrote that 
                                                 
238 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (hereinafter Doe I). 
 
239 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005) (hereinafter Doe II). 
 
240 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (hereinafter Doe III). 
 
241 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 476.   
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during times of war and national crisis it was especially important for the judiciary to 
remain vigilant of government attempts to curtail personal freedoms.242  Marrero’s 
opinion discussed legislative history and intent, textual analysis and precedents related to 
anonymous speech, the right of association and prior restraints.  However, at the heart of 
Marrero’s decision that the § 2709(c) was unconstitutional was a reliance on democratic 
theory. 
 Marrero began by explaining why he could not focus solely on textual analysis, 
legislative intent or history.  After a discussion of the legislative history of § 2709243 and 
a lengthy analysis of the text of § 2709 and other statutes that granted the government 
information-gathering authority, 244 Marrero concluded these methods were not sufficient 
to reach a conclusion about the constitutionality of the statute.  Marrero wrote that he 
could not “fairly infer clear congressional intent in the enactment of § 2709 solely by 
comparing it with other complex, analogous statutes.”245  For example, Marrero pointed 
out that while some of the statutes specifically allowed a recipient to discuss the receipt 
of an NSL with “persons whose assistance is necessary to comply with the demands of 
the NSL,” others, such as § 2709, appeared through their silence to prevent disclosure to 
anyone and it was unclear which of the statutes had enforcement mechanisms or allowed 
                                                 
242 Id. at 478.  (“[I]t is precisely times like these that demand heightened vigilance, especially by the 
judiciary, to ensure that, as a people and as a nation, we steer a principled course faithful and true to our 
still-honored founding values. The high stakes here pressing the scales thus compel the Court to strike the 
most sensitive judicial balance, calibrating by delicate increments toward a result that adequately protects 
national security without unduly sacrificing individual freedoms, that endeavors to do what is just for one 
and right for all.”). 
 
243 Id. at 480-84. 
 
244 Id. at 484-91. 
 
245 Id. at 491. 
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for judicial review.246  After discussing Doe’s Fourth Amendment challenges and the 
anonymous speech rights and association rights of Doe’s subscribers, Marrero turned to 
the issue of prior restraints.247   
  The government argued that the statute’s non-disclosure provision should be 
subject to intermediate scrutiny,248 citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism249 and Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service 
Commission,250 as well as a Second Circuit decision, Kamasinski v. Judicial Review 
Council.251 The court, however, held that because § 2709 was both a prior restraint on 
speech and a content-based regulation252 it was subject to strict scrutiny.  Applying this 
standard, the court held that while the Supreme Court had previously determined that 
protecting national security information was a compelling state interest,253 § 2709 was 
not sufficiently narrow to survive.  To support this ruling, the court returned to textual 
                                                 
246 Id. at 492. 
 
247 Although the court discussed Fourth Amendment issues, as well as issues related to the anonymous 
speech and association rights of Doe’s subscribers, because this chapter focuses on prior restraints, those 
issues are not examined. 
 
248 The government argued that the provision was not a prior restraint because it did not create a licensing 
system, arguing that section 2709(c) did not “authorize any government official to grant a speaker 
permission to make any particular disclosure. Rather, the statute simply prohibit[ed] certain disclosures.”  
Id. at 512.  The government argued that the provision was not content based because it did not seek to 
silence less favored views.  The court held that while the provision was viewpoint-neutral it was still 
content-based because “the restriction pertain[ed] to an entire category of speech.”  Id. at 513. 
 
249 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 
250 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
 
25144 F.3d 106 (2d Cir.1994). 
 
252 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 512-13. 
 
253 Id. at 513-14 (citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)). 
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analysis, reasoning that other analogous statutes provided for judicial review.254  Next, 
the court engaged in an extensive exploration of cases in which the courts had upheld 
secrecy in connection with official investigations, including the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart255 and Butterworth v. Smith,256 as well as 
decisions by the Second,257 Third258 and Tenth Circuits.259  Based on its analysis the court 
wrote, “A basic principle emerging from these cases is that laws which prohibit persons 
from disclosing information they learn solely by means of participating in confidential 
government proceedings trigger less First Amendment concerns that laws which prohibit 
disclosing information a person obtains independently.”260   
The court, however, returned to its focus on balancing competing interests, 
included a discussion of democratic and First Amendment theory, and found the doctrine 
established by these cases had its limits. 
The relevance of this doctrine reaches its limit, however, when the 
Court considers that the NSL statutes, unlike other legislation cited above, 
impose a permanent bar on disclosure in every case, making no distinction 
among competing relative public policy values over time, and containing 
no provision for lifting that bar when the circumstances that justify it may 
no longer warrant categorical secrecy. 
                                                 
254 Id. at 514-15. 
 
255 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that a judicial order preventing a newspaper from disclosing information 
learned solely through the discovery process of a trial in which it was a defendant did not violate the First 
Amendment). 
 
256 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (holding that a state statute that prevented a reporter from publishing information 
he testified to a grand jury about was unconstitutional because it prevented him from divulging information 
he was in possession of before he testified to the grand jury). 
 
257 Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106 (2d Cir.1994). 
 
258 First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
 
259 Hoffmann Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 
260 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
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. . .  
The Government’s claim to perpetual secrecy surrounding the FBI’s 
issuance of NSLs . . . presupposes a category of information, and thus a 
class of speech, that, for reasons not satisfactorily explained, must forever 
be kept from public view, cloaked by an official seal that will always 
overshadow the public’s right to know.  In general, as our sunshine laws 
and judicial doctrine attest, democracy abhors undue secrecy, in 
recognition that public knowledge secures freedom.  Hence, an unlimited 
government warrant to conceal, effectively a form of secrecy per se, has 
no place in our open society. Such a claim is especially inimical to 
democratic values for reasons borne out by painful experience.261 
  
Finally, the court addressed the government’s argument that the unique nature of 
its fight against international terrorism called for drastic measures.  Marrero focused on 
the role of the judiciary, writing that although courts traditionally gave deference to the 
political branches in these matters, the judiciary had a role to play as well.  Marrero 
concluded that unlike what the government was asking the court to do in the present case, 
in most cases even when courts chose to defer to the other branches, they still retained 
some sort of judicial review.  “[T]he central flaw in the Government’s argument is that it 
invites the Court to ‘assume that [§ 2709] will always advance the asserted [Government] 
interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive activity,’” he wrote.262  
 In 2005, Judge Janet C. Hall of the U.S. District Court of Connecticut considered 
the constitutionality of § 2709 when the four Connecticut librarians who were also 
initially identified only as “John Doe” brought suit against the FBI in Doe II.263  Like the 
                                                 
261 Id. at 519-20. 
 
262 Id. at 524 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 n.22 
(1984)(emphasis added by the court). 
  
263 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005).  As the court had done in Doe I, the Doe II court sealed 
information related to the case, including a section of the opinion, and attempted to keep the identity of the 
plaintiffs and any information related to the NSL confidential.  See, e.g., id. at 77 n.7 & n.8.  In addition, 
the government requested that the court examine much of the evidence it submitted ex parte.  The court 
granted the request.  See id. at 70-71.  However, on appeal the government agreed to let Doe II reveal its 
identity because of changes made to the Patriot Act.  See supra note 313 and accompanying text.  
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ISP plaintiff in Doe I, the plaintiffs in Doe II raised a number of challenges to § 2709, 
including a First Amendment challenge to the non-disclosure provision. 264  They argued 
that § 2709’s “ban on speech prohibit[ed] them from engaging in constitutionally 
protected speech that [was] relevant and perhaps crucial to an ongoing and time-sensitive 
national policy debate” about the Patriot Act and moved “for preliminary relief to enjoin 
enforcement of § 2709(c) as to Doe’s identity.”265  Hall identified the primary frames in 
the case as the First Amendment and judicial power.  The factors Hall used to reach her 
conclusion were First Amendment theory, specifically the role of freedom of expression 
in self-governance and as a check on the government, as well as precedent.  
 Hall began her discussion of the legal issues in the case by noting that the case 
called for a higher standard of review because allowing Doe to reveal its identity would 
render a trial on the merits meaningless.266  Citing Second Circuit precedent, the court 
ruled that Doe had to show both that the government’s prohibition on speech was causing 
irreparable harm and that there was a clear or substantial likelihood Doe would prevail on 
the merits.267  Examining the harm caused by § 2709, Hall relied on precedent to 
determine that the loss of First Amendment rights unquestionably constituted irreparable 
harm.268  In addition, Hall invoked the self-government theory of the First Amendment, 
                                                 
264 See id. at 69 for a summary of the challenges.  
 
265 Id. at 70. 
 
266 Id. at 71-72. 
 
267 Id. at 72 (citing Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1999)).  According to the court, the normal 
standard required “‘first, irreparable injury, and, second, either (a) likelihood of success on the merits, or 
(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships decidedly tipped in the 
movant’s favor.’” Id. at 72 n.3 (quoting Green Party of N.Y. State v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 
411, 418 (2d Cir. 2004)).  
 
268 Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion).  
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writing: “The subject matter of the speech at issue in the pending motion places it at the 
center of First Amendment protection.  Furthermore, in the specific instance at issue in 
the pending motion, there is a current and lively debate in this country over renewal of 
the PATRIOT Act.”269  Although Hall agreed with the government’s argument that Doe 
was free to still speak out against the Patriot Act in a “general manner,” she wrote that 
preventing Doe from identifying itself as a recipient of a NSL prevented Doe from 
commenting fully on the issue. 
Considering the current national interest in and the important issues 
surrounding the debate on renewal of the PATRIOT Act provisions, it is 
apparent to this court that the loss of Doe’s ability to speak out now on the 
subject as a NSL recipient is a real and present loss of its First 
Amendment right to free speech that cannot be remedied.  Doe’s speech 
would be made more powerful by its ability to put a “face” on the service 
of the NSL, and Doe’s political expression is restricted without that 
ability. Doe’s right to identify itself is a First Amendment freedom 
independent from Doe’s right to speak generally about its views on NSLs. 
Doe’s statements as a known recipient of a NSL would have a different 
impact on the public debate than the same statements by a speaker who is 
not identified as a recipient.270 
 
Hall next considered Doe’s likelihood of success on the merits, considering what level of 
scrutiny should be applied to the non-disclosure provision. 
 First, she considered the government’s argument that § 2709 was not a prior 
restraint because, typically, prior restraints were court orders or licensing schemes.271  
Hall, however, concluded that prior restraints are not limited to these two categories of 
restrictions, noting that the Supreme Court had “found a prior restraint when a state 
commission encouraged booksellers not to sell certain books that the commission deemed 
                                                 
269 Id.  Hall categorized the speech as political speech, which she stated was at the “core of First 
Amendment protections.” 
 
270 Id. at 72-73. 
 
271 Id. at 74. 
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objectionable.”272  In addition, Hall held that the government incorrectly argued that § 
2709 should be subject o intermediate scrutiny because it was analogous to a judicial 
order that the Supreme Court subjected to intermediate scrutiny in Seattle Times Co. v. 
Rhinehart.273  Hall wrote that a court order preventing the Seattle Times from disclosing 
information it learned because of forced government disclosure was entirely different 
from “a law barring disclosure of the use of the government’s authority to compel 
disclosure of information.”274  Finally, Hall determined that § 2709 was a content-based 
restriction and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.  Although Hall admitted that the 
government might intend for the provision to serve some purpose other than the 
suppression of speech, a situation which would call for intermediate scrutiny, the non-
disclosure requirement had the practical effect of silencing those who could best 
comment on the practical effects of the Patriot Act itself.275  
Next, Hall considered the government’s contention that even if § 2709 was a prior 
restraint, it met strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
government interest.  Hall framed this portion of the case in terms of the judiciary’s role 
in national security.  Although Hall “recognize[d] the defendants’ expertise in the area of 
counter-terrorism” and was “inclined to afford their judgments in that area deference, 
those judgments remain[ed] subject to judicial review.”  To support this, she quoted the 
                                                 
272 Id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).  
 
273 467 U.S. 20 (1984).  
 
274 Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 74-75. 
 
275 Id. at 75 (“The statute has the practical effect of silencing those who have the most intimate knowledge 
of the statute’s effect and a strong interest in advocating against the federal government’s broad 
investigative powers pursuant to § 2709: those who are actually subjected to the governmental authority by 
imposition of the non-disclosure provision.”). 
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Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that “‘the United States 
Constitution . . . most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual 
liberties are at stake’”276 and a Fourth Circuit case277 that warned of the historical dangers 
of deferring too much to national security concerns.278   
After justifying judicial review of the FBI’s determinations, Hall concluded that 
nothing in the record indicated the government had a compelling interest in preventing 
the disclosure of Doe’s identity.279  Hall called the government’s arguments “speculative” 
and noted that New York Times v. United States required a higher standard than 
speculation to support a prior restraint.280  Finally, the court cited McGehee to counter the 
government’s argument that the “mosaic concept,” which had been used to prevent 
disclosures under Freedom of Information Act, should prevent Doe’s disclosure.  The 
court concluded that this argument was not persuasive because it was considering a 
constitutional right to disseminate information already in Doe’s possession rather than a 
statutory right to gather information.281   
Next, considering if the statute was narrowly tailored, Hall cited the same cases 
the Doe I court had, Butterworth and Kamasinski, as well as Doe I itself, to determine 
                                                 
276 Id. at 76 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)). 
 
277 In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986). 
  
278 Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (quoting In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d at 391-92 (“History teaches us 
how easily the spectre of a threat to ‘national security’ may be used to justify a wide variety of repressive 
government actions. A blind acceptance by the courts of the government’s insistence on the need for 
secrecy, without notice to others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons, would 
impermissibly compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the door to public abuse.”)). 
 
279 Id. at 76-77. 
 
280 Id. at 77. 
  
281 Id. at 77-78. 
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that a permanent ban on speech was inherently not narrowly tailored.282  Concluding its 
discussion, the court relied on the role of free speech as a check on government to 
conclude the statute was not narrowly tailored. 
§ 2709(c) creates a unique situation in which the only people who 
possess non-speculative facts about the reach of broad, federal 
investigatory authority are barred from discussing their experience with 
the public. This ban is particularly noteworthy given the fact that 
advocates of the legislation have consistently relied on the public’s faith in 
the government to apply the statute narrowly in order to advocate for 
passage and reauthorization of various provisions of the Patriot Act.  The 
potential for abuse is written into the statute: the very people who might 
have information regarding investigative abuses and overreaching are 
preemptively prevented from sharing that information with the public and 
with the legislators who empower the executive branch with the tools used 
to investigate matters of national security.283 
 
However, although Hall ruled in favor of Doe and granted a preliminary injunction, she 
stayed the injunction, noting that the government could be irreparably harmed should the 
preliminary injunction be reversed by the court of appeals.   
Although the government appealed the case, while appeals in both Doe I and Doe 
II were pending, Congress passed the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005,284 which substantially changed § 2709 and added new provisions to the Act.  
Based on this action, the Second Circuit remanded Doe I to the Southern District of New 
                                                 
282 Id. at 79-80. 
 
283 Id. at 81-82 (citing Attorney General John Ashcroft, Protecting Life and Liberty (Sept. 18, 2003) 
(transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/091803memphisrem arks.htm) 
(accusing those who fear executive abuse of the increased access to library records under the PATRIOT 
Act of “hysteria” and stating that “the Department of Justice has neither the staffing, the time nor the 
inclination to monitor the reading habits of Americans.  No offense to the American Library Association, 
but we just don’t care.”)). 
 
284 Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (Mar. 9, 2006). 
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York285 to “consider the validity of the revised § 2709(c) and the new procedures codified 
in § 3511.”286  When the case came before District Judge Marrero the second time, Doe 
sought to declare §§ 2709 and 3511 unconstitutional “on their face and as applied under 
the First Amendment and the principle of separation of powers,”287 as well as to have the 
demand for records from Doe set aside.  However, because the government no longer 
sought to enforce the underlying NSL and only moved for dismissal of Doe’s 
constitutional challenges,288 the court did not consider the validity of the NSL. 
 Noting that the government was contending that the changes made to the Act 
directly addressed the concerns he raised in Doe I,289 Marrero began by summarizing the 
changes made in the Reauthorization Act. 
Instead of a categorical, blanket prohibition on disclosure with respect to 
the issuance of any NSL, § 2709(c) now calls for a case-by-case 
determination of the need for a nondisclosure order to accompany an NSL. 
Specifically, the statute provides that a recipient of an NSL is barred from 
disclosing that the FBI “has sought or obtained access to information or 
records” under the NSL statute if the Director of the FBI, or his designee, 
“certifies” that disclosure “may result” in “a danger to the national 
security of the United States, interference with a criminal, 
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with 
diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person” 
(here collectively referred to as the “Enumerated Harms”).290 
 
                                                 
285 Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 2006).  The appeal was a consolidation of Doe I and Doe 
II.  However, on appeal the government conceded that the defendants in Doe II could identify themselves.  
Therefore, the Second Circuit dismissed Doe II as moot.  Id. at 421.  
  
286 Doe III, 500 F.Supp. 2d 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 
287 Id. 
 
288 Id. 
 
289 Id. at 388-89. 
 
290 Id. at 389. 
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In addition, although the statute now specifically provided for judicial review of NSLs, 
the amended statute mandated the level of review, stating that courts could only overturn 
the non-disclosure provision if it found there was “‘no reason to believe’ disclosure ‘may 
result’ in one or more of the Enumerated Harms.” 291  Furthermore, as amended the 
statute provided that if an “authorized senior FBI officials ‘certifies that disclosure may 
endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations, 
such certification shall be treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the certification 
was made in bad faith.’”292  Doe contended the statute remained an unconstitutional prior 
restraint and a content-based restriction on speech because it failed “to provide 
constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards, . . . invest[ed] the FBI with unbridled 
discretion to suppress speech, . . . foreclose[ed] reviewing courts from applying a 
constitutionally mandated standard of review, and . . .  authorize[d] the issuance of 
nondisclosure orders that [were] not narrowly tailored.”293   
In its opinion, the court focused on balancing, discussing the need for balance 
both in terms of the First Amendment294 and separation of powers frames.295  To support 
the conclusion that the Act was still facially unconstitutional, the court relied upon 
precedents related to national security and the First Amendment but also discussed 
democratic theory and originalism.  
                                                 
291 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2)). 
 
292 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2)). 
 
293 Id. 
 
294 Id. at 395 (writing that the case presented “novel issues” involving both national security and the First 
Amendment). 
 
295 Id. at 395-96 (concluding that the “more troubling” issue presented by the case was Congress’ attempt to 
mandate the standard of judicial review required, which offended “the fundamental constitutional principles 
of checks and balances and separation of powers”). 
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The court began by discussing Doe’s claim that the statute did not provide 
constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards.  The court held that the Act should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny because the non-disclosure provision was still a prior 
restraint296 and allowing the FBI to decide on a case-by-case whether the non-disclosure 
would be enforced made the non-disclosure provision both a viewpoint and content-
based restriction.297  Based on this determination, the court ruled that the non-disclosure 
provision could survive only if it were “‘narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
government interest,’”298 there were no “‘less restrictive alternatives [that] would be at 
least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to 
serve,’”299 and the statute contained sufficient “‘procedural safeguards designed to 
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.’”300   As it had done in Doe I, the court cited 
a number of precedents to determine that national security was a compelling government 
interest.301  The court next considered the procedural safeguards required under 
precedent.  Based on Maryland v. Freeman,302 a case involving a statute that made it 
                                                 
296 Id. at 397. 
 
297 Id. (writing that the non-disclosure provision still prevented NSL recipients from participating in the 
public debate about NSLs and the amended 2709(c) also created the risk “that the FBI might engage in 
actual viewpoint discrimination”). 
 
298 Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  
 
299 Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).  
 
300 Id. at 399 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)). 
  
301 Id. at 398-99 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”) and Detroit Free Press v. 
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 706 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The Government certainly has a compelling interest in 
preventing terrorism.”). 
 
302 380 U.S. 51 (1965).  In Freedman, the Court held that licensing schemes that imposed prior restraints on 
protected speech required three procedural safeguards. First, in advance of judicial review prior restraints 
could only be imposed for “a specified brief period.”  Second, further restraints prior to “a final judicial 
determination on the merits” must be limited to “the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial 
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unlawful to exhibit a motion picture prior to obtaining approval, the court held the law 
did not provide enough procedural safeguards.  The court ruled that in order for the 
nondisclosure provision to be constitutional, the government had to “bear the burden of 
going to court to suppress the speech and . . . the burden of proof once in court.”303  The 
court concluded that while the government need not get judicial approval prior to issuing 
an NSL, “within a reasonable and brief period of time, it must either notify the NSL 
recipient that the order is no longer in effect, or justify to a court the need for a continued 
period of nondisclosure.”304   
 Considering the scope of § 2709(c), as it had in Doe I, the court focused on the 
length and totality of the ban on speech.  Citing a concurring opinion from Doe II, the 
court invoked democratic theory and the checking function of the First Amendment to 
criticize the reach of the statute.  Marrero wrote: “[A] ban on speech and a shroud of 
secrecy in perpetuity are antithetical to democratic concepts and do not fit comfortably 
with the fundamental rights guaranteed American citizens.  Unending secrecy of actions 
taken by government officials may also serve as a cover for possible official misconduct 
and/or incompetence.”305  Therefore, although the revised Act incorporated provisions for 
case-by-case review of the nondisclosure requirements, because it “continue[d] to 
authorize nondisclosure  orders that permanently restrict an NSL recipient from engaging 
                                                                                                                                                 
resolution.”  Third, the government had the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and the burden 
of proof once in court.  Id. at 58-59.  
 
303 Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
 
304 Id. 
 
305 Id. at 421-22. 
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in any discussion related to its receipt of the NSL,”306 Marrero held it was not narrowly 
tailored. 
Again focusing on balancing the roles of the courts and the executive branch and 
citing precedent, the court turned to Doe’s claim that the nondisclosure provision 
conferred unbridled discretion on the FBI to censor protected speech.  Although the court 
noted that the Supreme Court had established that any statute that provided government 
officials with discretion to suppress speech must have narrow, objective and definite 
standards to govern decisions307 and “national security” was a vague term, subject to 
broad interpretations which invited abuse,308 it remained “‘well-settled doctrine that 
courts grant substantial deference to the political branches in national security 
matters.’”309  Thus, Marrero was unwilling to rule that the statute’s self-certification 
procedure granted too much discretion to the FBI. 
 Finally, considering the separation of powers issues presented by the case, 
Marrero again relied upon precedent but also included a discussion of framers’ intent.  In 
a scolding tone, Marrero began by noting that while his discussion might seem “like 
unnecessary rehashing” or “tedious repetition,” “sometimes we are compelled to recite 
the obvious again because on occasion, counter to even the most constant refrain of the 
                                                 
306 Id. at 421. 
 
307 Id. at 407.  To support its conclusion, the court discussed Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 
147 (1969), and cited Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), and City of Lakewood 
v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).  Shuttlesworth and Forsyth County both involved parade 
and assembly ordinances.  City of Lakewood involved an ordinance that granted the mayor sole authority 
and discretion to grant or deny applications for annual permits to place newsracks on public property. 
 
308 Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 
(1972), and citing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). 
 
309 Id. (quoting Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), and citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 696 (2001) (“[C]ourts may afford ‘heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches 
with respect to matters of national security.’”)). 
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same theme, the message still goes unnoticed, or inadequately considered, perhaps 
ignored.”310  After discussing framers’ intent and citing the Federalists Papers,311 
Marbury v. Madison312 and, finally, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,313 Marrero concluded that the 
Act was an unconstitutional violation of long established principles. 
Against this backdrop of history and constitutional premises, § 3511(b) 
is invalid because it does not reflect full account of these controlling 
principles and the long-standing national experience from which their 
force derives. That provision amounts to a significant congressional 
incursion, one with profound implications, into exclusive jurisdictional 
ground the Constitution reserves for the judiciary’s role in our 
government.314 
 
Marrero went on to admonish Congress for its foray into judicial powers, warning of the 
consequences of such actions even in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
As Doe I noted, the Court recognized the “heavy weight” of 
September 11, 2001, “a murderous attack of international terrorism, 
unparalleled in its magnitude, and unprecedented in America's national 
security,” that looms over this proceeding.  Its effect is still felt and 
acknowledged by this Court, which sits just a few blocks from where the 
World Trade Center towers fell. . . .  However, new methods of protecting 
and combating threats that result in asserted expansions of executive 
power underscore the courts’ concerns of the dangers in suffering any 
infringement on their essential role under the Constitution.  The 
Constitution was designed so that the dangers of any given moment would 
never suffice as justification for discarding fundamental individual 
liberties or circumscribing the judiciary’s unique role under our 
governmental system in protecting those liberties and upholding the rule 
of law.315 
 
                                                 
310 Id. at 409. 
 
311 Id. 
 
312 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 
313 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 
314 Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 411. 
 
315 Id. at 415 (citation and footnotes omitted). 
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 Thus, as the previous national security/prior restraint cases had done, the courts in 
Doe I, Doe II and Doe III focused on both balancing the First Amendment with national 
security and examined the proper role of the judiciary in national security decisions.  
Although the Doe I court was primarily concerned with balancing freedom of expression, 
by the time the same judge considered the reworked Patriot Act in Doe III, Congress’ 
attempts to place limits on the judiciary’s power caused the court to invoke a separation 
of powers frame.  The cases outlined above are, therefore, as much, if not more, about the 
judiciary’s attempt to articulate its role in national security vis-à-vis the other branches’ 
roles as they are about the judiciary’s attempt to balance national security with freedom 
of expression.  While the judiciary/prior restraint cases share much in common with the 
national security/prior restraint cases—such as a reliance on New York Times v. United 
States, a focus on balancing the First Amendment with other interest, and statements that 
prior restraint are the least tolerable abridgement of expression—they lack any discussing 
of the power of the courts.  This is as should be expected, considering the cases do not 
deal with the other branches of government.  
     
Prior restraints and the judiciary 
 In the 1960s the U.S. Supreme Court overturned four criminal convictions on the 
grounds that media coverage of the trials had deprived the defendants of their right to a 
fair trial by an impartial jury.316  Although the Court recognized that prejudicial publicity 
                                                 
316 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that that a trial judge’s failure to protect a 
defendant from inherently prejudicial publicity and to control disruptive influences of the press in the 
courtroom deprived the defendant of due process); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (holding that a 
defendant was denied due process by the televising of his heavily publicized and highly sensational 
criminal trial); Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that a denial of change of venue 
was a denial of due process after the airing of the defendant’s taped confession); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 
717 (1961) (setting aside a guilty verdict because the jurors were subjected to intense prejudicial publicity 
before a trial). 
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and media activities within the courtroom might affect the fair administration of the 
judicial process, the Court never suggested that trial courts impose prior restraints on the 
media, instead declaring that trials were public events and the press was “plainly free to 
report whatever happens in open court.”317  Nonetheless, some trial judges decided to 
impose prior restraints on the press in an effort to protect the integrity of the judicial 
process.318  The first such case reached a Supreme Court Justice in 1974, when Justice 
Powell, sitting as the circuit justice for the Fifth Circuit, reviewed a gag order directly 
imposed on the press.319  In the years following, the Court considered a number of similar 
cases.  As in the national security and prior restraints cases discussed above, the Court 
often framed the cases in terms of the need to balance freedom of expression with other 
values and rights, in the court cases the right of criminal defendants to a fair trial and the 
need for the proper functioning of the judicial system.  However, because the Court was 
discussing the powers of the judiciary, there was no need to frame any of the cases in 
terms of separation of powers.  Thus, the Court never had to consider how much 
deference to give to other branches of government.  Despite this difference, the two types 
of cases have remarkable similarities. Indeed, overall, the national security and judiciary 
opinions involving prior restrains are very similar to each other.   
Typically, both kinds of cases note that while the First Amendment is not 
absolute, its primary purpose is to prevent prior restraints and the government will have a 
difficult time overcoming that burden.  Furthermore, the majority of opinions in both 
                                                 
317 Estes, 381 U.S. at 541-42. 
 
318 See, e.g., Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Oklahoma Pub’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 
308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Times-Picayune Pub. Corp. v. 
Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974). 
 
319 Times-Picayune Pub. Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974). 
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categories of cases frame the key legal issue as the need to balance the First Amendment 
with some other constitutional mandate. In addition, they often cite the same cases as 
precedent and apply the same test to determine when a prior restraint is constitutional.  In 
fact, many of the judiciary cases discussed in this section of the chapter were used to 
reach and justify decisions discussed above.  This is seen most notably in the Patriot Act 
cases, perhaps because they occurred most recently.    
 The first time a prior restraint related to media coverage of a judicial proceeding  
reached a Supreme Court Justice was in Times-Picayune Publishing v. Schulingkamp, a 
case involving a request for a stay of an order of the Louisiana Criminal District Court for 
the Parish of Orleans, which had prevented publication of information obtained at pretrial 
proceedings and the trials of two defendants accused of rape and murder.320  The court’s 
order imposed “a total ban on reporting of testimony given in hearings on pretrial 
motions” and “other selective restrictions on reporting” for the duration of the trial.321  
Justice Powell framed the case as one requiring balancing the First Amendment rights of 
the press with the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant to a fair trial.322  Although he 
wrote that “[t]he task of reconciling First Amendment rights with the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial before an impartial jury [was] not an easy one,” Powell relied upon precedent 
to determine the restraint was unconstitutional.323 
                                                 
320 Id. at 1301. 
 
321 Id. at 1304. 
 
322 Id. at 1305 (writing the case presented “a fundamental confrontation between the competing values of 
free press and fair trial”). 
 
323 Id. at 1308. 
 
 142 
 
 Powell began his opinion by citing a number of previous Supreme Court rulings 
that had also been relied upon in the prior restraints and national security cases.324 Powell 
discussed and cited New York Times v. United States,325 Organization for a Better Austin 
v. Keefe,326 Bantam Books v. Sullivan327 and Near v. Minnesota.328  Turning to precedents 
related to attending, viewing or reporting on the judicial process, Powell noted that a 
number of the Court’s decisions had “recognized that trials are public events.”329  Yet, 
Powell countered this by citing previous Court decisions that had “shown a special 
solicitude for preserving fairness in a criminal trial,”330 focusing especially on Branzburg 
v. Hayes,331 the famous reporter’s privilege case.  Powell reasoned that while the Court 
had stated in dictum in Branzburg that “newsmen might be prohibited from publishing 
information about trials if such restrictions were necessary to assure a defendant a fair 
trial,”332 nothing in the Court’s opinion indicated a prior restraint issued by a court would 
be subjected to a standard materially different from any other prior restraint.333  Powell 
concluded that in the present case, the government had not met the high burden of proof 
                                                 
324 Id. at 1307. 
 
325 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 
326 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
. 
327 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
 
328 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 
329 Times-Picayune Pub. Corp., 419 U.S. at 1307 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-50 
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381U.S. 532, 541 (1965); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)). 
 
330 Id. at 1307 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 222, 271 (1941); Rideau v. Louisiana 373 U.S. 723, 
726 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)). 
 
331 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 
332 Times-Picayune Pub. Corp., 419 U.S. at 1307 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685). 
 
333 Id. 
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required to sustain a prior restraint, especially one that was “both pervasive and of 
uncertain duration.”334 
 Two years later, the full Court considered the right to report on judicial 
proceedings in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart and ruled that a gag order was 
unconstitutional.335  The landmark case involved the prosecution of Erwin Charles 
Simants for the murder of six individuals in Sutherland, Nebraska.  The preliminary 
hearing for Simants was held in an open courtroom, but because of the pervasive 
publicity, the trial judge issued an order barring publication of testimony and evidence, as 
well as requiring journalists to abide by the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines, voluntary 
standards dealing with the reporting of crimes and criminal trials.336  When members of 
the media appealed, District Court Judge Hugh Stuart entered a new order that 
incorporated the press-bar guidelines and prohibited publication of “the existence or 
contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement officers, which had been 
introduced in open court,” certain aspects of medical testimony from the preliminary 
hearing, information that indicated that Simants had sexually assaulted some of the 
victims after murdering them, and the existence of the order itself until after a jury had 
been impaneled.337  Noting that Nebraska law did not allow the trial to be postponed 
more than six months and allowed a change of venue only to adjoining counties, where 
there would still be publicity, the Nebraska Supreme Court modified the order, but 
                                                 
334 Id. at 1308 (“On the record before me, and certainly in the absence of any showing of an imminent 
threat to fair trial, I cannot say that the order of the state court would withstand the limitations that this 
Court has applied in determining the propriety of prior restraints on publication.”). 
 
335 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
 
336 Id. at 542. 
 
337 Id. at 543-44. 
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refused to overturn it.338  The Nebraska Supreme Court’s order removed references to the 
press-bar guidelines but prohibited the disclosure of “the existence and nature of any 
confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers,  . . . any 
confessions or admissions made to any third parties, except members of the press, and . . . 
other facts ‘strongly implicative’ of the accused.”339  The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari eleven days after the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision but denied a motion 
to expedite review or to stay the gag order.340   
Although all nine justices agreed the order was unconstitutional, they offered 
different reasons for their conclusions and framed the case in different terms.  Both the 
majority’s opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, and a concurring opinion by Powell 
followed Powell’s opinion in Times-Picayune and focused on the need to balance 
freedom of expression with the proper functioning of the judicial system.341  Brennan, 
joined by Marshall and Stewart, framed the case totally in terms of the First Amendment, 
arguing for a complete ban on all prior restraints imposed by courts.342  Finally, in 
                                                 
338 State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 797 (1975).  
 
339 Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 545 (citing Simants, 194 Neb. at 797). 
 
340 Id. at 546. 
 
341 Id. at 570 (writing that the case was about “confrontation between prior restraint imposed to protect one 
vital constitutional guarantee and the explicit command of another that the freedom to speak and publish 
shall not be abridged”); id. at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that a prior restraint was appropriate 
to protect the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant upon “showing that (i) there is a clear threat to the 
fairness of trial, (ii) such a threat is posed by the actual publicity to be restrained, and (iii) no less restrictive 
alternatives are available.”). 
 
342 Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).  While Brennan agreed the right to a fair trial was “one of the most 
precious and sacred safeguards enshrined in the Bill of Rights,” he concluded that a prior restraint was an 
impermissible way to protect that right.  
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separate concurrences, White and Stevens indicated they might agree to an absolute ban 
at a later date but were unwilling to do so in the present case.343   
Burger relied on originalism and First Amendment and Sixth Amendment 
precedents to support his conclusion.  Noting that there was a long history of conflict 
between freedom of expression and the fair administration of justice344 and using 
originalism to support his contention that the rights of the press had to be balanced with 
other rights,345 Burger concluded that rather than “write a code” to govern all clashes 
between the two principles the court should rely on ad hoc balancing and look to the 
particulars of each individual case.346  
After reviewing a number of decisions involving the Sixth Amendment rights of 
defendants to a fair trial,347 Burger concluded that while “taken together, these cases 
demonstrate[ed] that pretrial publicity, even pervasive, adverse publicity, does not 
                                                 
343 Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring) (“[F]or the reasons which the Court itself canvasses there is grave 
doubt in my mind whether orders with respect to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be 
justifiable.  It may be the better part of discretion, however, not to announce such a rule in the first case in 
which the issue has been squarely presented here.”); id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Stevens wrote that 
while he was not prepared to answer whether the First Amendment categorically barred prior restraints in 
all situations without further arguments on the matter, he was in substantial agreement with much of 
Brennan’s opinion.  Stevens concluded that if he was “ever required to face the issues squarely,” he might 
“well accept [Brennan’s] ultimate conclusion.” 
 
344 Id. at 547-50.  Burger wrote that while “[t]he problems presented by this case are almost as old as the 
Republic,” a balance between the two interests was not discussed by the framers of the Constitution.  In 
addition, Burger discussed the trials of Aaron Burr and Bruno Hampton and attempts by the American Bar 
Association to establish guidelines to “accommodate the right to a fair trial and the rights of a free press.”  
Id. at 548-50.   
  
345 See id. at 548 (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay).   
 
346 Id. at 550-51. 
 
347 Burger discussed Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1966); 
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333 (1966); and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). 
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inevitably lead to an unfair trial,”348 the trial judge had a major responsibility to make 
sure media coverage did not unfairly influence a jury.349  Based on this Burger 
concluded: 
The state trial judge in the case before us acted responsibly, out of a 
legitimate concern, in an effort to protect the defendant's right to a fair 
trial.  What we must decide is not simply whether the Nebraska courts 
erred in seeing the possibility of real danger to the defendant's rights, but 
whether in the circumstances of this case the means employed were 
foreclosed by another provision of the Constitution.350 
 
To accomplish this, Burger again relied on familiar precedent, discussing Near v. 
Minnesota,351 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,352 and New York Times Co. v. 
United States.353  Burger concluded that these cases, taken together, demonstrated “prior 
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable 
infringement on First Amendment rights.”354  Returning to originalism, Burger wrote that 
the problem was balancing these two lines of cases. 
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities 
as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as 
superior to the other. In this case, the petitioners would have us declare the 
right of an accused subordinate to their right to publish in all 
circumstances. But if the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the 
potential conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the 
issue by assigning to one priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite 
the Constitution by undertaking what they declined to do.355 
                                                 
348 Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 554. 
 
349 Id. at 555. 
 
350 Id. at 555-56. 
 
351 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 
352 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
 
353 403 U.S. 713 (1972). 
 
354 Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 559. 
 
355 Id. at 561. 
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To solve the problem, Burger adopted the clear and present danger test 
established in the early 20th century sedition cases, reasoning that the constitutionality of 
a gag order could be decided by determining if “‘the gravity of the “evil,” discounted by 
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger.’”356  To determine this, Burger wrote there were three factors that had to be 
considered: “the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage, . . . whether other measures 
would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity,”  and, finally, 
“how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger.”357  
Applying the three factors to the case, Burger wrote that while there was a risk that 
pretrial coverage would have “some adverse impact” on the jurors,358 Judge Stuart had 
failed to consider any alternatives to a prior restraint,359 and it was doubtful that a gag 
order would be effective in such a small community.360  Additionally, Burger noted that 
precedent had established that the press was free to publish information it had gathered in 
an open courtroom.361  Thus, while Burger wrote that freedom of expression was “not an 
absolute prohibition under all circumstances,” the “barriers to prior restraint remain[ed] 
high and the presumption against its use continue[d] intact.”362 
                                                 
356 Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951). 
 
357 Id. 
 
358 Id. at 569. 
 
359 Id. at 565. 
 
360 Id. at 566-67. 
 
361 Id. at 568 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469, 495 (1975); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947)).  
 
362 Id. at 570. 
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In contrast, Brennan’s opinion did not accept that there was a need to balance 
First and Sixth Amendment concerns in these kinds of cases.  Noting that judges had a 
wide range of options to prevent prejudicial publicity from reaching jurors, Brennan 
concluded there was no need to resort to restraints on expression.363  Although he framed 
the case differently than Burger, to support his conclusion Brennan also relied on Sixth364 
and First Amendment precedents,365 citing many of the same cases as the Chief Justice.  
However, Brennan also invoked First Amendment theory, including the role of freedom 
of expression in self-government and as a check on government abuses,366 and discussed 
practical problems with ad hoc balancing.367   
                                                 
363 Id. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., concurring).  See also id. at 601-04 (discussing the other options available to 
Judge Stuart in the case). 
 
364 Like Burger, Brennan cited Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 
540 (1965); Rideau v. Lousiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).  In 
addition, Brennan cited Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), and Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 
(1976).  
  
365 As Burger had done, Brennan relied on Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1972); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); and Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).  However, Brennan also cited Miami Herald Pub’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 
(1947); and Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).  In addition, Brennan focused on cases dealing 
with prior restraints in much greater detail than did Burger.  See infa notes 394-95 and accompanying text. 
 
366 Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Commentary and reporting on the 
criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that 
system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the administration of government. Secrecy of judicial 
action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the competence and 
impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public 
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice 
system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure 
and public accountability.”). 
 
367 Id. at 604-08. 
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Brennan wrote that although the Court had stated “the right to a fair trial has been 
called ‘the most fundamental of all freedoms,’”368 there was no need to balance the Sixth 
Amendment with the First Amendment.   
[T]he past decade has witnessed substantial debate, colloquially known as 
the Free Press/Fair Trial controversy, concerning this interface of First and 
Sixth Amendment rights. In effect, we are now told by respondents that 
the two rights can no longer coexist . . . .  I disagree. Settled case law 
concerning the impropriety and constitutional invalidity of prior restraints 
on the press compels the conclusion that there can be no prohibition on the 
publication by the press of any information pertaining to pending judicial 
proceedings or the operation of the criminal justice system. . . .  This does 
not imply, however, any subordination of Sixth Amendment rights, for an 
accused’s right to a fair trial may be adequately assured through methods 
that do not infringe First Amendment values.369 
 
Brennan next concluded that while First Amendment protections were not 
unlimited even when evaluating prior restraints,370 the Court had previously determined 
that the First Amendment’s primary purpose was to prevent prior restraints371 and it 
afforded greater protections against them than it did against subsequent punishment for 
speech.372  Thus, Brennan concluded that prior restraints were justified only when the 
speech was “of a lesser value.”373  Turning specifically to prior restraints of judicial 
information, Brennan argued they were especially problematic for two reasons.  First, 
                                                 
368 Id. at 586 (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 540). 
 
369 Id. at 588. 
 
370 Id. at 590 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 716). 
 
371 Id. at 588-89 (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); Near, 283 U.S. at 713; 
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). 
 
372 Id. (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 
393 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1968)).  
 
373 Id. at 590 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 481 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words)).  
Brennan went on to explain at length that even when prior restraints were permissible, they were 
exceptionally difficult to justify.  Id. at 592-93. 
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there was an absolute right to publish information obtained in open court because it was 
in the public domain.374  Second, because a judge would have to speculate on the harmful 
effects of prejudicial information, Brennan concluded that prior restraints were 
inappropriate regarding “any information pertaining to the criminal justice system, even 
if derived from nonpublic sources and regardless of the means employed by the press in 
its acquisition.”375  Brennan argued that the farthest the Court had ever gone in support of 
prior restraints was to suggest in dictum that prior restraints might be acceptable in cases 
of national security where there was evidence of “certain, direct, and immediate harm.”376  
Thus, as opposed to Burger who suggested the relative values of the Sixth and First 
Amendment’s must be weighed against each other on a case-by-case basis, Brennan 
concluded that prior restraints in these kinds of cases were never appropriate. 
A year later, the issue returned to the Court in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. 
District Court,377 a case involving an order preventing the publication of the name and 
picture of an eleven-year-old charged with murder.  In a short per curiam opinion, the 
Court reinforced the right to publish information learned in open court, relying entirely 
on precedent.  The Court simply stated that Nebraska Press Association and Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn378 had clearly established that the First Amendment 
protected “the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court 
                                                 
374 Id. at 597-98. 
 
375 Id. at 599. 
   
376 Id. at 599 (“The only exception that has thus far been recognized even in dictum to the blanket 
prohibition against prior restraints against publication of material which would otherwise be 
constitutionally shielded was the ‘military security’ situation addressed in New York Times Co. v. United 
States.”) 
 
377 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
 
378 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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proceedings which were in fact open to the public.”379  The Court held that although there 
was a state statute that clearly provided for the closing of juvenile hearings, because the 
hearing was not closed, it was unconstitutional to order the media not to report what they 
learned.380  
  In 1984 the Court engaged in a much lengthier analysis of judicial restraints on 
the press in a case involving a court order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing 
information divulged as part of discovery in a civil case against the newspaper.  Seattle 
Times v. Rhinehart381 involved a defamation suit by the leader of the Aquarius 
Foundation, Keith Milton Rhinehart, and others against the Seattle Times.  Because the 
plaintiffs were alleging a loss of members and donations due to the Times’ stories, the 
Seattle Times filed a motion to compel the disclosure of Rhinehart’s and the Foundation’s 
financial records, including a list of the Foundation’s donors and members.382  After a 
series of motions by both parties, the court issued an order compelling Rhinehart and the 
Foundation to identify all donors who had contributed to the Foundation in the last five 
years and reveal membership information.  In addition, the court issued an order 
preventing the Seattle Times from “publishing, disseminating, or using the information in 
any way except where necessary to prepare for and try the case.”383  When the 
Washington Supreme Court upheld the order, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
                                                 
379 Oklahoma Pub’g, 430 U.S. at 310. 
 
380 Id. at 311. 
 
381 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
 
382 Id. at 24-25. 
 
383 Id. at 27.  The order specified that the newspaper was free to publish any information gained by means 
other than the discovery process. 
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noting there were conflicts among lower courts regarding the placing of restrictions on 
the publication of information learned during discovery.384 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell framed the case as a clash between the 
Seattle Times’ First Amendment rights and “the duty and discretion of a trial court to 
oversee the discovery process.”385  After again noting that First Amendment rights were 
not absolute,386 Powell applied intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny or a 
balancing test.387  Although he never specifically explained why he was applying 
intermediate scrutiny, Powell put forward a number of reasons related to “the extent of 
the impairment of First Amendment rights”388 that suggested intermediate scrutiny was 
proper.  Citing two cases dealing with First Amendment access rights, Zemel v. Rusk389 
and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,390 Powell reasoned that “[a] litigant has no First 
Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his 
suit,”391 discovery hearings were traditionally closed to the public,392 and the order was 
                                                 
384 Id. at 29.  The Court noted that the Washington Supreme Court’s holding was consistent with the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Inter’l Prod. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d 1963), but conflicted with the 
holdings of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 
(1979), and “applied a different standard” than the First Circuit’s decision in In re San Juan Star Co., 662 
F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 
385 Id. at 31. 
 
386 Id. (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-95 (1950)). 
 
387 Id. at 32 (writing that it was necessary to “consider whether the ‘practice in question [furthers] an 
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression’ and whether ‘the 
limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of 
the particular governmental interest involved.’ (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).  
 
388 Id. at 32. 
 
389 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 
390 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
 
391 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 (citing Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16-17) (“The right to speak and publish does not 
carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”). 
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“not the kind of classic prior restraint that require[d] exacting First Amendment 
scrutiny.”393 Furthermore, Powell argued that the restriction was not targeted at the 
Seattle Times’ First Amendment rights, but rather that the First Amendment infringement 
was incidental to the effort to protect the discovery process.394   
Determining that the trial court’s duty to protect a liberal discovery process was a 
substantial interest and the order was narrowly tailored, Powell upheld the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision.395  It is important to note, however, Powell made the 
distinction between information gathered as part of the discovery process and the exact 
same information if it was learned outside the discovery process.  Powell wrote that the 
Seattle Times could “disseminate the identical information covered by the protective 
order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court’s 
processes.”396  Although it would appear this situation would be at least somewhat 
analogous to a CIA agent publishing information he learned outside the scope of his 
duties but identical to information learned as part of his duties, it is a different standard 
than that used by courts when considering government employee confidentiality 
agreements.397   
Brennan, joined by Marshall, filed a brief concurring opinion. Brennan, however, 
wrote that the governmental interest advanced by the order was not the discovery process 
                                                                                                                                                 
392 Id. at 33 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 389). 
 
393 Id. at 33-34 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 399) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 
394 Id. at 34. 
  
395 Id. at 34-35.   
 
396 Id. 
 
397 See, e.g., supra notes 252-62 and accompanying text. 
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itself, but rather the protection of the Foundation members’ right to privacy and religious 
freedom.398  Therefore, while Brennan did not change his stance that there was no need to 
balance First Amendment rights with the effective operation of the judicial system, he did 
retreat from his statement that the press would be protected when publishing truthful 
information regardless of how it obtained the information. 
The final time a case involving a prior restraint imposed on the publication of 
information related to a judicial proceeding came to the Court was the 1990 case of 
Butterworth v. Smith.399  Butterworth involved a Florida statute that prohibited grand jury 
witnesses from ever disclosing the testimony they gave before the grand juries.400  The 
case began when Michael Smith, a reporter for the Charlotte Herald-News in Charlotte 
County, Florida, was called to testify before a special grand jury about information he 
had obtained while writing a series of newspaper articles about alleged improprieties 
committed by the Charlotte County State Attorney’s Office and Sheriff’s Department.401  
Wishing to publish a story and a book about the subject of the investigation and his 
testimony and experiences before the grand jury, Smith sued in United States District 
Court.  Smith sought a declaration that the Florida statute barring disclosure was 
unconstitutional and an injunction preventing his prosecution under the statute.  Like the 
other opinions in this section, Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court 
framed the case as involving the need to balance First Amendment rights against 
                                                 
398 Id. at 38 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 
399 494 U.S. 624 (1990). 
 
400 Fla. Stat. § 905.27 (1985). 
 
401 Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 626. 
 
 155 
 
Florida’s interest in “preserving the confidentiality of its grand jury proceedings.”402  
Finding the statute was an unconstitutional prior restraint as it applied to divulging one’s 
own testimony and experiences before the grand jury, Rehnquist discussed the history of 
the grand jury, First Amendment precedents and legislative intent. 
Rehnquist began his opinion by discussing the history of grand jury proceedings 
and laying out a number of reasons why the state had an interest in keep the proceedings 
secret.  First, he noted that if the proceedings were made public, fewer witnesses would 
be willing to fully and frankly testify.  Second, he reasoned that those under investigation 
might flee or attempt to influence the testimony of witnesses called before the grand jury.  
Finally, Rehnquist wrote that the state had an interest in making sure those who were not 
indicted by the grand jury were not subjected to public ridicule.403 
Rehnquist next distinguished the case from Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, noting that 
because the restriction involved the dissemination of information lawfully obtained 
before Smith’s grand jury testimony, it was more akin to the Court’s post-publication 
punishment decisions in Landmark Communications v. Virginia,404 Smith v. Daily 
Mail,405 and Florida Star v. BJF.406  Based on these precedents, Rehnquist concluded that 
because the order involved “core First Amendment speech,” a permanent ban that did not 
serve many of the state’s asserted interests, and those that were served were “not 
                                                 
402 Id. at 630. 
 
403 Id.  
 
404 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
 
405 443 U.S. 97 (1989). 
 
406 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
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sufficient to sustain the statute,”407 it was an unconstitutional infringement on protected 
speech.  Rehnquist wrote that when the investigation ended there was no reason to keep 
information from the subject of the investigation.  Second, he reasoned that after the 
investigation, there was no reason to worry about the effect of disclosure on witnesses.408  
Third, the statute did not advance the government’s interest in preventing retribution 
because witnesses were still free not to divulge their own testimony, and the Court was 
not considering the statute’s ban on disclosing other witnesses’ testimony.409  Finally, 
Rehnquist concluded that while the state’s interest in protecting individuals who were 
exonerated by the grand jury was advanced by the statute, that interest was not strong 
enough to overcome Smith’s First Amendment rights under the reasoning of Landmark 
Communications, Florida Star, Daily Mail and Oklahoma Publishing Co.410  
Foreshadowing Judge Marrero’s decision in the Patriot Act cases, Rehnquist concluded 
that the scope of the statute made its restrictions especially serious. 
The effect [of the statute] is dramatic: before he is called to testify in 
front of the grand jury, respondent is possessed of information on matters 
of admitted public concern about which he was free to speak at will. After 
giving his testimony, respondent believes he is no longer free to 
communicate this information since it relates to the “content, gist, or 
import” of his testimony. The ban extends not merely to the life of the 
grand jury but into the indefinite future. The potential for abuse of the 
Florida prohibition, through its employment as a device to silence those 
                                                 
407 Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 633. 
 
408 Id. at 632-33. 
 
409 Id. 
 
410 Id. at 634. (“[O]ur decisions establish that absent exceptional circumstances, reputational interests alone 
cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech.”) (citing Landmark Commc’n, 435 U.S. at 841-42; 
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103; Oklahoma Pub’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 
308 (1977)). 
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who know of unlawful conduct or irregularities on the part of public 
officials, is apparent.411 
 
Justice Scalia wrote a short concurring opinion attempting to frame the Court’s 
decision as a narrow one.412  The opinion is especially noteworthy because, as discussed 
above, the government would rely on its argument in the Patriot Act cases.413  Scalia 
wrote there was a difference between ruling that a witness could divulge what he knew 
and ruling he could divulge that he told that information to a grand jury.  While Scalia 
wrote he was doubtful the state could ever prevent a witness from disclosing his own 
information, even while the grand jury was sitting, he did not believe the Court was 
considering whether Smith could divulge the existence of the grand jury proceeding 
itself.414  In language that would be quoted by the government in the Patriot Act cases, 
Scalia wrote, “There may be quite good reasons why the State would want the latter 
information—which is in a way information of the State’s own creation—to remain 
confidential even after the term of the grand jury has expired.”415 
Thus, from 1974 to 1990, the Supreme Court ruled multiple times that the First 
Amendment protected the right to disseminate information about the judiciary.  The only 
time the Court ruled that other concerns limited the reach of the First Amendment was its 
decision in Seattle Times that the First Amendment did not protect information learned 
                                                 
411 Id. at 635-36. 
 
412 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join the Court's opinion because I interpret that to refer to the 
information contained within the witness’ testimony, but not necessarily to the fact that the witness 
conveyed that information to the grand jury.”). 
 
413 See e.g.,Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  See supra note 281 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Doe I’s use of the cases. 
 
414 Id.  
 
415 Id.  
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solely through discovery, although it was willing to allow the dissemination of that 
information if it was learned in some other manner.  Many of these cases used reasoning 
similar to the national security-prior restraint cases, with the notable exceptions of those 
cases that dealt with employee confidentiality agreements and Progressive.   
Thus, the research demonstrates that the Court’s holding that the primary purpose 
of the First Amendment is to prevent prior restraints is strong enough that it runs across 
categories of cases.  Furthermore, prior restraint doctrine is so strong that those 
attempting to uphold government restrictions must either frame the cases as dealing with 
some issue other than the First Amendment—as the dissenting justices in the Pentagon 
Papers did—or attempt to convince the court that the restriction is not a prior restraint at 
all—as the government attempted to do in the Patriot Act cases.  Thus, as noted, the 
major difference between the national security and judiciary cases has not been 
determining the strength of a First Amendment right to publish information without prior 
restraint, but rather what level of deference a court should give the executive when 
determining if classified information will be harmful.  Except for this key difference, 
however, the vast majority of opinions in both categories of cases at least partially framed 
the key legal issue as the need to balance the First Amendment with some other 
constitutional mandate. 
Indeed, it is notable how many of the opinions outlined in this chapter rely on 
similar precedents or each other to justify their conclusions and how many followed 
similar patterns.  After writing that the First Amendment’s protections are not absolute, 
many of the judges attempted to weigh competing interests to determine how far the 
Amendment’s protections extended.  Even Brennan’s concurring opinion in Nebraska 
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Press Association, one of the strongest defenses of the First Amendment discussed in this 
chapter, admitted that there were some national security cases in which the First 
Amendment might not protect against a prior restraint.  However, despite this focus on 
the importance of national security and many of the jurists’ apparent deference to the 
executive branch, with the exception of the government employee cases and Progressive, 
the First Amendment’s prohibition against prior restraints and the judiciary’s refusal to 
totally defer to the executive branch seem to be consistent in these cases.  Yet, while the 
government employee cases certainly stand out as cases in which the judiciary was the 
least willing to intrude on executive decisions, it is interesting to compare these cases, as 
well as the government’s argument in the Patriot Act cases, to Seattle Times and Scalia’s 
dissent in Butterworth. As Scalia noted, it appears that the courts are least willing to 
prevent prior restraints when the information in question was gained through direct 
interaction with the government or—as Scalia put it—is of the government’s own 
creation.  It will be telling to see if this argument is advanced by the government when 
Doe III is appealed, as it surely will be.  If the government continues to advance the 
argument that prohibiting ISPs and librarians from disseminating information related to 
NSLs is allowable because the information is “of the government’s own creation,” it is 
quite possible that current members of the Court other than Scalia will be persuaded by 
the argument and have an easy way to justify side-stepping the Court’s jurisprudential 
regime against prior restraints. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
National Security Information and Post-publication Punishments 
 
On May 21, 2006, while appearing on ABC’s This Week, then Attorney General 
Alberto R. Gonzales raised the possibility that New York Times journalists could be 
prosecuted for publishing classified information about the National Security Agency’s 
surveillance of terrorist-related calls between the United States and abroad.1  When asked 
if the prosecution of journalists for publishing classified information was legal, the 
Attorney General responded, “There are some statutes on the book which, if you read the 
language carefully, would seem to indicate that that is a possibility.”2  Gonzales went on 
to say:  
I understand very much the role that the press plays in our society, the 
protection under the First Amendment we want to promote and respect . . . 
but it can’t be the case that that right trumps over the right that Americans 
would like to see, the ability of the federal government to go after criminal 
activity.3   
 
Although the justice department never prosecuted the journalists, Gonzales’ statement 
raised a number of questions regarding the ability of the government to prosecute  
                                                 
1 See Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, at 
A04. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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journalists for the possession or publication of national security information.4  While 
some authors have suggested the U.S. government is in need of a new statute that grants 
broad powers to prevent the publication of national security information,5 in reality there 
is already a large body of laws that punish the dissemination of national security 
information. 6  However, as at least one court has noted, these laws have been 
infrequently used to prosecute individuals who disseminate information, except in 
“classic espionage cases.”7  The most famous cases involving the publishing of national 
security information by a newspaper, New York Times v. United States,8 never directly 
addressed the government’s ability to prosecute an individual for disseminating the 
information.  Although several of the justices discussed the question of whether the two 
newspapers could be prosecuted for possession or publication after the fact, and in dicta 
some of the justices indicated that the newspapers could or should be prosecuted,9 the 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the government’s ability to prosecute the press for the possession and/or publication of 
national security information, see Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The Government’s 
Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession or Publication of National Security Information, 13 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 447 (2008). 
 
5 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006); Eric E. Ballou & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Note, Plugging the Leak: The Case For A 
Legislative Resolution of the Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open 
Government, 71 VA. L. REV. 801 (1985). 
 
6 See Jennifer K. Elsea, Protection of National Security Information: Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, June 30, 2006, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68797.pdf. 
 
7 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1066 (4th Cir. 1988).   
 
8 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 
9 Id. at 735 (White, J., concurring) (“The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions potentially relevant 
to these cases.”); id. at 743 (Marshall, J., concurring) (Congress has given the executive branch the power 
to punish the receipt, disclosure, communication, and publication of “certain documents, photographs, 
instruments, appliances, and information” related to state secrets.); id. at 752 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“I am 
in general agreement with much of what Mr. Justice White has expressed with respect to penal sanctions 
concerning communication or retention of documents or information relating to the national defense.”); id. 
at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (It was left undecided whether “the newspapers are entitled to retain and use 
the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents, or the originals of 
which they are duplicates, were purloined from the Government’s possession and that the newspapers 
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question was never answered because the government never attempted to prosecute either 
newspaper.  Additionally, although the government attempted to prosecute Daniel 
Ellsberg for giving the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times and Washington Post, the 
case was dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct.10  Thus, while New York Times v. 
United States suggested it would be very difficult for the government to meet the high 
burden required to impose a prior restraint preventing the dissemination of national 
security information, the ability of the government to punish the publication of classified 
information has been infrequently addressed by courts.  There are, however, a few cases 
that illuminate the issue. 
This chapter of the dissertation discusses three cases that considered post-
publication punishments for disseminating national security information and examines 
how those courts framed the key legal issues presented by the cases and the legal factors 
the judges used to reach their decisions.  The chapter first examines the 1981 Supreme 
Court decision in Haig v. Agee,11 which considered whether the revocation of a passport 
for disseminating information about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) violated the 
First Amendment rights of a former CIA employee.  Next, it discusses the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Morison, 12 the 1988 appeal of former U.S. 
Navy analyst Samuel Morison, who was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 641 and two 
                                                                                                                                                 
received them with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired.”);  id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“I also am in substantial accord with much that Mr. Justice White says, by way of admonition, 
in the latter part of his opinion.”). 
 
10 United States v. Russo, No. 9373-(WMB)-(1) (filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973).  
For a discussion of the case, see Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues 
Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1974). 
 
11 453 U.S. 280 (1980).  
 
12 Morison, 844 F.2d 1057.   
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subsections of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 7939(d) and (e), for giving national 
security information to one “not entitled to receive it.” It continues with the more recent 
case of United States v. Rosen,13 part of an ongoing attempt by the U.S. government to 
prosecute two former lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) for violating the Espionage Act.  Finally, the chapter compares the frameworks 
and legal factors these three courts used to those used by the Supreme Court in the few 
cases the high court has heard involving attempts to punish publication of information 
relating to or obtained from the judiciary. 
As in the prior restraint cases discussed in chapter two, the two most frequently 
used frames were the need to balance national security with freedom of expression and 
separation of powers issues.  In addition, as in chapter two, the most commonly relied 
upon legal factor used to reach or justify decisions was precedent.  However, this only 
presents a partial picture of the opinions.  Although there were only a limited number of 
cases identified that considered post-publication punishments, the opinions were notably 
complex, many relying on a multitude of factors.  In addition, unlike the prior restraint 
cases, there was very little intersection between the two sets of cases examined in this 
chapter.  The opinions discussed below demonstrate that the Court has yet to articulate an 
approach to post-publication punishment cases that lower courts can follow across 
categories.  While the judiciary cases consistently relied on the clear and present danger 
line of cases to reach conclusions, the national security opinions did not, and the two sets 
of cases rarely, if ever, cited each other.   
 
 
                                                 
13 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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Post-publication punishments and national security 
 
In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the First Amendment rights of a 
former CIA employee to disseminate information about the agency in Haig v. Agee.14 In 
1974, Philip Agee, a former CIA employee living abroad, announced his campaign to 
fight the CIA by exposing the identities of CIA officers and agents operating around the 
world.15  According to the Court, Agee’s identifications violated the same secrecy oath at 
issue in Snepp v. United States,16 “prejudiced the ability of the United States to obtain 
intelligence,” and resulted in the murder of numerous CIA agents.17  In response to 
Agee’s activities, the U.S. Department of State revoked Agee’s U.S. passport in 
December 1979, advised Agee of his right to an administrative hearing and offered to 
hold such a hearing in West Germany, Agee’s country of residence, on five days notice.18  
Instead, Agee filed suit alleging that the regulation19 under which the Secretary of State 
had revoked his passport had not been authorized by Congress, that the regulation was 
overbroad, that the revocation prior to a hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to 
                                                 
14 453 U.S. 280 (1980).  
 
15 Id. at 283. 
 
16 444 U.S. 507 (1980).  As discussed in chapter two, in Snepp the government brought suit against a 
former CIA agent, Frank W. Snepp, seeking a declaration that Snepp had breached his contract, an 
injunction requiring him to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order imposing the 
creation of a constructive trust for the government’s benefit on all profits that Snepp might earn from 
publishing a book in violation of secrecy agreement. 
 
17 Haig, 453 U.S. at 285-86. 
 
18 Id. at 286-87. 
 
19 22 CFR § 51.70(b)(4) (1980). 
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due process, and the revocation violated his Fifth Amendment liberty interest as well his 
First Amendment right to criticize the government.20 
Despite Agee’s constitutional claims, the district court, the court of appeals and 
the U.S. Supreme Court all framed the case primarily in terms of separation of powers, 
focusing on the statutory grant of powers to the Secretary of State.  Finding for Agee, the 
district court held that the regulation under which the Secretary revoked Agee’s passport 
exceeded the statutory powers of the Secretary.21  A divided panel of the D.C. Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Zemel v. Rusk,22 the court 
of appeals held that the Secretary was required to show either that Congress had 
expressly authorized the regulation or that there was implied approval of “substantial and 
consistent” administrative actions.  Because the court found neither, it held there was no 
statutory authority for the revocation.23  Following the lower courts’ lead, the Supreme 
Court presented a narrow frame, writing, “The principal question before us is whether the 
statute authorizes the action of the Secretary pursuant to the policy announced by the 
challenged regulation.”24  To support its conclusion that the Secretary had the power to 
revoke Agee’s passport, Chief Justice Warren Burger’s opinion relied upon statutory 
textual analysis,25 precedent,26 and a lengthy discussion of statutory history and 
                                                 
20 Haig, 453 U.S. at 287. 
 
21 Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 
22 381 U.S. 1 (1965).  In Zemel, the Court was asked to determine if Zemel had a First Amendment right to 
travel to Cuba in order to “satisfy [his] curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and make [himself] a 
better informed citizen.”  Id. at 4.  The Court determined that the First Amendment did not protect Zemel’s 
right to gather information in Cuba.  Id. at 17. 
 
23 Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 
24 Haig, 453 U.S. at 289. 
 
25 Id. at 289-90. 
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legislative intent.27  Although none of the opinions issued in the case framed the case 
solely in terms of the First Amendment, all three discussed both separation of powers and 
First Amendment issues, two of the most prominent frames used in cases discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
After stating the principal legal question presented by the case, Burger quickly 
dealt with the separation of powers issue, simply writing in a footnote that the Court had 
“no occasion” to determine the scope of the President’s plenary and exclusive power in 
the field of international relations.28  Although he engaged in a somewhat lengthier 
discussion of the First Amendment issues in the case, Burger did not explicitly concede 
that Agee had a First Amendment claim, often dancing around the issue.  For example, 
Burger suggested that First Amendment protections did not apply to American citizens 
aboard29 and later cited Zemel for the idea that the revocation punished actions rather than 
speech.30  In addition, although Burger admitted that the government’s decision to revoke 
Agee’s passport was a content-based decision, he relied upon Near v. Minnesota to hold 
the government was within its constitutional powers to censor Agee.31  In the end, 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 Id. at 290 (citing Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958) (the Secretary has the 
power to revoke a passport for reasons not expressly stated by statute); id. at 291-92 (citing Zemel, 381 
U.S. at 17; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)) (national security and foreign affairs are areas inappropriate for judicial 
intervention); id. at 301-03 (discussing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)). 
 
27 Id. at 292-301. 
 
28 Id. at 289 n.17. 
 
29 Id. at 308 (“Assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections reach beyond our national 
boundaries, Agee’s First Amendment claim has no foundation.”). 
 
30 Id. at 309 (“To the extent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, ‘it is an inhibition of 
action,’ rather than of speech.”) (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16-17) (emphasis in the original). 
 
31 Id. at 308 (“The revocation of Agee's passport rests in part on the content of his speech: specifically, his 
repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and names of intelligence personnel. Long ago, however, 
this Court recognized that ‘[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction 
 167 
 
however, Burger returned to his contention that Agee’s First Amendment rights were not 
truly abridged by the decision to revoke his passport.  “Agee is as free to criticize the 
United States Government as he was when he held a passport—always subject, of course, 
to express limits on certain rights by virtue of his contract with the Government,” he 
wrote. 32 
Both Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurring opinion and Justice William 
Brennan’s dissenting opinion criticized the majority’s use of precedent.  Blackmun 
simply noted that while he agreed with the outcome of the case, it could not be reconciled 
with the Court’s previous decisions in Zemel or Kent v. Dulles.33  In addition to accusing 
the majority of distorting Zemel and Kent,34 Brennan’s opinion focused on balancing, 
discussing the issue in terms of both separation of powers issues and the First 
Amendment.  Addressing balancing and separation of powers, Brennan concluded that 
the Court’s decision handed too much power over to the executive branch.35  Turning to 
the First Amendment, although Brennan wrote that he did not need to decide the 
constitutional questions presented by the case because of his conclusion that the 
regulation was an invalid exercise of authority, he was highly critical of the majority’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of 
troops.’” ) (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931)). 
 
32 Id. at 309. 
 
33 Id. at 310 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“There is some force, I feel, in Justice Brennan’s observations . . . 
that today's decision cannot be reconciled fully with all the reasoning of Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), 
and, particularly, of Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), and that the Court is cutting back somewhat upon 
the opinions in those cases sub silentio.”). In Kent, Rockwell Kent was denied a passport to visit England 
based on his suspected affiliation with the Communist Party.  The Court held that the right to travel 
overseas was protected as part of a citizen’s right to “liberty” under the Fifth Amendment. Kent, 357 U.S. 
at 125. 
 
34 Id. at 312-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
35 Id. at 319. 
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reliance on Near36 as well as its logic that Agee remained free to criticize the 
government.37  Thus, while Brennan primarily relied on a separation of powers frame, he 
also framed the issue as a need to balance national security and freedom of expression.38 
The other two cases identified by this research, Morison and Rosen, dealt with 
attempts to prosecute individuals under sections of the Espionage Act of 1917,39 which 
punish a variety of acts in a specific attempt to protect national security information.  
Enacted in the midst of World War I, the Espionage Act of 1917 was intended to “enable 
the United States to carry out its duties as a neutral power, to protect the rights and 
property of United States citizens, and to punish crimes that endangered the peace, 
welfare, and honor of the United States.”40  It has been amended twice, once in 1950 in 
response to the perceived threat to the security of the country by the Communist 
movement, and again in 1986.41  The 1950 amendment expanded the Act’s scope by 
making the retention of defense information and the publication of “communications 
information” a crime.42  In 1986 it was amended again to provide that any property 
                                                 
36 Id. at 320 n. 10 (writing that Near was “hardly relevant or convincing precedent”). 
 
37 Id. (“Under the Court’s rationale, I would suppose that a 40-year prison sentence imposed upon a person 
who criticized the Government's food stamp policy would represent only an ‘inhibition of action.’  After 
all, the individual would remain free to criticize the United States Government, albeit from a jail cell.”). 
 
38 Id. (contending that the issue in the case was not whether Agee’s speech was protected by the First 
Amendment, but rather whether his First Amendment rights were outweighed by national security 
concerns). 
 
39 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2005). 
 
40 Jereen Trudell, Note, The Constitutionality of Section 793 of the Espionage Act and its Application to 
Press Leaks, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 205, 205-06 (1986). See id. at 205-06 for an extended discussion of the 
legislative history of the statute.  See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt Jr., The Espionage Statutes and 
Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973), for a discussion of the legislative 
intent of the Act. 
 
41Trudell, supra note 40, at 205-06. 
 
42 Id. at 206-07. 
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derived from or used in the commission of an offense would become the property of the 
United States.43 
In 1988, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered Samuel Morison’s 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 641, which punishes the theft of government property, and 
two provisions of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e).44  Under § 793, actions 
undertaken “for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with 
intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United 
States” are punishable.  Subsection (d) punishes the communication of “information 
related to national defense” by individuals who are authorized to have the information to 
individuals who are not so authorized.45  Subsection (e) punishes the communication or 
retention of such information by an individual not authorized to have it.46  While an 
employee at the Naval Intelligence Support Center, Morrison did off-duty work for 
Jane’s Fighting Ships, a British annual specializing in reporting on current developments 
in international naval operations.47  The arrangement with Jane’s had been submitted to 
and approved by the Navy, subject to Morison’s agreement that he would not supply any 
classified information on the U.S. Navy or extract unclassified data on any subject and 
                                                 
43Anthony R. Klein, Comment, National Security Information: Its Proper Role and Scope in a 
Representative Democracy, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433, 437 (1990).  
 
44 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060 (4th Cir. 1988).   Morison was also convicted of violating 
18 U.S.C. § 641, which punishes the theft of public money, property or records, rather than the publication 
of government information.  The statute punishes stealing, embezzling and the “knowing conversion” of 
“any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency 
thereof,” as well as the “knowing receipt” of the same by a person “with intent to convert it to his use or 
gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted.”  For a discussion of Morison’s 
prosecution under §641, see Silver, supra note 4, at 458-61. 
 
45 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2005). 
 
46 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2005).  
 
47 Id. at 1060. 
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forward the data to Jane’s.48  Morison’s troubles began when he sought employment with 
a new publication, Jane’s Defence Weekly.  In violation of his agreement with the Navy, 
Morrison provided Jane’s Defence Weekly’s editor-in-chief with three pages of 
background material from a classified report about a Soviet base where an explosion had 
occurred, information about previous explosions at the base, and a classified satellite 
photograph of a Soviet carrier under construction at the base.49   
Although Morison raised a number of First Amendment claims, Circuit Judge 
Donald Russell upheld Morison’s conviction and framed the case in terms of the 
government’s ability to prevent an employee from disseminating information under the 
Espionage Act.  To reach his conclusion Russell relied upon textual analysis, legislative 
history and precedent.  It is important to note, however, that while Russell specifically 
stated that Morison’s prosecution did not raise any First Amendment concerns, the two 
dissenting opinions issued clearly framed the case as at least implicating the First 
Amendment.50 
After recounting the facts of the case, Russell’s opinion considered Morison’s 
claim that “properly construed and applied” the two subsections of the Espionage Act 
applied only to “classic spying” and not to leaking information to the press.51  Relying on 
textualism and legislative history, Russell concluded that neither analysis supported 
Morison’s contention the Espionage Act did not apply to his conduct.  First, Russell 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1061. 
50 See id. at 1081 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (writing that the First Amendment concerns raised by the case 
were significant); id. at 1087 (Phillips, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the contention that prosecutions 
under the Espionage Act did not raise First Amendment concerns). 
51 Id. at 1063. 
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wrote that on their face, the sections were clear that they applied to “anyone” and “they 
declare[d] no exemption in favor of one who leaks to the press.”52  Next, turning to a 
detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Espionage Act, Russell declared that it 
was evident the history did not support Morison’s contention either.  Comparing the 
sections under which Morison was being prosecuted to §794, a statute designed to 
prevent “classic spying,” Russell concluded that Morison’s conduct was being punished 
under the appropriate statute.53  Finally, the court ruled that simply because §793 (d) and 
(e) had never been used to punish the disclosure of information to the press before did not 
mean they could not be used to punish such actions.54   
Russell next addressed Morison’s First Amendment arguments.  Relying on 
precedent Russell clearly rejected Morison’s attempt to frame the case in terms of the 
First Amendment, concluding, “[W]e do not perceive any First Amendment rights to be 
implicated here.”55  Russell wrote the case was “certainly . . . no prior restraint case” such 
as New York Times v. United States56 or United States v. Progressive57 but rather a case 
involving the prosecution of a government employee for “purloining from the 
intelligence files of the Navy national defense materials clearly marked as ‘Intelligence 
Information’ and ‘Secret’ and for transmitting that material to ‘one not entitled to receive 
                                                 
52 Id. 
 
53 Id. at 1065 (reasoning that while section 794 covered “classic spying,” § 793 (d) and (e) covered a lesser 
offense than spying, but was extendable to the disclosure of national security information to any person not 
entitled to receive it). 
 
54 Id. at 1066-67. 
 
55 Id. at 1068. 
 
56 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 
57 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
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it.’”58  Russell focused on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Branzburg v. Hayes59 and 
Snepp v. United States60 and the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Marchetti61 
to determine that there was no support for the contention that prosecution under the 
Espionage Act implicated the First Amendment.  He wrote: 
If Branzburg, Marchetti, and Snepp are to be followed, it seems 
beyond controversy that a recreant intelligence department employee who 
had abstracted from the government files secret intelligence information 
and had willfully transmitted or given it to one “not entitled to receive it” 
as did the defendant in this case, is not entitled to invoke the First 
Amendment as a shield to immunize his act of thievery. To permit the 
thief thus to misuse the Amendment would be to prostitute the salutary 
purposes of the First Amendment.62 
 
 Finally, Russell addressed Morison’s vagueness and overbreadth arguments.  
Considering the vagueness claims, Russell again relied on precedent to reach his 
conclusions.  Morison claimed that the terms “related to the national defense,” “willfully” 
and “entitled to receive,” were constitutionally vague.  Citing and discussing two 
previous Fourth Circuit cases, Russell held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury 
had eliminated any vagueness problems related to either “related to the national defense” 
or “willfully.”63  Similarly, citing precedent the court held that the term “one entitled to 
receive” was both limited and clarified by the appropriate classification regulations and 
                                                 
58 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068. 
 
59 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 
60 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 
61 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 
62 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1069-70. 
 
63 Id. at 1071-72 (citing and discussing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1978)). 
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was thus not unconstitutionally vague.64  Returning to his focus on the judge’s jury 
instructions, Russell also found they addressed any overbreadth problems associated with 
the terms “related to the national defense” or “one not entitled to receive.”65 
 The two other opinions in the case were not so willing to find that Morison’s case 
implicated no First Amendment rights.  Although he concurred in the court’s judgment, 
Circuit Judge James H. Wilkinson framed the case as a balance between national security 
and freedom of expression, as well as in terms of separation of powers.  Referencing 
framers’ intent,66 the marketplace of ideas,67 and the checking function,68 as well as the 
need for national security69 Wilkinson wrote: 
Public security can . . . be compromised in two ways: by attempts to 
choke off the information needed for democracy to function, and by leaks 
that imperil the environment of physical security which a functioning 
democracy requires. The tension between these two interests is not going 
to abate, and the question is how a responsible balance may be achieved. 70 
 
Writing that he believed it was necessary to directly address Morison’s First Amendment 
claims rather than as “unspoken aspects of a vagueness or overbreadth analysis,” 
                                                 
64 Id. at 1074-75 (citing and discussing McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Truong Dinh 
Hung, 629 F.2d at 919). 
 
65 Id. at 1076 (concluding that there was no overbreadth in the two terms as “narrowed by court instruction 
or as fleshed out by the Classification Act”). 
 
66 Id. at 1081 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (discussing the writings of James Madison). 
 
67 Id. (“The First Amendment interest in informed popular debate does not simply vanish at the invocation 
of the words ‘national security.’  National security is public security, not government security from 
informed criticism.”). 
 
68 Id. at 1085 (“[I]nvestigative reporting is a critical component of the First Amendment’s goal of 
accountability in government. To stifle it might leave the public interest prey to the manifold abuses of 
unexamined power.”). 
 
69 Id. at 1081(writing that the way in which Morison released information risked leaking important national 
security information). 
 
70 Id. at 1082. 
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Wilkinson started his concurring opinion by stating that the First Amendment issues at 
stake were “not insignificant.”71  In addition, however, Wilkinson also framed the case in 
terms of separation of powers.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in United 
States v. Snepp72 and Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,73 
Wilkinson noted that the judiciary typically deferred to the executive in areas of national 
security.74   
Wilkinson then took great pain to make several points related to the First 
Amendment.  First, Wilkinson pointed out that Morison was not a journalist.  “No 
member of the press is being searched, subpoenaed, or excluded, as in a typical right of 
access case,”75 he wrote.  In addition, Wilkinson made it clear that the case was about 
stealing information, not about receiving it.  He wrote: “[I]t is important to emphasize 
what is not before us today. This prosecution was not an attempt to apply the espionage 
statute to the press for either the receipt or publication of classified materials.”76  In the 
present case, however, Wilkinson found that Morison’s particular conduct was not 
protected by the First Amendment.  Wilkinson found that because Morison was a trained 
                                                 
71 Id. at 1081. 
 
72 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 
73 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
 
74 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1083 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“Presented with First Amendment, Fourth 
Amendment, and other constitutional claims, the Court has held that government restrictions that would 
otherwise be impermissible may be sustained where national security and foreign policy are implicated.”) 
(citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)); id. (“In short, questions of national security and 
foreign affairs are ‘of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and 
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or 
inquiry.’”) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 
(1948)).  
 
75 Id. at 1081. 
76 Id. at 1085. 
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national intelligence officer who had signed a security clearance and because the district 
court had given proper limiting instructions, neither Morison’s vagueness and 
overbreadth claims nor his contention that his prosecution would have far reaching 
implications on newsgathering and reporting were persuasive.77   
Circuit Judge James Phillips’ concurring opinion also discussed the First 
Amendment implications of the case. Calling the Espionage Act “unwieldy and 
imprecise,” Phillips was concerned the Act made it difficult to differentiate between 
individuals leaking information to the press for public debate and “government moles” 
passing along information to other countries.78  He wrote that the term “relating to the 
national defense” opened the act to overbreadth challenges and threatened to turn it into 
an “Official Secrets Act.”79  Revisiting the Fourth Circuit precedents discussed by 
Russell, Phillips wrote it was only “the limiting instruction which required proof that the 
information leaked was either ‘potentially damaging to the United States or might be 
useful to an enemy’” that made 793 (e) and (d) constitutional.80  Phillips even went so far 
as to suggest the solution to the unwieldy and potentially unconstitutional sections of the 
Act was for Congress to enact more carefully drawn legislation focusing on limiting 
prosecutions to situations in which there was a real danger to the United States.81 
                                                 
77 Id. at 1083-84. 
 
78 Id. at 1085 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
79 Id. at 1085-86. 
80 Id. at 86 (discussing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1978)). 
 
81 Id. at 1086. 
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More recently, in the AIPAC case, United States v. Rosen,82 Judge T.S. Ellis III of 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also considered whether § 
793(d) and (e) could be applied to non-governmental employees even when the facts of a 
case did not fit a classic espionage situation, but rather involved the “leaking” of 
information.83  While employed by AIPAC, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman obtained 
information from various government officials and transmitted this information to 
members of the media, officials of foreign governments, and others.84  Rosen and 
Weissman were charged with conspiring to transmit information relating to the national 
defense to those not entitled to receive it and Rosen was additionally charged with 
“aiding and abetting the transmission of information relating to the national defense” in 
violation of § 793.85 
While the case is still being tried, the district court released an opinion worth 
discussion when Rosen and Weissman filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charges, 
arguing that the government’s application of § 793(e) violated their Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause rights under the vagueness doctrine and violated the guarantees of 
the First Amendment.86  Although Judge Ellis denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
the charges based on Fifth87 and First Amendment claims, he clearly framed the case as 
                                                 
82 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 
83 See id. at 628-29 for a discussion of applying the statutes to “leakers” as opposed to “spies.” 
 
84 Id. at 608-10. 
 
85 Id. at 607.   
 
86 Id. at 610. 
 
87 Id. at 617-29.  For a discussion of Ellis’ analysis of the defendants’ Fifth Amendment claims, see Recent 
Case: Constitutional Law-Due Process and Free Speech-District Court Holds That Recipients of 
Government Leaks Who Disclose Information “Related to the National Defense” May Be Prosecuted 
Under the Espionage Act, 120 HARV. L. REV. 821 (2007). 
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dealing with the need to balance the First Amendment and national security.  Ellis wrote 
that Rosen and Weissman’s First Amendment challenges “exposed the inherent tension 
between the government transparency so essential to a democratic society and the 
government’s equally compelling need to protect from disclosure information that could 
be used by those who wish this nation harm.”88  In addition, the court summarily rejected 
the government’s contention that no prosecutions under the Espionage Act would 
implicate free expression rights.89  Ellis wrote:  
In the broadest terms, the conduct at issue—collecting information about 
the United States’ foreign policy and discussing that information with 
government officials (both United States and foreign), journalists, and 
other participants in the foreign policy establishment—is at the core of the 
First Amendment’s guarantees.90   
 
However, although Ellis clearly framed the case at least partially in terms of freedom of 
expression, in the end he ruled that the First Amendment did not automatically protect the 
defendants.  To support his decision not to dismiss the case, Rosen relied upon 
democratic and First Amendment theory, original intent, textual analysis, legislative 
intent and precedent.  
Ellis began by examining the abstract values at conflict in the case.  Writing that a 
democratic society demanded the judiciary balance competing societal interests in cases 
involving national security and freedom of expression, Ellis noted the role of freedom of 
expression in self-government,91 invoked framers’ intent92 and cited Justice Stewart’s 
                                                 
88 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 629. 
 
89 Id. at 629-30 (writing that the government’s “proposed categorical rule that espionage statutes cannot 
implicate the First Amendment” overreached). 
 
90 Id. at 630. 
 
91 Id. at 633 (writing that the collection and dissemination of information about the workings of government 
was “indispensable to the healthy functioning of a representative government”). 
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concurrence in New York Times v. United States and Morison to establish the importance 
of freedom of expression to self-government and as a check on government.93  Quoting 
Haig v. Agee, however, Ellis wrote, “[H]owever vital an informed public may be, it is 
well established that disclosure of certain information may be restricted in service of the 
nation’s security, for ‘[i]t is “obvious and unarguable” that no governmental interest is 
more compelling than the security of the Nation.’”94   
Moving from an abstract discussion of the issues to a concrete application, Ellis 
wrote it was necessary to make two determinations:  first, whether § 793 was “narrowly 
drawn to apply only to those instances in which the government’s need for secrecy is 
legitimate, or whether it is too indiscriminate in its sweep, seeking in effect, to excise the 
cancer of espionage with a chainsaw instead of a scalpel;”95  second, whether the 
government was allowed to prosecute individuals “who have no employment or 
contractual relationship with the government, and therefore have not exploited a 
relationship of trust to obtain the national defense information they are charged with 
disclosing, but instead generally obtained the information from one who has violated 
such a trust.”96 
Focusing on textual analysis, legislative history and precedent, Ellis ruled that 
while terms in the Espionage Act were vague, so long as a judge properly limited terms 
                                                                                                                                                 
92 Id. (quoting the writings of James Madison).  
 
93 Id. (citing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); United 
States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 
94 Id. at 633-34 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 
378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964))).  
 
95 Id. at 634. 
 
96 Id. at 635. 
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such as “related to the national defense” and “one not entitled to receive it” and provided 
proper instructions regarding the statute’s intent requirements, § 793 was narrowly drawn 
to deal with espionage.97  Next, Ellis wrote that while United States v. Marchetti,98 Snepp 
v. United States99 and Morsion together stood for the proposition that there were no 
constitutional barriers to prior restraints on and post-publication punishments of 
government employees who disseminated national security information,100 the analysis 
was more difficult when non-governmental employees were involved.  Because 
Marchetti, Snepp and Morison all involved government employees, Ellis instead turned 
to the various opinions in New York Times v. United States for guidance.  Ellis’ analysis 
of the opinions concluded that three of the concurring justices—Stewart, White and 
Marshall—and the three dissenting justices—Burger, Harlan and Blackmun—explicitly 
acknowledged the possibility of a prosecution of the newspapers under § 793(e).101  
Based on these opinions, Ellis concluded that a majority of the Supreme Court felt the 
statute did not offend the Constitution.102  However, Ellis was also clear that the 
                                                 
97 Id. at 634-35.  Ellis wrote that § 793 “taken together with its judicial glosses” was narrowly tailored.  The 
“judicial gloss” to which he was referring was the judicial limitations that had been placed on the statutory 
language in various precedents.  Ellis wrote at great length about the “gloss” earlier in his decision when 
discussing the defendant’s Fifth Amendment claims.  See id. at 614-27 for Ellis’ discussion of the terms 
“relating to the national defense” and “entitled to receive” as used in § 793(d) and (e) as well as a 
discussion of the scienter or intent requirements of the statutes.  
 
98 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.1972). 
 
99 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 
100 Id. at 636. 
 
101 Id. at 638-39. 
 
102 Id. at 639.  Although Ellis acknowledged that the Court’s discussion took place in dicta, he wrote, 
“While the Supreme Court’s discussion of the application of § 793(e) to the newspapers is clearly dicta, 
lower courts ‘are bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright 
holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent 
statement.’” (quoting McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.1991)). 
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Constitution limited prosecutions to situations in which national security was genuinely 
at risk, there was proof of intent to harm the United States, and there was reason to 
believe that disclosure would actually cause that harm.103   
Finally, Ellis turned his attention to the defendants’ overbreadth claim.  Ellis 
wrote that the First Amendment issues at stake in the case required the statute be 
narrowly construed.  Ellis concluded that the statute was not overbroad only so long as it 
was construed as punishing “only those people who transmit information related to the 
national defense, in tangible or intangible form, to one not entitled to receive it.”104  
Going into detail, Ellis wrote that to overcome First Amendment concerns and prove the 
information was related to national defense the government had to show “that the 
information relate[d] to the nation’s military activities, intelligence gathering or foreign 
policy,” was “closely held by the government” and not in the public domain, and that 
disclosure of the information “could cause injury to the nation’s security.”105  Ellis wrote 
that to prove the information was transmitted to someone not entitled to receive it, the 
government had to show there was an executive branch regulation or order that restricted 
the disclosure of information to a certain set of people and the information was disclosed 
to someone outside that set.106  In addition, he wrote the government had to prove that 
anyone alleged to have violated the statute “knew the nature of the information, knew 
that the person with whom they were communicating was not entitled to the information, 
                                                 
103 Id. at 639-640. 
 
104 Id. at 643. 
 
105 Id. 
 
106 Id. 
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and knew that such communication was illegal.”107  Thus, although Ellis put several 
constraints on the government’s case, he did not rule that using the Espionage Act to 
punish individuals who were not classic “spies” was an inherent violation of the First 
Amendment. 
Although there have been only three cases that have discussed post-publication 
punishments for the dissemination of national security information, several key points 
emerge from an analysis of these cases.  First, although the majority in Agee did not find 
a serious First Amendment concern associated with the case, Brennan’s dissent in Agee, 
two of the three judges in Morison, and Ellis’ opinion in Rosen all clearly expressed 
serious concerns with the ability of the government to prosecute individuals when they 
were neither government employees nor “classic spies.” One judge drew a clear 
distinction between members of the press and government employees.  Judge 
Wilkinson’s concurring opinion in Morison went so far as to state that a member of the 
press “probably could not” be prosecuted under the Espionage Act based on First 
Amendment concerns.108  Second, the cases all engaged in detailed analysis of the 
legislative history, intent and text of the statutes involved in the cases.  The courts were 
clearly attempting to determine what Congress wanted to accomplish with the laws in 
question and the extent to which the laws could be applied to individuals engaged in the 
discussion of national security information.  There was unquestionably a focus on 
legislative power and intent in all the cases.  Finally, in both Morison and Rosen, there 
was a great deal of focus on the need to narrowly construe the Espionage Act so as not to 
violate the First Amendment.   
                                                 
107 Id. 
 
108 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d. 1057, 1081(4th Cir. 1988). 
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Thus, while there is limited case law dealing with the issue, these three cases 
indicate that while punishing individuals for disseminating national security information 
raises First Amendment concerns, so long as the trial court properly narrows applicable 
laws there is no true First Amendment barrier to prosecution.   
 
Post-publication punishments and the judiciary 
 Just as the government has sought to punish individuals for disseminating 
information harmful to national security, both courts and state legislatures have sought to 
inflict post-publication punishments for disseminating information about judicial 
proceedings or commenting on the operation of the judicial system itself.  These 
sanctions have come in the form of contempt citations from courts and state statutes 
designed to punish the dissemination of certain types of information.   While the Supreme 
Court has not established as high a barrier to post-publication punishments as it did in the 
prior restraint cases discussed in the previous chapter, the Court has established clear 
constitutional limits on the power to punish individuals for disseminating information 
about or critical of the courts.  The first time the Court considered a post-publication case 
dealing with the judiciary Justice Hugo Black authored an opinion which discussed the 
need to balance freedom of expression with the fair administration of justice and invoked 
the clear and present danger standard.  While the Court has continued to use the same 
frame and the same precedents, it has also consistently taken an ad hoc approach, 
weighing the specific facts of each case to determine if there was a substantial likelihood 
that the effective operation of justice would be impaired.   
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 In 1941, the Court heard a joinder of two appeals, Bridges v. California and Times 
Mirror Co. v. Superior Court.109  Both cases involved punishments for “publishing . . .  
views concerning cases not in all respects finally determined.”110  Times Mirror Co. 
concerned three anti-union editorials published in the Los Angeles Times.111  In Bridges, 
labor leader Harry Bridges was held in contempt for calling a judge’s ruling in a labor 
dispute “outrageous” and stating that attempted enforcement of the order “would tie up 
the port of Los Angeles and . . . the entire Pacific Coast.”112  As noted, Black framed the 
case as dealing with the balance between freedom of expression and the effective 
operation of the judicial system.113  However, he also invoked a secondary frame dealing 
with the inherent power of the courts.114  To support his decision that the contempt power 
of courts did not grant the courts the ability to silence Bridges or the Los Angeles Times 
in the case, Black relied on originalism, discussing the effect of the ratification of the 
Constitution on the historical “power of judges to punish by contempt out-of-court 
publications tending to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice in a pending 
case”115 and on precedent, citing the clear and present danger cases.116 
                                                 
109 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
 
110 Id. at 259. 
 
111 Id. at 271-72.  For the text of the editorial that contained the “most serious offense,” see id. at 272 n.17. 
 
112 Id. at 276. 
 
113 Id. at 260 (discussing the difficult task of balancing free speech and fair trial “two of the most cherished 
policies of our civilization”).  
 
114 Id. at 259-60 (writing that in deciding whether the First Amendment forbade state courts from punishing 
the petitioners for publishing their views concerning cases not in all respects finally determined the Court 
was “necessarily measuring a power of all American courts, both state and federal, including this one”). 
 
115 Id. at 263.  For Black’s discussion of the Constitution and its effects on the British legal traditions, see 
id. at 263-67.  
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 Black concluded there were two separate government interests at stake in the 
case: “disrespect for the judiciary” and the prevention of the “disorderly and unfair 
administration of justice.”117  Black summarily dismissed a post-publication restraint as a 
way to advance the first interest, noting that it was a “prized American privilege” to 
speak out about every aspect of government and enforced silence “would probably 
engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance 
respect.”118  In contrast, Black wrote that the government’s interest in preventing the 
disorderly administration of justice would be advanced by the contempt citations.119  
However, when he applied the clear and present danger test to the facts of the two cases, 
Black concluded that the circumstances did not constitute the substantive evil or degree 
of likelihood necessary under the test to justify punishment.120 
In addition to Black’s opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a lengthy and 
complex dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Harlan Stone and Justices 
Owen Roberts and James Byrnes.  Although Frankfurter discussed the role of the press in 
self-government and as a watchdog on governmental misconduct, unlike Black, 
Frankfurter argued several times that the First Amendment was not truly or seriously 
implicated by the case. Frankfurter began by discussing the limits of the Supreme Court’s 
power and arguing for judicial restraint.  Frankfurter wrote that it was not clear the First 
                                                                                                                                                 
116 Id. at 261-63.  To flesh out the standards of the test, Black discussed a number of cases, including 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); and Whitney 
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 
117 Id. at 270. 
 
118 Id. at 271. 
 
119 Id. 
 
120 Id. at 272-75 (discussing the editorials in question in Times Mirror Co.); id. at 275-78 (discussing the 
statements made by Harry Bridges). 
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Amendment was implicated because the Court was considering the power of California’s 
courts,121 and, even if the First Amendment was involved, the Court should practice 
judicial restraint and defer to the wishes of the people of California.122  In addition, he 
argued that the traditional power of courts to inflict post-publication punishment through 
contempt orders had never been thought to raise First Amendment concerns.123  Thus, 
although he raised a number of issues in his opinion, Frankfurter primarily framed the 
two cases as dealing with federalism and the unique role of courts.  To support his 
conclusion that the contempt orders were not unconstitutional, Frankfurter relied upon 
originalism, discussing the long history and importance of protecting the fair 
administration of justice, to argue that the courts were unique in their need to be free from 
influence. 124  While Frankfurter admitted that the checking function applied to judges 
and courts, and neither were entitled to “greater immunity from criticism than other 
                                                 
121 Id. at 280 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“We are not even vouchsafed reference to the specific provision 
of the Constitution which renders states powerless to insist upon trial by courts rather than trial by 
newspapers. . . . [W]e are here dealing with limitations upon California—with restraints upon the states.  
To say that the protection of freedom of speech of the First Amendment is absorbed by the Fourteenth does 
not say enough.”). 
 
122 Id. at 202-03 (“‘Under the guise of interpreting the Constitution we must take care that we do not import 
into the discussion our own personal views of what would be wise, just, and fitting rules of government to 
be adopted by a free people, and confound them with constitutional limitations.’”) (quoting Twining v. 
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1908)); id. at 294 (discussing the power of the people of California to 
modify their state constitution if they did not want courts to have the power of contempt and saying it was 
inappropriate for the Court, “sitting over three thousand miles away from a great state without intimate 
knowledge of its habits and its needs in a matter which does not cut across the affirmative powers of the 
national government,” to rule on the issue). 
123 Id. at 290 (“[T]he conventional power to punish for contempt is not a censorship in advance but a 
punishment for past conduct and, as such, like prosecution for a criminal libel, is not offensive either to the 
First or to the Fourteenth Amendments, has never been doubted throughout this Court’s history.”).  
 
124 Frankfurter cited a number of historical sources and frequently referenced the long history of protecting 
the fair administration of justice to support his contention.  See, e.g., id. at 282 (discussing the Magna 
Carta); id. at 283-84 (discussing the historical importance of the judicial process to “statesmen and 
constitution makers” and the history of the power to punish for contempt); id at 285-86 (discussing the 
writings of Blackstone, Kent and Story). 
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persons or institutions,”125 he wrote that both should be protected from speech designed 
to intimidate or influence.126  Based on this argument, Frankfurter determined that when 
speech referred to a matter under consideration before a court, constituted a threat to the 
impartial adjudication of the matter and was purposely calculated to interfere with the 
court’s work, it could be punished even if there was no evidence that the speech would 
actually interfere with justice.127  Therefore, considering the Los Angeles Times editorials, 
Frankfurter concluded that because “[a] powerful newspaper brought its full coercive 
power to bear in demanding a particular sentence”128 from a judge who within a year 
would have to run for reelection, the state court was “[c]learly . . . justified in treating this 
as a threat to impartial adjudication.”129  Turning to Bridges’ comments, Frankfurter 
similarly concluded that the state court’s judgment should not be overturned because the 
threat made by the union leader constituted “a definite attempt at coercing a court into a 
favorable decision.”130  However, despite Frankfurter’s dissent, the Court continued to 
overturn attempts to punish the publication of information by invoking the clear and 
present danger standard. 
In 1946, in Pennekamp v. Florida, the Court considered whether two editorials 
and a cartoon critical of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, published by the 
                                                 
125 Id. at 289. 
 
126 Id. at 291. 
 
127 Id.  Later in his opinion, Frankfurter phrased the clear and present danger requirements differently, 
writing: “The threat must be close and direct; it must be directed towards a particular litigation.  The 
litigation must be immediately pending.  When a case is pending is not a technical, lawyer’s problem, but is 
to be determined by the substantial realities of the specific situation.”  Id. at 303-04. 
 
128 Id. at 300. 
 
129 Id. at 299. 
 
130 Id. at 303. 
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Miami Herald constituted a clear and present danger to the fair administration of 
justice.131  In an opinion by Justice Stanley Reed, the Court once again framed the case as 
dealing with the need to balance the fair administration of justice with freedom of the 
press.132  Relying primarily on Bridges, Reed determined the editorials did not constitute 
a clear and present danger.  Although Reed did not provide a definition or example of 
what would constitute “a clear and present danger to the fair administration of justice,”133 
he concluded it was obvious the Miami Herald’s editorials did not rise to that level.  He 
wrote, “For circumstances to create a clear and present danger to judicial administration, 
a solidity of evidence should be required which it would be difficult to find in this 
record.”134 
In addition to Reed’s opinion, Justices Frankfurter, William Francis Murphy and 
Wiley Rutledge, Jr. wrote separate concurring opinions.  While Frankfurter again 
discussed the need for respect of the judicial process and the limited nature of First 
Amendment protection in these situations, citing his own dissenting opinion in Bridges, 
he ultimately concurred with the majority because the case was no longer pending.135  
Murphy and Rutledge, on the other hand, argued that it was necessary to extend the press 
a great deal of protection when commenting on the judicial process.  Murphy wrote that it 
was necessary to provide the press with protection even when its criticism of the judicial 
                                                 
131 328 U.S. 331, 333 (1946). 
 
132 Id. at 346-47 (writing that while “[f]ree discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of 
Americanism,” courts also had the “power to protect the interests of prisoners and litigants before them 
from unseemly efforts to pervert judicial action”).  
 
133 Id. at 348 (“What is meant by clear and present danger to a fair administration of justice? No definition 
could give an answer.”)   
 
134 Id. at 347. 
135 Id. at 369 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing why the case was no longer “pending” under the 
definition he had previously provided in Bridges). 
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system was “vitriolic, scurrilous or erroneous” unless the criticism made it “impossible in 
a very real sense for a court to carry on the administration of justice.”136  Otherwise, 
Murphy warned, the Court risked severely limiting liberty.  Similarly, while Rutledge 
was highly critical of the press’s coverage of the judiciary,137 he wrote that it could not be 
shown that the Herald’s editorials in any way even tended to block or impede the fair 
administration of justice.138 
  Just one year later, in 1947, the Court again considered a contempt citation in 
Craig v. Harney.139  Craig involved the jailing of a publisher, an editorial writer and a 
reporter from the Corpus Christi Caller-Times for contempt.  The case arose from an 
editorial and several news stories that criticized a judge for instructing a jury to return a 
verdict with which it did not agree.140  Citing Bridges, Justice William O. Douglas wrote 
that the facts of the case showed there was “no threat or menace to the integrity of the 
trial.”141  Based on the clear and present danger test, Douglas established a formidable 
standard for a judge to overcome in order to hold a journalist in contempt: 
The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the 
power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute 
an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. 
The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately 
imperil.142 
                                                 
136 Id. at 370 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 
137 Id. at 372 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (writing that there were few areas that were as poorly covered by 
the press as judicial proceedings). 
 
138 Id. 
 
139 331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
 
140 Id. at 369. 
   
141 Id. at 377. 
 
142 Id. at 376. 
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Similarly, in a concurring opinion, Murphy was once again adamant about the protection 
the Court should afford to the press when commenting on government, even when the 
attacks were unjust.143   
In contrast to the standards advanced by Douglas and Murphy, however, were 
dissents by Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson.  Again framing the case in terms of 
federalism144 and the need to protect the impartial administration of justice, Frankfurter, 
who was joined by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, argued that the editorials were not 
criticism, but rather attempts to influence the outcome of pending litigation: 
The publications now in question did not constitute merely a narrative 
of a judge’s conduct in a particular case nor a general commentary upon 
his competence or his philosophy. Nor were they a plea for reform of the 
Texas legal system to the end that county court judges should be learned 
in the law and that a judgment in a suit of forcible detainer may be 
appealable. The thrust of the articles was directed to what the judge should 
do on a matter immediately before him.145  
 
Although he agreed with Frankfurter that the contempt citation should be upheld, 
Jackson focused his opinion on the importance of the judicial process.  While Jackson 
framed the case as a conflict between freedom of the press and the fair administration of 
justice, he clearly placed his thumb on the side of the fair administration of justice.  He 
wrote: 
The right of the people to have a free press is a vital one, but so is the 
right to have a calm and fair trial free from outside pressures and 
                                                 
143 Id. at 383 (Murphy, J., concurring) (writing that the First Amendment “forbids a judge from summarily 
punishing a newspaper editor for printing an unjust attack upon him or his method of dispensing justice” 
except only possibly under the “rare instance where the attack might reasonably cause a real impediment to 
the administration of justice”). 
 
144 Id. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court was passing judgment on “the power of 
the State of Texas”).  
 
145 Id. at 389. 
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influences. Every other right, including the right of a free press itself, may 
depend on the ability to get a judicial hearing as dispassionate and 
impartial as the weakness inherent in men will permit.146 
 
Concluding that the majority’s opinion sponsored “the myth that judges are not as other 
men” and are, therefore, not influenced by caustic attacks because they “do not penetrate 
the judicial armor,”147 Jackson dissented and ruled that judges must be insulated from 
such attacks in order to protect judicial impartiality. 
 In 1962, under slightly different circumstances, the Court considered a contempt 
citation issued in connection in with a grand jury investigation in Wood v. Georgia.148  In 
1960, James Wood, an elected sheriff in Bibb County, Georgia, was cited for two counts 
of contempt of court for issuing a statement regarding a grand jury investigation of 
election law violations.149  Again framing the case as a need to balance freedom of 
expression with the fair administration of justice and relying on the clear and present 
danger precedents, the Court found Wood’s statements did not constitute an imminent 
danger to the administration of justice.150  In addition, Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
majority opinion emphasized the important role free expression played in self-
government, even in the realm of the judicial process.151  Once again, however, other 
justices disagreed with the majority’s application of the clear and present danger test. 
                                                 
146 Id. at 394-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 
147 Id. at 396. 
 
148 370 U.S. 375 (1960). 
 
149 Id. at 380-81. 
 
150 Id. at 388. 
 
151 Id. at 391-92 (noting that the fair administration of justice required “the active cooperation of an 
enlightened public”). 
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 Justice John Harlan II, joined by Justice Thomas Clark, wrote a dissent 
emphasizing the differences between Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig and the present 
case.  While Harlan still framed the case in terms of conflicts between free expression 
and the judicial process, as Frankfurter’s previous dissents had done, Harlan emphasized 
the ability of the statements in question to influence the outcome of the judicial 
proceeding.152  To differentiate the case, Harlan focused on the unique nature and history 
of grand jury proceedings153 and the fact that in Wood it was a group of citizens who 
might be influenced by the statements in question rather than a judge.154  
In addition to cases involving contempt citations, the court has heard several cases 
involving state statutes that penalized the disseminating of information relating to the 
judicial process155 and one case involving the state of Nevada’s rules governing 
                                                 
152 Justice Frankfurter did not participate in the case. 
 
153 Id. at 397-99 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 
154 Id. at 401 (“Of equal if not greater importance is the fact that petitioner’s statements were calculated to 
influence, not a judge chosen because of his independence, integrity, and courage and trained by experience 
and the discipline of law to deal only with evidence properly before him, but a grand jury of laymen chosen 
to serve for a limited term from the general population of Bibb County. It cannot be assumed with grand 
jurors, as it has been with judges, that they are all ‘men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.’”) 
(quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).  See id. at 402 for Harlan’s discussion of additional 
differences between the cases. 
 
155 In addition to the case discussed in this chapter involving state laws, two notable Supreme Court cases, 
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979), also 
considered the constitutionality of state laws that imposed criminal penalties for publishing information 
related to the judicial process.  However, in neither case was the asserted government interest the protection 
of the judicial process.  In Cox Broadcasting the Court considered a Georgia statute that made it a crime to 
publish or broadcast the name of a rape victim when the parents of a teenage girl who was raped and 
murdered sued an Atlanta television station for broadcasting the girl’s name.  The case is not discussed here 
because the Court framed the main issues in the case as the conflict between free expression and an 
individual’s right to privacy, rather than between free expression and the effective operation of the judicial 
system.  Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 487 (writing that the Georgia statute in question was an attempt to 
protect the “zone of privacy surrounding every individual”).  Smith concerned a law that made it a crime to 
publish the names of juvenile offenders without the written approval of a juvenile court, even if that 
information was lawfully obtained.  Smith is not discussed because the issues the Court was considering 
were freedom of expression and the protection of juveniles for rehabilitation purposes rather than freedom 
of expression and the fair administration of the judicial process.  Smith, 443 U.S. at 104 (“The sole interest 
advanced by the State to justify its criminal statute is to protect the anonymity of the juvenile offender. It is 
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extrajudicial statements made by an attorney.  In the 1978 case Landmark 
Communications v. Virginia, the Virginia Pilot was fined $500 for accurately identifying 
a state judge whose conduct was being investigated in violations of a state statute that 
made it a crime to publish information about the confidential proceedings of a state 
judicial review commission which was “authorized to hear complaints about judges’ 
disability or misconduct.”156  In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court 
framed the case as a conflict between the First Amendment and the effective operation of 
the judicial system and relied on the cases discussed above to reach its conclusion.  
Burger wrote there were a number of government interests related to the effective 
operation of the judicial system associated with the statute. 
First, confidentiality is thought to encourage the filing of complaints and 
the willing participation of relevant witnesses by providing protection 
against possible retaliation or recrimination.  Second, at least until the time 
when the meritorious can be separated from the frivolous complaints, the 
confidentiality of the proceedings protects judges from the injury which 
might result from publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints. 
And finally, it is argued, confidence in the judiciary as an institution is 
maintained by avoiding premature announcement of groundless claims of 
judicial misconduct or disability since it can be assumed that some 
frivolous complaints will be made against judicial officers who rarely can 
satisfy all contending litigants.157 
 
Burger concluded the state’s interests had to be balanced with the Pilot’s right to press 
freedom.  Although the Virginia Supreme Court had followed the Supreme Court’s clear 
                                                                                                                                                 
asserted that confidentiality will further his rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage 
further antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose future employment or suffer other 
consequences for this single offense.”). 
 
156 435 U.S. 829, 831 (1978). 
 
157 Id. at 835 (citations omitted).  Additionally, Burger outlined a number of “practical” advantages to 
keeping information related to the proceedings confidential.  See id. at 835-36. 
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and present danger cases outlined above,158 Burger questioned the “relevance of the 
standard” to the case and rejected the state court’s “mechanical application of the test.”159  
Despite this, the Court again used an ad hoc approach to balance Virginia’s interests in 
protecting judicial reputations and integrity against the Pilot’s core First Amendment 
rights to hold that the potential harm caused by publication could not support criminal 
sanctions against the press.160    
Relying upon Pennekamp, Justice Louis Brandies’ opinion in Whitney v. 
California161 and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power, 
Burger concluded that the Virginia court should have determined for itself whether the 
specific statements in the case constituted a clear and present danger rather than simply 
cite the Virginia legislature’s determination that information regarding the proceeding 
should not be disclosed.162  Citing Bridges, Penekamp, Craig, and Wood, Burger 
summarized the standard that had to be met: 
What emerges from these cases is the “working principle that the 
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence 
extremely high before utterances can be punished,” and that a “solidity of 
evidence,” is necessary to make the requisite showing of imminence. “The 
danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately 
imperil.”163 
                                                 
158 Landmark Commc’n v. Virginia, 233 S.E.2d 120, 129 (Va. 1977). 
 
159 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 842. 
 
160 Id. at 841-42. 
161 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 
162 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 844 (writing that the judicial function commanded an independent analysis of 
whether “the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute . . . .  [O]therwise, the scope of 
freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative definition and the function of the First 
Amendment as a check on legislative power would be nullified.”). 
 
163 Id. at 845 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 
331, 347 (1946); and Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)). 
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Again referencing those cases, Burger concluded, “If the clear-and-present-danger 
test could not be satisfied in the more extreme circumstances of those cases, it 
would seem to follow that the test cannot be met here.”164 
 In addition to Burger’s opinion, Justice Potter Stewart issued a concurring 
opinion, which framed the case as dealing specifically with the press clause of the 
First Amendment.  Writing that “[t]here could hardly be a higher governmental 
interest than a State’s interest in the quality of its judiciary,”165 Stewart concluded 
there was nothing unconstitutional about punishing someone for violating the 
confidentiality of the hearings.166  Stewart concluded, however, that the 
constitutional problem arose when Virginia attempting to apply the statute to a 
newspaper: 
[I]n this case Virginia has extended its law to punish a newspaper, 
and that it cannot constitutionally do.  If the constitutional 
protection of a free press means anything, it means that 
government cannot take it upon itself to decide what a newspaper 
may and may not publish.  Though government may deny access to 
information and punish its theft, government may not prohibit or 
punish the publication of that information once it falls into the 
hands of the press, unless the need for secrecy is manifestly 
overwhelming.167 
 
Finally, in 1991—fifty years after it considered the contempt citations of Harry 
Bridges and the Los Angeles Times—the Court decided to what extent an attorney could 
                                                 
164 Id.   
 
165 Id. at 848 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 
166 Id. at 849. 
 
167 Id. 
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be disciplined for making extrajudicial statements in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.168  
In the case, the Court considered the First Amendment rights of a lawyer who was 
disciplined for making statements to the press regarding the innocence of his client.  In a 
complex decision,169 the Court relied on precedent and ruled that the “substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice” standard used in Nevada’s rules governing attorney 
extrajudicial speech did not violate the First Amendment.170   
Although Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion framed the case as a need to 
balance the effective operation of justice with Gentile’s First Amendment rights,171 he 
differentiated the case from Pennekamp and Craig, as well as from Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart,172 because none of those cases had involved lawyers who 
represented parties to pending proceedings in court.  Instead, Rehnquist relied on a series 
of other cases to conclude that the Court should engage in a “balancing process, weighing 
the State’s interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a lawyer's First 
                                                 
168 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 
169 Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court with respects to Part I and II, in which 
Justices Byron White, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia and Steven Souter joined.  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court with respects to Parts III and VI, in which Justices Thurgood 
Marshall, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, and O’Connor joined.  Thus, Justice O’Connor was the 
deciding vote, joining Rehnquist on Parts I and II, and Kennedy on Parts III and VI.   In a concurring 
opinion, O’Connor wrote that she agreed that speech by a lawyer representing a client in a pending cases 
could more readily be regulated than speech by the press she also agreed with Kennedy’s assertion in Part 
III that Nevada’s rules were unconstitutionally vague.  Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1082-83 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).   
 
170 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1063.   
 
171 Id. at 1073. 
 
172 427 U.S. 539 (1976).  As discussed in chapter two, Nebraska Press Association. involved a gag order 
preventing dissemination of information related to a murder trial issued by a judge against newspapers in 
Nebraska. 
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Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue.”173  Again citing precedent, 
Rehnquist concluded that because “the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending 
cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for 
regulation of the press”174 and the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” properly 
balanced lawyers’ weaker free expression interests with the state’s strong interest in the 
integrity and fairness of its judicial system, Nevada’s rules were constitutional.175 
Thus, in a series of cases from 1941 to 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court set out the 
standards under which speech related to the judicial process could be punished after the 
fact.  While some of the justices in the cases came to different conclusions about the 
particular facts of each case and whether a particular statement constituted a clear and 
present danger, in every case dealing with contempt citations the justices framed the 
cases in similar ways and relied upon the clear and present danger precedents to reach 
their conclusions.  In addition, while Rehnquist’s opinion in Gentile did not find the clear 
and present danger line of cases to be controlling, he still framed the cases in terms of the 
need to balance the fair administration of justice with freedom of expression.   
Examining the two sets of cases, several interesting points emerge.  First is the 
limited number of cases that have involved post-publication punishments and national 
security or the judiciary, relative to prior restraint and access cases.  Only three cases 
were identified that involved national security, and the Supreme Court has only heard a 
                                                 
173 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1073.  Rehnquist cited Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of 
Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); and Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 
174 Id. at 1074.  Rehnquist cited Nebraska Press Ass’n., 427 U.S. at 601 n.27; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333 (1966); and In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).  
 
175 Id. at 1075 (“We agree with the majority of the States that the ‘substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice’ standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights 
of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in fair trials.”). 
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handful of cases dealing with post-publication punishments and the judiciary.  Despite 
this limited number of cases, it is important to note that with the exception of Burger’s 
opinion in Agee and Russell’s opinion in Morison nearly every opinion issued in these 
cases framed the issues at least somewhat in terms of the First Amendment.  While the 
opinions put different weight on the strength of the free speech principle involved, few 
were willing to totally write it off in favor of national security or the effective operation 
of the judicial system.  In contrast, it appears that the two sets of cases did rely on 
different factors.  While the national security cases tended to focus on textualism, 
legislative intent and history, the judicial cases relied upon the clear and present danger 
precedents.  While this is partly explained by the fact that the national security cases all 
involved applications of federal statutes, those courts could have relied on the clear and 
present danger test just as easily as the Supreme Court has done in other cases involving 
statutes. 
Next, a common thread that runs throughout both sets of cases is the idea that 
post-publication punishments are not as constitutionally suspect as prior restraint cases.  
Indeed, both sets of cases reference the Pentagon Papers case to point out what is not at 
stake in these cases.  Finally, many of the cases point out the difference between 
punishing an individual involved in either national security or the judiciary—such as 
Agee, Morison, or Gentile—and punishing the press for disseminating information.  For 
example, it is interesting to note that Rehnquist’s decision in Gentile that it was easier for 
a court to control the speech of lawyer’s is similar to Ellis’ conclusion in United States v. 
Rosen that the government could more easily control the speech of its employees. 
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Perhaps because of the limited number of cases that have dealt with post-
publication punishments, it is also important to note that there is no clear consensus on 
when a court can punish the dissemination of lawfully obtained truthful information.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently been unwilling to categorically answer the 
question.  Although the Court briefly noted the issue in Landmark Communications,176 it 
refused to rule on it.  Because the newspaper did not break any laws in obtaining the 
information, the Court specifically stated that the issue before it was the “narrow and 
limited” question of “whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of 
third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, for divulging or 
publishing truthful information.”177  The Court refused to rule on “the possible 
applicability of the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means and 
thereafter divulges it.”178   
Eleven years later, in 1989, the Court again sidestepped the issue in Florida Star 
v. B.J.F,179 a case involving the publication of a rape victim’s name that was obtained 
from an official report in a police pressroom. Citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing 
Co.,180 the Court noted that the publication of lawfully obtained truthful information 
could not be prohibited absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.181  
However, the Court was clear that Daily Mail did not answer the question of whether the 
                                                 
176 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
177 Id. at 837. 
178 Id. 
179 491 U.S. 524 (1989).   
180 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
181 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534. 
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possession or publication of unlawfully obtained information could be punished.182  The 
Court wrote: 
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where 
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, 
government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the 
ensuing publication as well.  This issue was raised in New York Times v. 
United States and reserved in Landmark Communications.  We have no 
occasion to address it here.183 
 
Finally, in what has become the seminal case in this area of law, a 2001 civil suit, 
the Court was again careful not to answer the question.  Bartnicki v. Vopper184 involved 
the broadcast of an audiotape recording of a cell phone conversation between two 
officials of a teachers’ union in which threats were made against local school board 
members.  The conversation was illegally taped by unknown persons and then distributed 
to the press. 185  In a 6-3 ruling the Court held that there was no liability in the case for 
broadcasting the tape.  However, the Court was very careful to note that it was doing so 
only because the broadcasters in the case had played no part in intercepting or obtaining 
the taped conversation and because of the public significance of the matter.186  The Court 
specifically wrote that it was again intentionally leaving open “the question ‘whether, in 
cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, 
government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing 
                                                 
182 Id. at 533-34. 
183 Id. at 535 n.8 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
184 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
185 Id. at 518-19. 
186 Id. at 525. 
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publication as well.’”187  The Court wrote that its narrow holding in Bartnicki was 
“consistent with this Court’s repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful 
publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”188  Citing 
Florida Star, the Court wrote, “Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate 
question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not 
resolving anticipatorily.”189  Thus, in comparison to the prior restraint cases, the post-
publication line of cases provides no consistent answer on when the publication of 
information can be punished.     
Perhaps because the Court has yet to definitively provide guidance to lower courts 
in post-publication punishment cases, a final point must be made that unlike the prior 
restraint and access cases discussed in this dissertation, the national security and judiciary 
cases discussed in this chapter rarely cite each other.  The two lines of cases don’t seem 
to intersect, and lower courts are not turning to the Supreme Court judiciary cases to 
provide guidance to lower court national security cases.  However, perhaps because the 
Court has not provided guidance, both sets of cases do spend a great deal of time 
examining the specific set of facts relevant to the case.  That is, both groups of cases 
consistently use ad hoc approaches that put a great deal of emphasis on the particular 
facts of each case to determine if punishment is constitutional.   
                                                 
187 Id. at 528 (emphasis in the original). 
188 Id. at 529. 
189 Id. at 529 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989)). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
National Security Information and Access 
 
During the Vietnam War, although media access to the battlefield was at the 
discretion of field commanders, it was rarely denied.1  This unwritten policy of access to 
military activity “enabled American audiences to observe events daily, including 
casualties and deaths in vivid and often painful detail.”2  As one observer noted, perhaps 
because of the unflattering coverage of the Vietnam War, the military would never again 
grant unrestricted battlefield access to the media.3  When the United States invaded 
Grenada and Panama, the Department of Defense (DOD) significantly restrained media 
coverage, a move that garnered widespread criticism.4  Despite this criticism, when the 
United States sent troops to the Middle East in the fall of 1990, the DOD again issued 
                                                 
1 For a full description of the history of media coverage of the Vietnam War, see generally Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Media-Military Relations Panel, Sidle Report, reprinted in OFFICE OF ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) NEWS RELEASE NO. 450-84 (Aug. 23, 1984). 
 
2 Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1563 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 
3 Barry E. Venable, The Army and the Media, MIL. REV. 66, 67 (Jan.-Feb. 2002) (“The enduring legacy of 
media coverage of [the Vietnam War] is the charge that the media lost the war by its [sic] negative 
reporting.  Whether true or not, this ‘post-Vietnam blame the media’ legacy effectively built the stone wall 
that was erected between” the media and the military.) 
 
4 Id.  During the invasion of Grenada the media were barred from the island for the first two days of the 
operation, and only one fifteen-person press pool—out of approximately 600 reporters—was allowed on 
the island on the third day.  The media’s furor forced the military to examine how conflicts should be 
reported and resulted in the creation of a standing media pool know as the DOD National Media Pool 
(NMP).  However, when the military invaded Panama, then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney deliberately 
called out the DOD NMP so late that the journalists missed the beginning of the invasion.  Id.  See also 
Fred S. Hoffman, “Review of the Panama Pool Deployment, December 1989,” Memorandum for 
Correspondents, The Pentagon, (Mar. 1990); Steven L. Katz, Ground Zero: The Information War in the 
Persian Gulf, 9 GOV’T INFO. Q. 380 (1992).   
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regulations restricting access.5  The regulations were in effect during both “Desert 
Shield” (American military presence in the Persian Gulf) and “Desert Storm” (open 
hostilities) and did not end until March 4, 1991, the informal cessation of hostilities in the 
Persian Gulf.6 
Among other things, the DOD regulations created temporary press pools to 
provide coverage of the war.7  During combat activities, the only journalists authorized to 
enter forward areas were the pool participants.  Membership in the pools did not, 
however, entitle journalists to observe all military activities.  Rather, the military 
determined where pool members would be able to travel, and journalists had to remain 
with their escorts at all times.  Additionally, according to DOD regulations, news stories 
by pool participants were subject to review by a DOD public affairs officer.  In the event 
there was a disagreement between the press and the public affairs officer about the 
“sensitive nature” of a story, the information was sent to the Joint Information Bureau in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.  If consensus could not be reached, the issue was ultimately 
forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for 
review.8   
In 1991 various members of the press9 challenged the regulations as violations of 
                                                 
5 According to court records, the regulations were modified a number of times.  Nation Magazine, 762 F. 
Supp. at 1564 n.4.  For the modified regulations, see id. Appendices A-D. 
 
6 Id. at 1560. 
 
7 Id. at 1564.  The DOD claimed that the primary purpose of press pools was to balance the media's desire 
for “unilateral coverage” with the DOD’s responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety 
of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations. 
 
8 Id. at 1564-65.  According to DOD policies, although all stories had to go through this process, the 
ultimate decision on publication remained with “the originating reporter’s news organization.”  Id.  
 
9 The plaintiffs in the case were The Nation, Harper’s, Pacific News Service, In These Times, The 
Guardian, The Progressive Magazine, Mother Jones Magazine, The L.A. Weekly, The Village Voice, The 
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the First and Fifth Amendments.  While the regulations were challenged on several 
grounds, the plaintiffs’ fundamental claim in Nation Magazine v. U.S. Department of 
Defense was that the press had “a First Amendment right to unlimited access to a foreign 
arena in which American military forces are engaged.”10  In his opinion, Federal District 
Judge Leonard Sand of the Southern District of New York noted that because there was 
little precedent to guide his decision he was being asked to chart “new constitutional 
territory.”11  He wrote: “The issues raised by this challenge present profound and novel 
questions as to the existence and scope of a First Amendment right of access in the 
context of military operations and national security concerns. Those few precedents 
which have discussed First Amendment issues in the context of national security have 
been ‘prior restraint’ cases.”12 
Although Judge Sand would still be correct today in asserting that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had never considered the existence of a First Amendment right of access 
to military operations, over the course of the twentieth century various courts did address 
the legal questions surrounding access to locations and information related to national 
security.  As Judge Sand eventually did in Nation Magazine, typically in these cases the 
courts discussed two issues:  first, whether access—or the denial of access—implicated 
                                                                                                                                                 
Texas Observer, Pacifica Radio News, Sydney H. Schanberg, E.L. Doctorow, William Styron, Michael 
Klare, and Scott Armstrong. 
 
10 Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561. 
 
11 Id. at 1571. 
 
12 Id.  The court cited Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713 (1971); and Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 713 (1971).  The court concluded that while the Supreme 
Court “has on a number of occasions considered the relationship between the First Amendment and 
national security” none the cases had directly addressed “the role and limits of news gathering under the 
First Amendment in a military context abroad.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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the Constitution; second, whether cases involving access and national security were 
justiciable—or “capable of being disposed of judicially.”13  Some courts framed such 
access claims as a First Amendment cases or used frames focused on some other 
constitutional concern and clearly stated the executive branch shares jurisdiction over 
some areas of national security with the other two branches of government.  Others 
framed the cases as primarily involving separation of powers questions and held that the 
constitutional structure left the area of national security solely to the executive branch.  
Similarly, courts have used a wide variety of legal factors to decide these cases.  While in 
early cases courts used textualism or legislative intent and engaged in detailed 
discussions of framers’ intent and constitutional structure, courts in later cases focused 
almost exclusively on precedent.  This stands in stark contrast to Supreme Court cases 
that have examined access to the judiciary.  With the exception of a few early cases, the 
Supreme Court has framed access to judicial proceedings as a First Amendment issue and 
invoked democratic theory.  In addition, even after the precedent was established, the 
Court continued to use a variety of legal factors, for example, engaging in detailed 
discussions of legal history and framers’ intent. 
This chapter of the dissertation examines cases in which courts have discussed 
how to balance access to information and locations with national security concerns and 
identifies how courts framed the legal issues and arguments and the legal factors courts 
used to reach decisions.  First it examines cases that have dealt with access to 
information.  Second, it analyzes cases that have dealt with access to locations.  Finally, it 
compares the frameworks and legal factors courts used in these cases to those used by the 
Supreme Court in cases that dealt with access to judicial proceedings and documents. 
                                                 
13 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (8th ed. 2004). 
 205 
 
The most frequently discussed frame in the national security and access cases was 
separation of powers.  While this frame was frequently used in both chapters two and 
three, the cases analyzed for this chapter discussed the power of courts at great length.  
The opinions repeatedly discussed the existence of a First Amendment-based right of 
access or a First Amendment theory that might support a “right to know,” but ultimately 
most of the jurists chose to focus on the justiciability of the cases or the power of courts 
to intervene in national security information cases.  In large part because of this focus on 
the existence of a right to know, although precedent was once again the legal factor most 
often used to justify an opinion, many of the jurists relied upon First Amendment theory.   
Comparing the national security/access cases and the judiciary/access cases 
further reinforces the complex nature of the national security/access decisions.  While the 
two categories of opinions used similar frames and factors, the outcome of the two types 
of cases were very different.  While the Supreme Court has established a clear First 
Amendment-based right of access to the judiciary, courts have been reluctant to articulate 
more than a qualified or tentative right of access to national security information and 
locations.  While the courts have been unwilling to totally embrace the notion that a right 
of access exists outside of the judicial context, the opinions certainly used the judiciary 
precedents to support their arguments that there might be some sort of universal qualified 
right of access guaranteed by the First Amendment.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of cases in which the two issues might finally merge: access to court 
proceedings dealing with national security threats. 
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Access to national security information 
 Although there is evidence that military documents were marked secret as early as 
the Revolutionary War, the official system that controls classified information in the 
United States traces its origins to an executive order14 issued by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
March 1940. 15  According to Harold C. Relyea, a congressional researcher and 
“specialist in American government,” the executive order was prompted by desires to 
establish a structure for protecting military information during “growing global 
hostilities,” to clarify the authority of civilian personnel in the national defense 
community to classify information, and to generally better manage the discretionary 
power to classify information.16 
 Although the classification system was modified shortly after the conclusion of 
World War II,17 the most important changes came in an executive order issued in 
September 1951.18  Relyea summarized three “sweeping innovations” introduced in 
Executive Order 10,290.  First, because the order indicated the Chief Executive was 
relying upon “the authority vested in [him] by the Constitution and statutes, and as 
President of the United States,” it strengthened the President’s discretion to make official 
secrecy policy.  Second, information was now classified in the interest of “national 
                                                 
14 Exec. Order 8,381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1,147 (Mar. 22, 1940). 
 
15 Harold C. Relyea, Security Classified and Controlled Information: History, Status, and Emerging 
Management Issues, CRS Report for Congress RL 33494, January 2, 2008 2 available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL33494.pdf.   
 
16 Id.  Prior to this order, information was designated as secret pursuant to Army and Navy general orders 
and regulations. 
 
17 Exec. Order 10,104, 15 Fed. Reg. 597 (Feb. 1, 1950). 
 
18 Exec. Order 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9,795 (Sept. 24, 1951). 
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security” rather than in the interest of “national defense.” 19  According to Relyea, “in the 
view of some,” this “somewhat new, but nebulous, concept . . . conveyed more latitude 
for the creation of official secrets” than the previous term.20  Finally, the order extended 
classification authority to nonmilitary entities throughout the executive branch so long as 
they had “some role in ‘national security’ policy.”21  Nineteen years after President 
Roosevelt created the modern classification system, the Supreme Court first reviewed the 
executive’s ability to classify national security information in a case involving the 
government’s revocation of a civilian contractor’s security clearance, Greene v. 
McElroy.22  Although on the surface the case was not about access to national security 
information, an important dissent in the case made it the first time a member of the 
Supreme Court wrote about the power of the executive branch to protect national security 
information. 
 In 1951, William L. Greene was vice president and general manager of 
Engineering and Research Corporation (ERCO), a company that developed and 
manufactured various mechanical and electronic products for the armed forces.23  While 
working on classified projects, Greene was denied a renewal of his security clearance 
based on information indicating he had associated with Communists, visited officials of 
the Russian Embassy, and attended a dinner given by an allegedly Communist front 
                                                 
19 Relyea, supra note 15, at 3.  A new executive order issued in 1953 revived the term national defense.  
Exec. Order 10,501, 18 Fed. Reg. 704 (Nov. 5, 1953). 
 
20 Relyea, supra note 15, at 3.  For a discussion of the evolution of the ability to classify information from 
1953 to 2008, see id. at 3-5.  
 
21 Id. 
 
22 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
 
23 Id. at 475. 
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organization.24  When Secretary of the Navy Robert E. Anderson overruled an original 
recommendation to grant Greene access to classified information and Anderson’s 
decision was upheld by the Eastern Industrial Personnel Security Board,25 Greene 
brought suit asking for a declaration that the revocation was unlawful and for an order 
restraining the government from revoking his security clearance.26  The District Court for 
the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the government, and the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.27 
 The court of appeals framed its main legal argument in terms of separation of 
powers.  Although the court recognized that Greene had suffered substantial harm from 
having his security clearance revoked, it held that Greene’s suit presented no justiciable 
controversy.  That is, there was no controversy “which the courts can finally and 
effectively decide, under tests and standards which they can soundly administer within 
their special field of competence.”28  The court did not discuss any constitutional or 
theoretical basis for its decision.  Instead, citing only its own precedent, the court held 
that the case involved an issue outside of judicial “experience and competence,” and that 
                                                 
24 Id. at 478.   
 
25 For a detailed procedural history of the case and hearings, see id. at 475-91. 
 
26 Id. at 490-91. 
 
27 Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1958).  
 
28 Id. at 953.  (“Here there is no such controversy. As we have seen, Greene makes no claim of lack of 
compliance by the Government with its own regulations. He attacks the Secretary’s decision on its merits 
and as a matter of constitutional right. But for a court to hear de novo the evidence as to Greene’s fitness to 
be assigned to a particular kind of confidential work would be a bootless task, involving judgments remote 
from the experience and competence of the judiciary.”). 
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the executive branch alone was responsible for the classification of national security 
information.29   
When Greene appealed, however, the U.S. Supreme Court framed the case in far 
narrower terms.  Instead of addressing the larger issue of classifying and accessing 
national security information, the Court framed the principle question of law as whether 
Greene had been denied due process.  In an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the 
Court validated Greene’s claim that the DOD had “denied him ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ 
without ‘due process of law’ in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.”30  According to 
the Court, Greene’s property was his employment, and his liberty was his freedom to 
practice his chosen profession.31  The Court held that without explicit authorization from 
either the President or Congress, the DOD was not empowered to create a security 
clearance program “under which affected persons may lose their jobs and may be 
restrained in following their chosen professions on the basis of fact determinations 
concerning their fitness for clearance made in proceedings in which they are denied the 
traditional procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.”32  Thus, the 
majority was very clear that it was steering away from legal questions of the powers of  
 
                                                 
29 Id.  (“[A]ny meaningful judgment in such matters must rest on considerations of policy, and decisions as 
to comparative risks, appropriate only to the executive branch of the Government. It must rest also on a 
mass of information, much of it secret, not appropriate for judicial appraisal.”) (citing Dayton v. Dulles, 
254 F. 2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). 
 
30 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959). 
 
31 Id. 
 
32 Id. at 493. 
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the President and Congress.33   
 Relying on statutory textualism and precedent to support its decision, the Court 
closely analyzed the language of the executive orders and federal legislation that 
controlled access to national security information.  Focusing on the exact wording of 
Executive Orders 10,290 and 10,501, the Court concluded that neither had authorized the 
creation of a process that did not allow for cross-examination. 
Clearly, neither of these orders empowers any executive agency to 
fashion security programs whereby persons are deprived of their present 
civilian employment and of the opportunity of continued activity in their 
chosen professions without being accorded the chance to challenge 
effectively the evidence and testimony upon which an adverse security 
determination might rest.34   
 
Turning to the legislative enactments that “might be deemed as delegating authority to 
the Department of Defense”35 to create programs to control access to national security 
information, the Court again found no explicit text to suggest a person could be deprived 
of due process rights.36   
Although the majority did not frame the case as involving access to information 
and declared it was deciding a very narrow question, Justice Tom C. Clark wrote an 
important dissenting opinion, which argued the case presented a “clear and simple” legal 
                                                 
33 Id. at 496 (“[T]he question which must be decided in this case is not whether the President has inherent 
power to act or whether Congress has granted him such a power; rather, it is whether either the President or 
Congress exercised such a power and delegated to the Department of Defense the authority to fashion such 
a program.”).  See also id. at 508 (reiterating that the Court was not deciding “whether the President has 
inherent authority” to create a program that suspended due process, “whether congressional action” was 
necessary to create such a program, or even “what the limits on executive or legislative authority may be”). 
 
34 Id. at 502. 
 
35 The Court analyzed the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401, the Armed Services 
Procurement Act of 1947, 41 U.S.C. § 255, and two sections of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 798 and 50 
U.S.C. § 783(b). 
 
36 Greene, 360 U.S. at 504 (finding that although the statutes “make it apparent that Congress recognizes 
the existence of military secrets, they hardly constitute an authorization to create an elaborate clearance 
program which embodies procedures traditionally believed to be inadequate to protect affected persons”). 
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question: Was there a constitutional right of access to government information?37  Taking 
this frame directly from the Solicitor General’s brief,38 Clark was critical of the 
majority’s framing of the issue as well as its reasoning.  He argued that the Court was 
ignoring “the basic consideration in the case. . . that no person, save the President, has a 
constitutional right to access to governmental secrets.”39   
Clark first attacked the majority’s opinion for misrepresenting precedent to reach 
its conclusion.  He wrote: 
[The majority opinion] cites four cases in support of this proposition and 
says compare four others. As I read those cases not one is on point.  In 
fact, I cannot find a single case in support of the Court’s position. Even a 
suit for damages on the ground of interference with private contracts does 
not lie against the Government.40   
 
Next, Clark turned to the “constitutional question.”  Clark wrote that although the 
majority’s opinion claimed to avoid answering the constitutional question of the 
executive branch’s ability to classify information, its decision was actually establishing a 
dangerous precedent during a dangerous time.  Alluding to the Cold War, Clark wrote 
that the Court’s decision to strike down the program “for lack of specific authorization” 
was “indeed strange, and hard for me to understand at this critical time of national 
emergency.”41  Finally, although the majority opinion never mentioned a “right of 
access” and Clark’s dissent did not specifically mention a First Amendment right of 
                                                 
37 Id. at 510-11 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 
38 Id. at 511 n.1 (“My brother Harlan very kindly credits me with ‘colorful characterization’ in stating this 
as the issue. While I take great pride in authorship, I must say that in this instance I merely agreed with the 
statement of the issue by the Solicitor General and his co-counsel in five different places in the Brief for the 
United States.”). 
 
39 Id. at 513. 
 
40 Id. at 512-13. 
 
41 Id. at 515. 
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access to government information, Clark concluded that the majority opinion would be 
read to guarantee some sort of broad right of access in the future.  He wrote: 
While the Court disclaims deciding this constitutional question, no one 
reading the opinion will doubt that the explicit language of its broad sweep 
speaks in prophecy.  Let us hope that the winds may change.  If they do 
not the present temporary debacle will turn into a rout of our internal 
security.42 
 
Thus Clark’s dissenting opinion in Greene was the first time a member of the 
Court framed a case as involving a constitutional right of access to government 
information.  While the majority supported Greene’s claims through texualism, it did so 
without framing the case in terms of access to information.  Although Clark’s dissent in 
Greene spoke of broad constitutional interpretations and impending doom, a Supreme 
Court majority did not frame a case as involving the issue of access to national security 
information until 1988.43  In 1965, however, the Court addressed a different access issue, 
whether a U.S. citizen had a First Amendment right to gather information in Cuba despite 
a government prohibition on traveling to the country.   
In 1962, roughly one year after the United States broke diplomatic ties with Cuba 
and declared U.S. passports invalid for travel to Cuba “unless specifically endorsed for 
such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State,”44 Louis Zemel filed a suit in 
federal court seeking a judgment declaring that he was “entitled under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States to travel to Cuba and to have his passport validated for that 
purpose.”45  In Zemel v. Rusk, the Court was asked to determine if Zemel had a First 
                                                 
42 Id. at 524. 
 
43 See infra notes 89-111 and accompany text. 
 
44 Zemel v. Rusk, 318 U.S. 1, 3 (1965).  
 
45 Id. at 4. 
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Amendment right to travel to Cuba in order to “satisfy [his] curiosity about the state of 
affairs in Cuba and make [himself] a better informed citizen.”46  
The Court framed three separate legal questions presented by the case.  First, the 
Court framed the case as a separation of powers issue, seeking to determine if Congress 
had properly conferred upon the Secretary of State authority to grant and validate 
passports.  Using both statutory textual analysis and legislative intent, the Court 
concluded the Secretary’s power to refuse to validate Zemel’s passport was supported by 
the authority granted by Congress in the Passport Act of 1926.47   
Turning to the constitutional questions presented by the case, the Court first 
considered if the Secretary’s refusal to validate Zemel’s passport violated Zemel’s due 
process rights.  Relying on a public policy analysis, the Court concluded that the 
Secretary of State had sufficient reason to restrict Zemel’s travel.  Focusing on the 
dangers of the communist Cuban government, the Court held that “the Secretary has 
justifiably concluded that travel to Cuba by American citizens might involve the Nation 
in dangerous international incidents, and that the Constitution does not require him to 
validate passports for such travel.”48  Although the Court cited precedent to support the 
existence of a constitutional right to travel both inside and outside the country, that right 
was outweighed by the obvious national security concerns related to traveling to Cuba,  
 
                                                 
46 Id.   
 
47 Id. at 7-13. 
 
48 Id. at 15. 
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concerns highlighted by the recent Cuban missile crisis.49 
Finally, the Court considered Zemel’s First Amendment claims.  In Zemel’s 
petition, he asserted that the refusal to validate his passport was “a direct interference 
with the First Amendment rights of citizens to travel abroad so that they might acquaint 
themselves at first hand with the effects abroad of our Government's policies, foreign and 
domestic, and with conditions abroad which might affect such policies.”50  Although the 
Court acknowledged that banning travel to Cuba interfered with the free flow of 
information, it refused to acknowledge the existence of a First Amendment issue.   
We must agree that the Secretary’s refusal to validate passports for Cuba 
renders less than wholly free the flow of information concerning that 
country. While we further agree that this is a factor to be considered in 
determining whether appellant has been denied due process of law, we 
cannot accept the contention of appellant that it is a First Amendment right 
which is involved. For to the extent that the Secretary’s refusal to validate 
passports for Cuba acts as an inhibition (and it would be unrealistic to 
assume that it does not), it is an inhibition of action. There are few 
restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in 
the garb of decreased data flow.51 
 
Relying on a First Amendment theory that did not embrace newsgathering, the Court 
concluded, “The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to 
                                                 
49 Id. at 15-16 (“The right to travel within the United States is of course . . . constitutionally protected.  But 
that freedom does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence cannot be quarantined when it 
can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety 
and welfare of the area or the Nation as a whole. So it is with international travel. That the restriction which 
is challenged in this case is supported by the weightiest considerations of national security is perhaps best 
pointed up by recalling that the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 preceded the filing of appellant's 
complaint by less than two months.”) (citing Edwards v. People of the State of California, 314 U.S. 160 
(1941)). 
 
50 Id. at 16. 
 
51 Id. at 16-17. 
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gather information.”52  Thus, the Court primarily framed the case only in terms of 
separation of powers and due process issues.  
Although the majority did not frame the case as directly implicating the First 
Amendment, a dissent authored by Justice William O. Douglas and joined by Justice 
Arthur Goldberg framed a “peripheral” First Amendment right as the main legal issue in 
the case.  Relying on the Court’s decision in Kent v. Dulles,53 Douglas concluded the 
Court had already established that the right to travel both at home and overseas was 
protected by the Constitution.54  Delving deeper into First Amendment theory, Douglas 
used a classic marketplace of ideas approach to support his contention that although the 
Secretary could prevent travel to dangerous locations, Cuba did not qualify as such a 
location. 
[T]he only so-called danger present here is the Communist regime in 
Cuba.  The world, however, is filled with Communist thought; and 
Communist regimes are on more than one continent. They are part of the 
world spectrum; and if we are to know them and understand them, we 
must mingle with them . . . .  
The First Amendment presupposes a mature people, not afraid of 
ideas. The First Amendment leaves no room for the official, whether 
truculent or benign, to say nay or yea because the ideas offend or please 
him or because he believes some political objective is served by keeping 
the citizen at home or letting him go.55 
  
Douglas concluded his opinion writing, “Restrictions on the right to travel in times of 
                                                 
52 Id. at 17. 
 
53 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
 
54 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 23-24 (“We held in Kent v. Dulles that the right to travel overseas, as well as at home, 
was part of the citizen's liberty under the Fifth Amendment. That conclusion was not an esoteric one drawn 
from the blue. It reflected a judgment as to the peripheral rights of the citizen under the First Amendment.  
The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical, political and 
other phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press”). 
 
55 Id. at 25-26. 
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peace should be so particularized that a First Amendment right is not precluded unless 
some clear countervailing national interest stands in the way of its assertion.”56 
In the years following Greene and Zemel, a number of lower courts applied First 
Amendment frames in a variety of access cases.57  In 1973, for example, in Brunnenkant 
v. Laird,58 a relatively obscure and rarely cited case,59 the D.C. District Court ruled that 
the First Amendment prevented the government from removing Siegfried Brunnenkant’s 
security clearance solely for voicing his social and political opinions.60  In a two-page 
opinion the court clearly framed the case in terms of the First Amendment.61  Although 
the court noted that in most cases involving national security the key legal issue was to 
balance competing interests, it wrote there was no need to engage in balancing here 
because the evidence overwhelming showed that Brunnenkant, a resident alien in the 
employ of a private contractor working for the U.S. government, lost his security 
                                                 
56 Id. at 26.   
 
57 In addition to the cases discussed here, a number of cases involving the state secrets privilege exist.  As 
noted in chapter one, the state secrets privilege, a judicial creation, is most often used by executive branch 
officials in civil court cases to protect against subpoenas, discovery motions and other judicial requests for 
information.  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss these cases.  For a summary of the state 
secrets privilege and cases dealing with concept, see William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallito, State Secrets 
and Executive Power, 120 POLI. SCI. Q. 85 (2005).  See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), for 
the genesis of the privilege. 
 
58 360 F.Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1973). 
 
59 Westlaw.com’s “Citing References” function reported only a single, unreported case that cited 
Brunnenkant, Pamella M. Doviak v. Dep’t of the Navy, 1987 WL 908627 (E.E.O.C. 1987). 
 
60 Brunnenkant, 360 F.Supp. at 1332.  (“[T]he withdrawal of plaintiff's security clearance, as a result of his 
expressions of opinion, is an unconstitutional invasion of his rights under the First Amendment.”) 
 
61 Id. (“In certain situations [a balancing process is required].  We do not have such a situation in this case 
and there is no need to balance competing interests. This is because the claimed threat to national security 
resulting from plaintiff's continued clearance lacks rational support in the only evidence of record and the 
deprivation of First Amendment rights to express oneself freely on any matter, no matter how unpopular 
those views may be, is clear and unambiguous.”)  
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clearance solely for voicing “heterodox political, social and economic views.”62  Relying 
upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bridges v. California63 and “other opinions to 
numerous to cite,”64 District Judge John H. Pratt granted Brunnenkant’s request for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  Although Pratt mentioned “balancing” competing 
interests in his opinion, he did not address any separation of powers issues.  At no point 
did he mention deferring to the executive in matters of national security, hint that the 
court might be exercising its power in an area in was not meant to, or even cite Greene.65     
Four years later, in 1977 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard two important 
cases addressing some of the legal issues that were raised, but not settled, by Greene.  
The first, United States v. AT&T,66 addressed national security information and the 
inherent power of both the executive and legislative branches of government.  The case 
concerned the issue of congressional access to national security information.  The second, 
discussed later in this chapter, Sherrill v. Knight,67 addressed a First Amendment right of 
access and the inherent power of the executive branch.  That case involved a claim of 
constitutional right of access by the press. 
United States. v. AT&T arose out of a congressional investigation into “the nature 
and extent of warrantless wiretapping” being conducted by the federal government.68  In 
                                                 
62 Id.  
 
63 314 U.S. 252 (1942). 
 
64 Brunnenkant, 360 F.Supp. at 1332. 
 
65 The entire opinion only cites one case other than Bridges, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). 
 
66 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
67 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
68 AT&T, 567 F.2d at 123. 
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the course of an investigation into the Justice Department’s wiretapping program, the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce issued a subpoena for all national security request letters in the 
possession of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co.  The Justice Department sued to 
enjoin AT&T from complying with the subpoena on the grounds “that compliance might 
lead to public disclosure of the documents, with adverse effect on national security.”69  
The district court granted the injunction and the chairman of the subcommittee, John D. 
Moss, appealed.  Rather than attempt to resolve the dispute at that time, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court with the suggestion that the 
parties attempt to negotiate a settlement.70  When the negotiations between the Justice 
Department and the subcommittee failed, the D.C. Circuit heard the case again. 71   
 In an opinion by Circuit Judge Harold Levevnthal, the court squarely framed the 
case as dealing with separation of powers.  First, the court addressed what it considered 
the “primary issue”72 of the case, the political question doctrine.  Similar to justiciability, 
the political question doctrine deals with the appropriateness of having a case decided by 
a court.  A political question is one “that a court will not consider because it involves the 
exercise of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch.”73  Both the 
legislative branch and the executive branch claimed in their briefs that the court did not 
                                                 
69 Id. at 123-24.   
 
70 See United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 
71 For a complete description of the proposal made by the Justice Department and the subcommittee’s 
reasons for rejecting the proposal, see AT&T, 567 F.2d at 125. 
 
72 Id. at 125-26. 
 
73 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004).   
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have the authority to make a “determination of the propriety of [their] acts.”74  While 
Congress based its claim of “absolute discretion” on the Speech or Debate Clause,75 the 
executive relied “on its obligation to safeguard the national security.”76 
The court disagreed with both parties, holding “neither the traditional political 
question doctrine nor any close adaptation thereof is appropriate where neither of the 
conflicting political branches has a clear and unequivocal constitutional title, and it is or 
may be possible to establish an effective judicial settlement.”77  Citing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr,78 the court of appeals noted that simply because a 
political controversy or conflict existed between the other two branches of government 
did not inherently mean the issue was beyond the competency of the judiciary to decide.79  
Instead, the court wrote, the political question doctrine applied when only one branch had 
the “constitutional authority” to make a decision that would settle the dispute.80   
The court then discussed at length which branch had the constitutional authority 
to control information classified for national security purposes.  Leventhal relied on 
framers’ intent and the text of the Constitution, in combination with the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
74 AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127. 
 
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 
76 AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127 n.17. 
 
77 Id. at 127. 
 
78 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 
79 AT&T, 567 F.2d at 126. 
 
80 Id.  In addition, in a footnote the court cited a number of cases to support its conclusion that “disputes 
concerning the allocation of power between the branches have often been judicially resolved.”  Id. at n.13 
(citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 
(1935); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 420 
U.S. 136 (1975); State Highway Comm’n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973)). 
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decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,81 to reach his conclusion.  First, the 
opinion concluded that the framers did not intend for absolute authority over any area of 
governance to rest with any of the three branches.  According to the court’s opinion, the 
framers expected that when “conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate 
branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in the 
manner most likely to result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental 
system.”82  The court wrote that “each branch should take cognizance of an implicit 
constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of 
the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation” in order to avoid “the 
mischief of polarization.”83 
 Next, moving from framers’ intent to textualism, Leventhal addressed the 
executive branch’s claim that the Constitution conferred upon it absolute power in the 
arena of national security.  He wrote that such a claim was not supported through textual 
analysis. 
The executive would have it that the Constitution confers on the 
executive absolute discretion in the area of national security. This does not 
stand up. While the Constitution assigns to the President a number of 
powers relating to national security, including the function of commander 
in chief and the power to make treaties and appoint Ambassadors, it 
confers upon Congress other powers equally inseparable from the national 
security, such as the powers to declare war, raise and support armed forces 
and, in the case of the Senate, consent to treaties and the appointment of 
ambassadors.84 
                                                 
81 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown involved an executive order issued in response to a strike called by the 
American Steel Workers Union in the latter part of 1951.  The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to 
take possession of most of the steel mills in the country and keep them running.  The Supreme Court held 
that the seizure order was not within the constitutional power of the President.  
 
82 AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127. 
 
83 Id. 
 
84 Id. at 128. 
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However, “most significant” to Leventhal was “the fact that the Constitution is largely 
silent on the question of allocation of powers associated with foreign affairs and national 
security.”85  The opinion then invoked Justice Jackson’s much quoted passage from 
Youngstown that such powers are “within a ‘zone of twilight’ in which the President and 
Congress share authority or in which its distribution is uncertain.”86   
Thus, after also determining that it did not “accept the concept that Congress’ 
investigatory power is absolute,”87 the court attempted to balance the executive’s interest 
in national security and Congress’ interest in investigating the warrantless wiretapping 
program by using a “gradual approach.”88  The court reasoned that such an approach was 
“consistent with our view that the present dispute should be regarded as a concerted  
                                                 
85 Id. 
 
86 Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).  Jackson’s full 
quotation reads: “When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, 
he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on 
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”   
   
87 Id. at 130.  To deal with Congress’ claim of authority based on the Speech or Debate Clause, the court 
primarily relied upon Supreme Court precedent, Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 
491 (1975).  In Eastland, the Supreme Court held that investigatory activities of a Senate subcommittee, 
individual senators and the chief counsel fell within the “legitimate legislative sphere” and were protected 
by the Speech or Debate Clause from being questioned in any other place and hence were immune from 
judicial interference.  After a lengthy discussion of Eastland, Leventhal concluded that courts could review 
actions taken by Congress and were not prohibited from doing so under the Speech or Debate Clause 
because the immunity from judicial inquiry afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause was personal to 
members of Congress.  Because this dissertation is concerned primarily with national security, a discussion 
of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.  For the court’s complete discussion of the issue, see id. at 
128-30. 
 
88 Id. at 131.  The court repeatedly referred to “gradualism” throughout the opinion. 
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search for accommodation between the two branches.”89  While the court’s balancing 
approach was somewhat analogous to the majority’s opinion in Greene, it framed the 
case much closer to Clark’s dissent, focusing on control of national security information.  
Using this approach allowed the court to acknowledge that the executive’s duty to protect 
national security information was important while also recognizing competing values.   
In 1988, almost thirty years after Greene, the Supreme Court decided a case using 
both Clark’s frame of a constitutional right of access to government information and his 
emphasis on the power of the executive branch to control information and deny access.  
In Department of Navy v. Egan90 the Court adopted a position put forward by the 
Solicitor General,91 ruling that it was solely the executive’s role to classify and protect 
information and make decisions about access to national security information.  In 1983, 
Thomas M. Egan lost his year-old position as a laborer leader at the Trident Naval Refit 
Facility in Bremerton, Washington, when he was denied a required security clearance.92  
Because the mission of the Refit Facility was to provide “quick-turn-around repair, 
replenishment, and systems check-out” of the Trident nuclear submarine, “the most 
                                                 
89 Id.  The court proposed a detailed compromise between the two branches that focused on how large a 
random sample of documents the Subcommittee would be allowed to review, whether note taking would be 
allowed, and whether the executive branch would be allowed to substitute documents if the randomly 
selected documents were found to contain “extraordinarily sensitive” national security information.  See id. 
at 131-33 for details of the court’s compromise. 
 
90 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
 
91 Compare Reply Brief for the Petitioner Charles Fried, Solicitor General, at 1, Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518 (1988) (No. 86-1552) 1987 WL 880379 (arguing the “narrow” issue in the case was the Merit 
Systems Protection Board’s power to review the Navy’s decision to deny Egan security clearance), with 
Egan, 484 U.S. at 520 (“The narrow question presented by this case is whether the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (Board) has authority . . . to review the substance of an underlying decision to deny or 
revoke a security clearance in the course of reviewing an adverse action.”). 
 
92 Egan, 484 U.S. at 520.  Egan was denied clearance based upon California and Washington state criminal 
records for assault and being a felon in possession of a gun and for his failure to disclose on his application 
for federal employment two earlier convictions for carrying a loaded firearm.  Id. at 521. 
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sophisticated and sensitive weapon in the Navy’s arsenal,” all positions at the Refit 
Facility were classified as “sensitive.”93  Because Egan could not qualify for any job at 
the Refit Facility without a security clearance, he was removed from his position.  Egan 
appealed the decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board as provided by the section of 
the U.S. Code under which he was dismissed.94  Although Egan initially won his appeal 
to the head of the Board, after he lost before the full Board he appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.95 
The court of appeals, by a divided vote, reversed the full Board’s decision that the 
Board had no authority to review the merits of a security-clearance decision.96  Like the 
Greene majority, the court of appeals framed the issue as procedural.  The court focused 
on the text and legislative history of the two possible sections of the U.S. Code under 
which Egan could have been removed, sections 7513 and 7532, to support its ruling.  The 
court wrote: 
The statute provides in 5 U.S.C. § 7532 for the exclusion from Board 
review of agency actions against employees in national security matters, 
and establishes a procedure for such actions.  Mr. Egan’s removal was not 
taken under that provision.  The statute provides no exclusion from Board 
review of removals under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), the provision under which 
                                                 
93 Id.  According to the Court, Egan had a “noncritical-sensitive” position that included “[a]ccess to Secret 
or Confidential information.”  However, pending the outcome of his security investigation, Egan performed 
only limited duties. 
 
94 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1985). 
 
95 At the initial hearing, the head of the Board reversed the decision not to grant Egan security clearance.  
Although the government argued that the Board “did not have the authority to judge the merits of the 
underlying security-clearance determination” and could only determine whether the required removal 
procedures had been followed, the head of the Board ruled that the Board did have the authority to review 
security clearance decisions.  Additionally, she held that the government had to “specify the precise criteria 
used in its security-clearance decision” and show that those criteria were “rationally related to national 
security.”  After the rehearing, the full Board reversed, holding that the Board did not have the power to 
review security clearance decisions.  Egan, 484 U.S. at 523-35. 
 
96 Egan v. Dep’t of Navy, 802 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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Mr. Egan was removed on the ground of failure to receive a job-required 
security clearance.  We have found no indication in the legislative history 
of the Civil Service Reform Act that such a removal action if taken under 
§ 7513(a) was intended to be exempt from Board review, and the 
government has not asserted that Congress so intended.97 
 
The court remanded the case to the Board for a new review, stating that the Board must 
rule on the propriety of denying the security clearance, and until it did, the question of an 
appropriate judicial remedy was not ripe.98  Noting “the importance of the issue in its 
relation to national security concerns,”99 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 Identifying the core legal issue as a right of access to information, in a 5-3 
decision, the Court used a number of legal factors to reach and justify its conclusion.  The 
Court relied on constitutional textualism, precedent, and the text of the statutes as well as 
“the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature 
of the administrative action involved”100 to support its decision to reverse.  First, in a nod 
to the power of the executive to protect national security information, Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s majority opinion began the analysis by noting, “It should be obvious that no 
one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”101  Using textualism to interpret the 
Constitution, Blackmun wrote that although the statutory language of section 7513 was 
important, the statute did not fundamentally alter the power of the executive under the 
Constitution to control national security information. 
                                                 
97 Id. at 1567. 
 
98 Id. at 1573-75. 
 
99 Egan, 484 U.S. at 520. 
 
100 Id. at 530. 
 
101 Id. at 528. 
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The President, after all, is the “Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States.” His authority to classify and control access to 
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive 
Branch that will give that person access to such information flows 
primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President and 
exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.102 
 
Next, using precedents to support his arguments, Blackmun noted both the 
compelling need to keep information secret and the executive’s unique ability to decide 
what should be kept secret.  Citing a number of cases, he concluded the Court had long 
“recognized the Government’s ‘compelling interest’ in withholding national security 
information from unauthorized persons in the course of executive business.”103  In 
addition, the Court relied on precedent for the proposition that “‘for reasons . . . too 
obvious to call for enlarged discussion’ the protection of classified information must be 
committed to the broad discretion of the agency responsible”104 and the assertion that it 
was “the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility 
of the Executive.”105  In conclusion the Court stated, “Thus, unless Congress specifically 
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the 
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”106 
                                                 
102 Id. at 527. 
 
103 Id.  The Court cited Snepp v. United State, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980); United States v. Robel, 389 
U.S. 258, 267 (1967); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); and Totten v. United States, 9 U.S. 
105, 106 (1876).   
 
104 Egan, 484 U.S. at 527 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)). 
 
105 Id. (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)). 
 
106 Id. at 530 (citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 
144 (1953); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757-58 
(1975); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)). 
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Justice Byron White, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, 
wrote a dissenting opinion.  Although White also framed his argument in terms of the 
control of national security information, he wrote an opinion that attempted to balance 
multiple interests, much as the AT&T court had done.  While White deviated from 
Blackmun by not focusing on textual analysis, like Blackmun, he focused much of his 
opinion on legislative intent and precedent.  Although White’s opinion acknowledged the 
“compelling interest” of national security, he contended that it was already accounted for 
in statutes dealing with government employee dismissals and accused the majority of 
trying to “rewrite” the statutes in the name of national security.107  White reasoned that 
Congress intended for there to be two statutes to deal with dismissals “to guarantee every 
discharged employee a hearing into the ‘cause’ for his removal.”108  The majority’s 
opinion, according to White, “frustrate[d] this congressional intent by denying any 
meaningful hearing to employees such as respondent who are discharged on national 
security grounds under provisions other than § 7532.”109   
Next, White turned his attention to precedent, or more specifically, to the lack of 
reference to Greene in the majority’s opinion.  Taking the majority to task for the 
omission, White wrote it was “difficult to reconcile today’s decision with the Court’s 
discussion in Greene v. McElroy of the procedural protections available” to a government 
contractor who had been denied a security clearance.110   
                                                 
107 Id. at 534 (White, J., dissenting). 
  
108 Id. at 535. 
 
109 Id. 
 
110 Id. at 536.  
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Finally, focusing on the practical ability of the government to keep information 
classified, White concluded the majority’s result was “not necessary to protect the 
Nation’s secrets”111  Although he did not invoke democratic theory, an analysis of 
constitutional text or structure, or the framers’ intent, in a footnote White suggested the 
executive did not have the sole ability or power to evaluate national security concerns and 
cited precedent to demonstrate that the courts had previously “adjudicated cases 
involving denials of security clearances without any documented harm to national 
security.”112  Thus, although the majority’s opinion suggested that the Court had 
traditionally deferred to the executive in the area of access to national security 
information and the executive was uniquely suited to deal with such concerns, the 
precedents cited in White’s dissent, including Greene, cast doubts on those notions.   
Despite White’s dissent, in the years following Egan a number of the U.S. Circuit 
Courts have cited the case for the idea that courts should show considerable deference to 
the executive branch in the area of national security, especially in terms of protecting 
national security information.113  In the area of access to classified information, a 1995 
case, Stehney v. Perry,114 is a good example of this trend.   
The plaintiff, Dr. Ann K. Stehney, was a former employee of a nonprofit agency 
who refused to take a polygraph examination in order to obtain a security clearance to 
                                                 
111 Id. at 537. 
 
112 Id. at 537 n.1 (citing Hoska v. United States Dep’t of Army, 677 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Gayer v. 
Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973); McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 
113 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2007); El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2007); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 
2003);  Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
308 F.3d 198, 219 (3rd Cir. 2002); United States v. McKevee, 131 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 
114 907 F. Supp. 806 (D.N.J. 1995). 
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work on a National Security Agency (NSA) project.  Although a failed polygraph was not 
grounds for automatic denial of security clearance, all individuals with access to 
“Sensitive Compartmented Information” were required to take the examination.  Instead 
of the taking the examination Stehney asked that she be treated as if she had taken the 
polygraph examination and failed.  Eleven months after Stehney’s security clearance was 
terminated, she filed suit in federal district court seeking mandamus relief to force NSA 
officials to allow her not to take the polygraph test.115   
In considering Stehney’s claim, the district court framed the case in terms of 
separation of powers issues and quickly and decisively held that the case was non-
justiciable based on the political question doctrine.  The court relied on familiar 
precedents and constitutional text to reach its conclusion.  First, the court cited Baker v. 
Carr116 for the proposition that courts should not decide questions that are “textually 
committed” to another branch of government.117  Next the court focused on the 
President’s powers as commander-in-chief and cited a number of cases, including Egan, 
to support its conclusions that “it has long been the ‘generally accepted view . . . that 
foreign policy [is] the province of and responsibility of the Executive,’”118 and “[t]he 
                                                 
115 Id.  The plaintiff based her claim on DOD regulations, the U.S. Constitution and New Jersey law and 
policy. 
 
116 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 
117 Stehney, 907 F. Supp. at 816. 
 
118 Id.  (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)).  The court also cited  Cafeteria & Restaurant 
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961) (recognizing that the executive branch “has 
traditionally exercised unfettered control” of access to military bases); and Chicago & Southern Air Lines 
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign 
policy is political, not judicial” because “[t]hey are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither 
aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political 
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”).   
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same principle logically applies to the protection of national-security secrets.”119  Turning 
to textual analysis, the court wrote:  
[T]he text of the Constitution expressly confers on the President exclusive 
authority to take action as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States.”  The authority to classify and control access to 
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give 
that person access to such information flows primarily from this 
constitutional investment of power and exists quite apart from any explicit 
congressional grant. . . . 
. . . . 
Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive 
in military and national security affairs. 120 
 
The district court went on to conclude that because Egan gave the President the “final 
say” in deciding what information to classify, “such plenary authority cannot, by 
definition, be exercised unconstitutionally.”121 
 In addition to showing great deference to the executive branch, the district court 
dismissed Greene.  Although the court admitted that the Supreme Court reviewed an 
executive branch decision in Greene, it held that Stehney’s reliance on that precedent was 
misplaced because “no justiciability issue was raised or addressed.”122  Although the 
                                                 
119 Stehney, 907 F. Supp. at 816 (citing  Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir.1990) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).  In addition, even though the Supreme Court 
supported the right of the press to publish the Pentagon Papers, the Stehney court also cited Justice 
Stewart’s concurring opinion in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29 (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (“The responsibility [for protecting classified information] must be where the power is. If the 
Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the 
maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely 
unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that power 
successfully.”). 
 
120 Stehney, 907 F. Supp. at 817 (citing Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526-30 (1988) (quoting 
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985))). 
 
121 Id. at 818. 
 
122 Id. 
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Supreme Court never said so, the district court concluded that Greene was left 
inapplicable in the wake of Egan.   
In summary, although a few opinions have voiced concerns or put restraints on 
the executive branch’s ability to control national security information,123 the general trend 
has been for courts to rule they are not qualified to consider such cases.  In the years 
following Egan, most courts framed cases involving classification and access as 
justiciability or separation of powers issues.  For example, in addition to the District 
Court of New Jersey’s decision in Stehney, a number of federal courts, including four 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, have held that the executive branch’s power to classify 
and control information is not judicially reviewable.124  These cases are often excellent 
examples of issue fluidity, demonstrating the ability of courts to focus on one issue while 
ignoring others.  In addition, they also demonstrate the ability of courts to focus on 
certain factors that justify or support their conclusion while ignoring others that may not.  
Since Egan, courts have moved away from lengthy analytical discussions of framers’ 
intent, shared powers, legislative history or access to information.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, a similar trend has emerged in cases that have considered access to 
locations.  Although in many of these cases courts at least framed the issue in terms of 
access or the First Amendment, they continued to defer to the executive branch or relied 
                                                 
123 See Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 534 (1988) (White, J., dissenting); Greene v. McElroy, 360 
U.S. 474 (1959); United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
124 See Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Admin. Rev. Board, 476 F. 3d. 847 (10th Cir. 2007); Bennett v. 
Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003); Reinbold v. Evers, 
187 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 1999); Makky v. Chertoff, 489 F. Supp. 2d 421 (D.N.J. 2007); Nickelson v. United 
States, 284 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D. Va. 2003); Cobb v. Danzig, 190 F.R.D. 564 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Edwards v. 
Widnall, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D.Minn.1998).  But see Ranger v. Tenet, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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on justifiability frames to avoid answering the difficult question of how to balance 
national security and transparency.    
 
Access to national security locations 
 Just a few months after its decision in AT&T, the D.C. Circuit was called upon in 
Sherrill v. Knight125 to determine if the First Amendment rights of a journalist were 
violated by the White House’s refusal to grant a press pass.  While the case did not 
directly implicate national security information per se, it was framed as an access case, 
dealt with the ability of the executive branch of the government to curtail newsgathering 
based on concerns related to the safety of the President, and contained a detailed 
discussion of a constitutionally based right to know. 
In 1966, Robert Sherrill, the White House correspondent for The Nation, was 
denied a press pass based on the results of an investigation by the Secret Service.  
Although at the time there existed no published or internal regulations on which decisions 
to grant or deny press passes were based, during discovery it was determined that there 
was a routine process.  First, a journalist would submit a request for a pass to the White 
House Press Office.  Next, the Press Office would determine if the applicant had already 
obtained a pass for the House and Senate press galleries, resided in the Washington, D.C., 
area, and needed to report from the White House on a regular basis.126   If all of these 
requirements were met, the Press Office would then forward the application to the Secret 
                                                 
125 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
126 According to court records, this was usually verified by an editor of the publication for which the 
applicant was a correspondent.  Id. at 126. 
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Service for a security check, including a background FBI investigation.127  If an 
application for a pass was denied, the journalist was informed only that the denial was 
“for reasons relating to the security of the President and/or the members of his immediate 
family.”128  Sherrill’s application had been denied based on his having been arrested and 
fined for physical assault in the State of Florida.129   
Sherrill filed for relief in federal district court, alleging that the denial of a press 
pass violated the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.130  Although Sherrill’s 
suit asked the district court to declare the refusal to grant him a press pass unlawful and 
to enjoin the Press Office from doing so,131 the court instead crafted a set of specific 
standards by which the Secret Service should operate.  On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court remanded the case to the Secret Service with an order to: (1) 
“devise and publicize narrow and specific standards” for press pass denials; (2) in the 
case of a denial, institute procedures whereby an applicant would be “given notice of the 
evidence” upon which the Secret Service was to base its denial; (3) grant the journalist an 
opportunity to rebut or explain the evidence; and (4) issue “a final written decision 
                                                 
127 Id. 
 
128 Id. at 127   
 
129 Id.  Sherrill learned the reasons for the denial when Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eugene Rossides 
sent a letter to the American Civil Liberties Union about a Freedom of Information Act request regarding 
documents pertaining to the issue.  Sherrill was never officially informed why he was denied a press pass 
by the Secret Service.  
 
130 See Forcade v. Knight, 416 F. Supp. 1025 (D.C.D.C. 1975).  Thomas Forcade, a correspondent for the 
Alternate Press Syndicate who was also denied a White House press pass, was a second party to the 
complaint in the district court case.  Although the judgment of the district court pertained to both Forcade 
and Sherrill, Forcade disclaimed further interest in the case after the parties appealed, but before the court 
of appeals ruled.  Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 126 n.1. 
 
131 Forcade, 416 F. Supp. at 1027. 
 
 233 
 
specifying the reasons for its refusal to grant a press pass.”132  Sherrill appealed the 
decision to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 Like the district court, the circuit court found the case implicated the First and 
Fifth Amendments and framed the dispute as an access issue.133  First, however, as it did 
in AT&T, the court dealt with the issue of justicability and the executive’s constitutional 
power.  Circuit Judge Carl E. McGowan’s opinion soundly rejected the government’s 
attempt to frame the case in terms of separation of powers and its argument that the 
Constitution prohibited the judiciary from ruling on the case because access to the White 
House and the safety of the President were outside the power of the judiciary.  The court 
wrote: 
We reject at the outset the contention of appellants that this case is 
nonjusticiable either because protection of the President is vested within 
the sole discretion of the Executive or because there are no judicially 
manageable standards for presidential protection. The former argument is 
wholly without force. Nothing in the Constitution suggests that courts are 
not to be the final arbiters of the legality of the actions of those protecting 
the President. . . . 
. . . . 
[W]e cannot agree with the Government's argument that mere mention 
of the President's safety must be allowed to trump any First Amendment 
issue.134 
 
After summarily dismissing that legal question, the court turned its attention to the First 
Amendment, engaging in a detailed discussion of previous cases involving constitutional 
protections for newsgathering. 
                                                 
132 Id. at 1039. 
 
133 Sherrill, 569 F. 2d at 128 (“We agree with the District Court that both first and fifth amendment 
concerns are heavily implicated in this case. . . .  We further conclude that notice, opportunity to rebut, and 
a written decision are required because the denial of a pass potentially infringes upon first amendment 
guarantees. Such impairment of this interest cannot be permitted to occur in the absence of adequate 
procedural due process.”). 
 
134 Id. at 128 n.14. 
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 Citing the Supreme Court decision in Pell v. Procunier135 and dicta from Zemel v. 
Rusk136 for the respective propositions that the press had no greater First Amendment 
right of access than the general public and the general public had no First Amendment 
right of access to the White House, the government argued that denial of a White House 
press pass would violate the First Amendment “only if it is based upon the content of the 
journalist’s speech or otherwise discriminates against a class of protected speech.”137  
While McGowan wrote that denying a press pass on content-based criteria would be 
problematic, he also concluded that there were additional First Amendment arguments to 
consider.  Chief among these was “the protection afforded newsgathering under the first 
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.”138 Citing a host of Supreme Court 
decisions, McGowan concluded: 
[T]he protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment 
guarantee of freedom of the press, requires that this access not be denied 
arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons. Not only newsmen and the 
publications for which they write, but also the public at large have an 
interest protected by the first amendment in assuring that restrictions on 
newsgathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that individual 
newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information.139   
  
                                                 
135 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (“The Constitution does not, however, require government to accord the 
press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally.”). 
 
136 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (“For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House 
diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way 
the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right.”). 
 
137 Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129. 
 
138 Id. 
 
139 Id. at 129-30.  The court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972), and Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-35 (1974), for the proposition that the First Amendment protected 
newsgathering; Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 
444 (1938), as requiring that access for the purpose of newsgathering not be denied for “less than 
compelling reasons”; and Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975), and Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), for the conclusion that the public had a right to 
receive information. 
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Although the court agreed with the government that protection of the President was a 
“compelling, even overwhelming interest,” the practice of “[m]erely informing individual 
rejected applicants that rejection was for ‘reasons of security’ does not inform the public 
or other potential applicants of the basis for exclusion of journalists from White House 
press facilities.”140   
However, while the court clearly identified the First Amendment issue in the case, 
its focus on the specific pragmatic concerns of the case led it to a different conclusion 
than the district court.  Although the court of appeals agreed with the district court that 
denial of a White House press pass to a bona fide journalist could violate the First and 
Fifth Amendments, the D.C. Circuit held that neither amendment justified requiring “the 
articulation of detailed criteria upon which the granting or denial of White House press 
passes is to be based.” 141  The court wrote that protecting the President and his 
immediate family did not “lend itself to detailed articulation of narrow and specific 
standards or precise identification of all the factors which may be taken into account” by 
the Secret Service.142  Instead, the court ordered the Secret Service to “publish or 
otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in determining whether an 
otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White House press pass.”143 In case of a denial, 
the court required that a final statement of denial be sent to the applicant containing the 
reason for the denial “in order to assure that the agency has neither taken additional, 
                                                 
140 Id. at 130. 
 
141 Id. at 129. 
 
142 Id. at 130. 
 
143 Id.  
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undisclosed information into account, nor responded irrationally to matters put forward 
by way of rebuttal or explanation.”144  The court wrote: 
This standard is sufficiently circumspect so as to allow the Secret Service, 
exercising expert judgment which frequently must be subjective in nature, 
considerable leeway in denying press passes for security reasons. At the 
same time, the standard does specify in a meaningful way the basis upon 
which persons will be deemed security risks, and therefore will allow 
meaningful judicial review of decisions to deny press passes.145 
 
Additionally, the court wrote that it expected courts to “be appropriately deferential to the 
Secret Service’s determination of what justifies the inference that an individual 
constitutes a potential risk to the physical security of the President or his family.”146 
Thus, in one year the D.C. Circuit held that the judiciary had a role in determining 
who had access to information in two cases—United States v. AT&T. and Sherrill—and 
that the First Amendment protected at least some newsgathering activity in Sherrill, 
although it limited its ruling based on practical considerations and cautioned courts to 
defer to the executive branch.  While a First Amendment right of access case would not 
come back before the D.C. Circuit for a number of years, in 1988 the Southern District of 
New York was called upon to determine if the First Amendment provided unlimited 
access to a foreign arena in which American military forces were engaged. 
As noted above, Nation Magazine v. Department of Defense147 involved a 
challenge to the Department of Defense regulations governing press coverage of 
American military activities during periods of open hostilities.  While the plaintiffs 
                                                 
144 Id. at 131. 
 
145 Id. at 130. 
 
146 Id. 
 
147 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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framed the case as a First Amendment right of access case, the government put forth a 
variety of arguments involving justiciability and separation of powers.  Therefore, when 
considering the media organizations’ requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, the 
Southern District of New York’s opinion first addressed issues of justiciability raised by 
the DOD’s brief, including standing, the political question doctrine and mootness.148  In 
addition, the court stated that even in “the event the Court determines that at least some 
of the issues are not moot and that there is jurisdiction to hear the claims, a question 
remains whether the Court should exercise its power to address the controversy.”149 
First, the court briefly discussed standing and held that because the charges were 
“brought before the Court by parties who have allegedly suffered immediate injury 
resulting from the challenged regulations,” the plaintiffs had standing to raise First and 
Fifth Amendment claims.150  Next, the court turned its focus to the political question 
doctrine.  Focusing on precedents, the court determined that a “long line of cases 
addressing the role of the judiciary in reviewing military decisions” had left the clear 
message that “[c]ivilian courts should ‘hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks 
the court to tamper with the . . . necessarily unique structure of the Military 
Establishment.’”151  Yet, despite this strong language that seemed to favor the 
government’s position that the case was outside judicial power, the court was unwilling 
                                                 
148 Id. at 1565.     
 
149 Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1565 (emphasis added). 
 
150 Id.  Standing is defined as “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty 
or a right.  To have standing in federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) that the challenged conduct has 
caused the plaintiff actual injury, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of 
interests meant to be regulated by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
151 Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1566-67 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983)). 
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to go so far as to accept the government’s claim that all cases involving the military were 
outside the power of Article III courts.152  Instead, the court found the cases cited by the 
government differed from the case at hand in that they had involved “direct challenges to 
the institutional functioning of the military in such areas as the relationship between 
personnel, discipline, and training.”153  Unlike that line of cases, the court ruled that the 
present case did not impact the executive’s foreign relations powers or require the court 
to move beyond its traditional area of expertise and, therefore, was justiciable.154 
Finally, the court addressed the mootness doctrine, what it termed the “most 
difficult of the justiciability questions” raised by the case, and used its discussion to 
contemplate the existence of a constitutional right of access.155  Considering the 
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, the court wrote, “Since the regulations have been 
lifted and the press is no longer constrained from traveling throughout the Middle East, 
                                                 
152 Id. at 1568 (concluding the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged “claims that are judicially enforceable under the 
First and Fifth Amendments”).  The court found the DOD’s primary argument that “the political question 
doctrine bars an Article III court from adjudicating any claims that involve the United States military” 
unpersuasive.   The court went on to state that “[u]nder this theory of separation of powers, a court would 
lack jurisdiction to hear any controversy that involved DOD, including any government actions that 
violated the rights of non-military personnel. This reasoning is inconsistent with large bodies of 
constitutional law.”  Id. 
 
153 Id. at 1567. 
 
154 Id. 
 
155 Id. at 1568-69.  The mootness doctrine is “[t]he principle that American courts will not decide . . . cases 
in which there is no longer any actual controversy.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (8th ed. 2004).  The 
court addressed mootness because by the time it heard the case, although the DOD regulations still existed, 
they had been “lifted” in regards to the Persian Gulf conflict.  Considering its ability to hear the overall 
case, the court found that the issue was capable of repetition yet likely to continue to evade judicial review.  
Because of the short duration of modern military action, the court wrote, “the judicial process often will not 
be able to resolve legal controversies such as this before hostilities have ceased.”  In addition, the court 
wrote that it was “not unreasonable to suppose that in future military activities DOD will behave in a 
manner that is susceptible to the same challenges as those raised in this complaint.”  Nation Magazine, 762 
F. Supp. at 1569.     
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there is no longer any presently operative practice for this Court to enjoin.” 156  However, 
on the issue of declaratory relief the court ruled that because the plaintiffs asserted that 
the existence of the DOD restrictions violated the First Amendment generally, and not 
simply as applied to operations in the Middle East, the court could hear the challenge.  
Unfortunately for the media plaintiffs, that did not end the court’s discussion.  The court 
then wrote: “The question of the court’s power to hear a case is, however, only the 
beginning of the inquiry. A separate and more difficult inquiry is whether it is appropriate 
for a Court to exercise that power.”157  
 More than in any other case discussed in this chapter, the issue was clearly 
framed by the court as a conflict between transparency and national security.  The court 
also stated that it needed to consider what branch of government should strike the balance 
between these two competing interests. 
At issue in this action are important First Amendment principles and 
the countervailing national security interests of this country. This case 
presents a novel question since the right of the American public to be 
informed about the functioning of government and the need to limit 
information availability for reasons of national security both have a secure 
place in this country’s constitutional history. In short, this case involves 
the adjudication of important constitutional principles. The question, 
however, is not only which principles apply and the weighing of the 
principles, but also when and in what circumstances it is best to consider 
the questions.158   
 
To determine if it should exercise its power, the court turned to a detailed discussion of 
First Amendment theory, specifically whether theories related to self-governance and the 
checking function of the press supported the establishment of a right of access.  After 
                                                 
156 Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1570.     
  
157 Id. at 1570. 
 
158 Id. at 1571. 
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framing the case in terms of the First Amendment, the court relied upon precedents to 
flesh out this discussion of a constitutional right to access.   
 Although the media organizations argued that they were not asking the court to 
establish a new constitutional right of access that required “affirmative assistance” from 
the government to provide information, 159  the court reasoned that the case involved 
charting “new constitutional territory.”  The court wrote that while the Supreme Court 
had considered cases involving the First Amendment and national security, none of those 
cases had directly addressed “the role and limits of news gathering under the First 
Amendment in a military context abroad,” and therefore there was no direct precedent to 
rely upon. 160  Instead, the court turned to “case law on questions involving the access 
rights of the press and public” to answer the novel constitutional questions of a right to 
access to military endeavors and whether press pools violated that right.161 
 The court began by citing the Supreme Court precedents that had previously 
established “there is no right of access of the press to fora which have traditionally been 
characterized as private or closed to the public, such as meetings involving the internal 
discussions of government officials,”162 and limitations may be “placed on access to 
                                                 
159 Id. (“The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that, under the First Amendment, the press has a right to 
gather and report news that involves United States military operations and that DOD’s pool regulations are 
an unconstitutional limitation on access to observe events as they occur. . . .  In other words, plaintiffs 
claim that no affirmative assistance from the government is being requested, only the freedom from 
interference to report on what is overtly happening in an allegedly open area.”).  
 
160 Id.  The court cited Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713, 
722-23 (1971) and Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980) as examples of the cases in which 
the Supreme Court had considered the balance between the First Amendment and national security. 
 
161 Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1571.     
 
162 Id.  (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974)). 
  
 241 
 
government controlled institutions.”163  Continuing to focus on precedent, the opinion 
next cited a number of cases that supported a First Amendment “right to know.”  First, it 
discussed two cases dealing with a First Amendment access to judicial proceedings—
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia164 and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court165—as examples of the Supreme Court’s support for a “right to know” and the 
checking function of the press.166   
A fundamental theme in Richmond and Globe was the importance of an 
informed American citizenry. As the Court wrote, guaranteed access of the public 
to occurrences in a courtroom during a criminal trial assures “freedom of 
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”  Learning 
about, criticizing and evaluating government, the Supreme Court has reasoned, 
requires some “right to receive” information and ideas.167 
 
In addition, the court suggested that in Globe Newspaper Co.  the Court implied access to 
other situations might also be included in the Amendment168 and pointed out that the 
Supreme Court held the right to be informed about government operations was important 
“even when the government has suggested that national security concerns were 
implicated.”169  The court summarized:  
                                                 
163 Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974)). 
 
164 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 
165 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 
166 Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572. 
 
167 Id. 
 
168 Id. (“In recent times the Supreme Court has been particularly generous in interpreting the scope of the 
public’s right under the First Amendment to know about government functioning, at least in such fora as a 
criminal trial.  See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 564. In these cases, there appears to be some 
indication that the basis for such a right of access could apply more broadly. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court for County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).”). 
 
169 Id. (citing New York Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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Given the broad grounds invoked in these holdings, the affirmative right to 
gather news, ideas and information is certainly strengthened by these 
cases.  By protecting the press, the flow of information to the public is 
preserved.  As the Supreme Court has observed, “the First Amendment 
goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals 
to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which 
members of the public may draw.”  Viewing these cases collectively, it is 
arguable that generally there is at least some minimal constitutional right 
to access.170 
 
Having established a number of precedents that supported a right of access, the 
court speculated about how this line of cases would apply to the military.  Although the 
court concluded that at least some right of access to the military might exist, it was 
uncertain because “military operations are not closely akin to a building such as a prison, 
nor to a park or a courtroom.”171  Ultimately, based on this uncertainty, the hypothetical 
nature of its discussion, and the lack of concrete facts on which to apply precedent, the 
court refused to decide if there was a right of access.  “Pursuant to long-settled policy in 
the disposition of constitutional questions, courts should refrain from deciding issues 
presented in a highly abstract form, especially in instances where the Supreme Court has 
not articulated guiding standards,”172 the court wrote. 
 The court next considered whether the DOD’s use of press pools gave preferential 
treatment to some members of the press.  Again the court turned to Supreme Court 
precedent to support its discussion, this time focusing on the Court’s public forum 
doctrine.  First, the court discussed precedent that supported the plaintiffs’ case, finding 
that because the government had decided to “open the door” to press coverage it had 
                                                 
170 Id. (quoting First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) and citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could 
be eviscerated.”)). 
 
171 Id. 
 
172 Id. 
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created an “expressive area.”173  “Regardless of whether the government is 
constitutionally required to open the battlefield to the press as representatives of the 
public, a question that this Court has declined to decide, once the government does so it is 
bound to do so in a non-discriminatory manner,” the court said.174  Citing Sherrill v. 
Knight, the court ruled that government could not arbitrarily exclude some members of 
the press once it allowed others to cover the conflict.175   
The court, however, then noted that the right to be free from discriminatory 
treatment was “not synonymous with a guaranteed right to gather news at all times and 
places or in any manner that may be desired” and the press could be subjected to 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.176  Thus, the court concluded that some 
restrictions might be appropriate at some point.  After reaching this conclusion, the court 
once again declined to decide the issue.  Instead, it concluded it was not faced with 
concrete enough facts to rule on the limitations on access.  The court wrote: 
[S]urely a court ruling on the possible appropriateness of such a restriction 
for some future military conflict must consider the possibility that at times 
such circumstances may be present. Who can say that during the next 
American overseas military operation some restriction on the number of 
journalists granted access at a particular time to a particular battlefield 
may not be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction? Who today 
can even predict the manner in which the next war may be fought?177  
                                                 
173 Id. at 1573 (citing Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983), for 
the proposition that the government had created a limited public forum by establishing pools for coverage 
for the Persian Gulf conflict).  
 
174 Id.  
 
175 Id. (“Once a limited public forum has been created, the government is under an obligation to insure that 
‘access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons.’ Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) . . . .  Restrictions on newsgathering must generally be no more ‘arduous than necessary, 
and . . . individual newsmen may not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information.’ Sherrill, 569 
F.2d at 130.”). 
 
176 Id. (citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972)). 
 
177 Id. at 1574. 
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Faced with two “significant and novel constitutional doctrines”178 and without 
clear direction from the Supreme Court or concrete facts to rule on, the court concluded 
that “based on all the circumstances of the case,” the controversy was not “sufficiently 
concrete and focused to permit adjudication on the merits.”179  Thus, although the court 
clearly considered a First Amendment right of access to be the main principle of law 
presented by the case, the court could duck the issue, citing a lack of direction from the 
Supreme Court and pragmatic concerns related to the hypothetical nature of the situation 
it was contemplating.  While the Supreme Court has yet to provide any clear direction, 
the U.S. District Court for D.C. has twice decided cases very similar to Nation Magazine 
with nearly identical results.  In these cases, Getty Images v. Department of Defense180 
and Flynt v. Rumsfeld,181 the court engaged in similar First Amendment discussions as 
the Nation Magazine court, relied on almost identical precedents and again focused on 
the lack of a concrete controversy.   
In Getty Images, a case involving access to the U.S. government’s detention 
center at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, the D.C. District Court used similar 
frames and precedents as Nation Magazine.  Although the court discussed First 
Amendment issues as well as an equality frame involving the likelihood that there was at 
least some sort of constitutional right of equal access to Guantanamo Bay, it ultimately 
determined that Getty had failed to demonstrate that injunctive relief was needed.  In the 
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179 Id. at 1568.   
 
180 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 
181 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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case, Getty Images News Services Corp., “a reputable press organization that produces 
over 100,000 photographs annually for subscribers such as Time and Newsweek,”182 
sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the DOD to provide Getty with equal access to 
the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, to require the DOD to “promulgate standards 
and procedures ensuring equal access,” and to compel the DOD to create a press pool for 
access to Guantanamo.183  According to the court, Getty’s claim “framed several 
constitutional challenges to its alleged treatment by DOD.”184  Getty alleged that the 
DOD’s actions violated the company’s First Amendment right to equal access to 
Guantanamo and Fifth Amendment right to equal protection, and that the company’s First 
and Fifth Amendment rights had been violated “because adequate regulatory standards 
had not been developed and applied.”185   
In considering Getty’s claim, District Judge John D. Bates primarily relied upon 
Sherrill and Nation Magazine to reach his conclusions.  Comingling First Amendment 
and non-discrimination issues, the court used these two cases to support Getty’s argument 
that once the DOD “opened Guantanamo Bay to certain members of the press, all 
members of the press became constitutionally entitled to equal access to the detention 
                                                 
182 Getty, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 113. 
 
183 Id. at 113-14.  In addition, Getty also sought to enjoin the DOD from excluding it from participation in 
the National Media Pool or any ad hoc or regional pools created during Operation Enduring Freedom.  
However, by the time the case reached the district court, Getty was granted membership in the National 
Media Pool and the Afghanistan regional pool no longer existed.  Therefore, the court dismissed these 
claims after a short discussion of standing and mootness. 
 
184 Id. at 114. 
 
185 Id.  In addition, the media company alleged its due process rights under the Fifth Amendment were 
violated because the company’s competitors “had allegedly been delegated the power to regulate Getty’s 
access to pool coverage.”  Id. 
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facilities there.”186  In addition, after a discussion of Sherrill, the court concluded that 
although it was “reluctant to interfere” with military conduct, 187 the First and Fifth 
Amendments required, “at a minimum, that before determining which media 
organizations receive the limited access available” there must be some reasonable criteria 
to guide the DOD decisions.188  Quoting the Sherrill court’s discussion of First 
Amendment protection for newsgathering without truly devolving into First Amendment 
theory,189 Bates determined that the First Amendment required the government to have 
solid reasoning behind its decisions and refrain from arbitrary or capricious decision 
making. 
Ultimately, however, as in Nation Magazine, the district court ruled that it was not 
the appropriate time to grant Getty’s motion for an injunction.  Although the court wrote 
that it was persuaded that Getty had raised “a serious question” relating to its request for 
equal access and that the DOD “at some point in time” would have to establish and 
publish non-arbitrary criteria and a process to govern media access, the court would not 
grant Getty’s injunction.  To support this ruling, the court used both precedent and a 
pragmatic public policy argument, balancing Getty’s interests and likelihood of success  
 
                                                 
186 Id. at 118. 
 
187 The court noted that it agreed with the government’s arguments that “that the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base [was] not a public forum and that consideration of Getty’s First and Fifth Amendment claims must be 
undertaken through the prism of the heightened deference due to military regulations and decision-
making.”  Id. at 119. 
 
188 Id. at 121. 
 
189 Id. at 119 (quoting Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129-30 (D.C.Cir. 1977)). 
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against the public interest.190  The court weighed the potential harm to the public interest 
that a disruption at Guantanamo Bay would cause against Getty’s “speculative” First 
Amendment claims.  The court reasoned that “absent some concrete and irreparable 
diminution of First Amendment rights,” it was “not possible to conclude that the public 
interest favors the injunctive relief Getty seeks.”191  In its conclusion, the district court 
focused on the speculative nature of both a First Amendment right of access and Getty’s 
claims that it was being harmed to support the decision not to grant an injunction.192  One 
year later, the court adopted a similar stance in Flynt v. Rumsfeld.193 
Like Nation Magazine, Flynt involved a magazine’s claim that DOD regulations 
violated the “qualified First Amendment right” of media access to the battlefield.194  
While the court discussed the First Amendment implications of access, the court again 
focused instead on the hypothetical nature of the claim and the need to practice judicial 
restraint in such situations.  In 2001, Hustler Magazine requested one of its 
correspondents be allowed “to accompany and cover American ground forces in 
Afghanistan and wherever else such forces may be utilized in this campaign against 
terrorism.”195  While the Hustler correspondent was placed on a waiting list of journalists 
                                                 
190 Citing precedent, the court determined that in order to be granted an injunction Getty needed to 
demonstrate “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm 
absent the relief requested; (3) that other parties will not be harmed if the relief is granted; and (4) that the 
public interest supports granting the requested relief.”  Id. at 118.   
 
191 Id. at 124.  While the court found in favor of Getty on parts one and two of the test, it found that the 
public interest outweighed the speculative nature of Getty’s claims. 
 
192 Id.   
 
193 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 
194 Id. at 99. 
  
195 Id. at 97. 
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seeking to embed with conventional combat troops, because all of the ground forces in 
Afghanistan at the time were special operations forces, the correspondent was not 
allowed to accompany any soldiers on actual missions.  In what would become a central 
argument to the case, the DOD claimed that it was “awaiting approval to allow reporters 
to accompany special forces on missions.”196   
In challenging the DOD’s regulations, Hustler made two distinct claims.  First, 
the magazine challenged the DOD regulations as applied,197 charging that the DOD 
violated Hustler’s First Amendment rights by “improperly denying a Hustler 
correspondent the right to accompany combat forces on the ground in Afghanistan.”198  
Second, the magazine brought a facial challenge,199 asserting that the DOD regulations 
were “facially unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments.”200   
The opinion, authored by District Judge Paul L. Friedman, first considered 
Hustler’s as-applied challenge.  The court held that it had no jurisdiction to address the 
issue because the controversy was not ripe for review nor did Hustler have standing.  
Although Hustler attempted to insert the First Amendment into the argument by 
contending that a ripe controversy existed because the parties disagreed as to whether 
there was “a First Amendment right of media access to the battlefield,”201 the court ruled 
                                                 
196 Id. at 99. 
 
197 “A claim that a law or government policy, though constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as 
applied, usually because of a discriminatory effect; a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a 
particular case or in its application to a particular party.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
198 Id. at 99. 
 
199 “A claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face—that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
200 Flynt, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 99. 
 
201 Id. at 102. 
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that this was not enough to make the controversy ripe.  The court wrote that the “mere 
existence of a legal disagreement about the scope of the First Amendment [did] not make 
that disagreement fit for judicial review.”202  Instead, because the DOD was still 
technically “awaiting permission” to allow journalists to travel with the only troops on 
the ground, the court held the issue had not been settled and was, therefore, not ripe for 
review.  It wrote Hustler’s as-applied claims were “not fit for judicial decision at this 
juncture because defendants have not made a final decision with respect to plaintiffs’ 
request for access to combat ground forces in battle.”203  In addition, the court concluded 
that because Hustler could not show it had been denied access, it could not demonstrate it 
had suffered any injury.204 
Next, considering Hustler’s facial challenge, although the court admitted “there 
may be a limited or qualified right of media access to the battlefield”205 based on the First 
Amendment, it declined to definitively decide the issue.  Instead, the court shifted frames 
and turned to the legal issue of judicial power, adopting the frame that the case was more 
about the role of the courts in making decisions than it was about the First Amendment.  
Like the Nation Magazine court, although the Flynt court discussed access, ultimately it 
did not rely on First Amendment theories related to self-governance or the checking 
function to decide the case.  Instead, the court focused on precedent, the proper role of 
the judiciary and pragmatic factors to decide not to definitive rule on the First 
Amendment issue.  Not surprisingly, in its discussion the court cited Nation Magazine 
                                                 
202 Id. 
 
203 Id. at 101.  
 
204 Id. at 103. 
 
205 Id. at 109. 
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and Getty Images, relying multiple times on the reasoning of those cases.  
As Judge Sand of the Southern District of New York had done in Nation 
Magazine, the D.C. District Court held it could decide the case under the political 
question doctrine because Hustler was not making a claim that went to “the heart of the 
military's ‘goals, directives and tactics” by challenging the DOD’s regulations.206  The 
court wrote: 
In their facial challenge claims plaintiffs do not ask the Court to delve into 
tactical decisions made by defendants. They ask the Court only to consider 
whether a First Amendment right of media access to the battlefield 
exists—a right they themselves characterize as a ‘qualified right of access’ 
subject to reasonable Executive Branch regulations—and, if so, to direct 
defendants to enact guidelines that comport with such First Amendment 
protections.207  
 
However, as noted, the court never truly addressed the existence of a First Amendment 
“qualified right of access.”  Instead the court ruled that just because it had jurisdiction to 
hear the facial challenge, that conclusion did “not necessarily result . . . in adjudication of 
plaintiffs’ claims on the merits at this time.”208  After quoting both Judge Bates 
admonition in Getty Images that “the absence of a concrete controversy is of particular 
concern in light of the important constitutional issues at stake and the national defense 
interests that might be implicated,”209 as well as a lengthy passage from Nation  
 
                                                 
206 Id. at 106-07. 
 
207 Id. at 107. 
 
208 Id. 
 
209 Id. at 109. (quoting Getty Images News Services, Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 193 F.Supp.2d 112, 113, 
118 (D.D.C. 2002)). 
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Magazine,210 the court concluded the “prudent course” was to “delay resolution of these 
constitutional issues until and unless plaintiffs are denied access after having pursued 
their request through normal military channels.”211  The court therefore “declined to 
exercise its discretion” to consider the facial challenge.212  Thus, although the Nation 
Magazine court engaged in a discussion of First Amendment values and the Flynt court at 
least cited the Nation Magazine discussion in its decision, ultimately neither court relied 
on self-governance or the checking function to support a First Amendment based right of 
access.  While both courts agreed there might be at least a qualified First Amendment 
right of access,213 both turned away from First Amendment issues and instead framed the 
cases in terms of judicial powers, relied heavily on precedents and clearly deferred to 
pragmatic factors related to not deciding undeveloped or hypothetical cases.  Neither 
court was willing to advance a right of access based on abstract issues and hypothetical 
situations.   
                                                 
210 Id. (“‘In order to decide this case on the merits, it would be necessary to define the outer constitutional 
boundaries of access. Pursuant to long-settled policy in the disposition of constitutional questions, courts 
should refrain from deciding issues presented in a highly abstract form, especially in instances where the 
Supreme Court has not articulated guiding standards. . . .  Since the principles at stake are important and 
require a delicate balancing, prudence dictates that we leave the definition of the exact parameters of press 
access to military operations abroad for a later date when a full record is available, in the unfortunate event 
that there is another military operation. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its power to grant 
plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief on their right of access claim.’ (quoting Nation Magazine v. Dep’t 
of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) citing Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los 
Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 575-85 (1947)”). 
 
211 Id. at 110. 
 
212 Id. at 110. 
 
213 Id. at 108 (“[T]he court agrees there might be a limited or qualified right of media access to the 
battlefield.”); Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572  (“[T]here is support for the proposition that the press 
has at least some minimal right of access to view and report about major events that affect the functioning 
of government, including, for example, an overt combat operation.”).  See also Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F. 
Supp. 2d 174, 175 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The Court is persuaded that in an appropriate case there could be a 
substantial likelihood of demonstrating that under the First Amendment the press is guaranteed a right to 
gather and report news involving United States military operations on foreign soil subject to reasonable 
regulations.”). 
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From Greene to Flynt, a pattern emerged in cases considering access and national 
security.  Although many of the courts engaged in detailed discussions of a First 
Amendment right of access, ultimately most of the courts focused on the justiciability of 
the cases.  Furthermore, many of the courts considering national security and 
transparency were reluctant to inject themselves into disputes about access.  In addition, 
later cases involving national security clearances abandoned detailed discussion of 
frameworks and legal factors and instead simply cited Egan as holding that the executive 
branch has authority in matters of national security.  As noted, in Nation Magazine the 
court discussed how the judiciary’s approach to national security access cases compared 
with cases involving access to the judiciary itself.214  As the Nation Magazine court 
noted, in cases that have considered a right of access to the judiciary, the Supreme Court 
has consistently framed access in terms of the First Amendment and articulated a broad 
right of access.  In addition, many of the justices in these cases have written thoughtful 
opinions, providing in-depth discussions of a number of legal factors to support their 
conclusions.  These cases also provide an excellent example of how the justices frame 
issues and cite factors to support their differing conclusions.   
 
Access to judicial proceedings and documents 
 
As opposed to cases involving access and national security, over the last thirty-
eight years the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment guarantees a 
broad right of access to criminal judicial proceedings.  In addition, although the Court has 
never specifically said there is a constitutional right of access to court documents, at least 
two decisions imply there is a First Amendment right of access to records of open 
                                                 
214 Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572. 
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proceedings or proceedings that should have been open.215  It is important to note 
however, that the Court did not initially frame access to the judiciary as a First 
Amendment issue.  Although the Court addressed judicial secrecy in a number of cases 
between 1947 and 1966,216 the Court discussed access in terms of the Sixth Amendment, 
not the First, and said the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial belonged to the 
accused, rather than the public or the press.217  For example, in Gannett Co., Inc. v. 
DePasquale,218 a 1979 case involving a pretrial evidence suppression hearing, the Court 
wrote, “The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the 
part of the public; its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the accused.”219  
In addition, in 1978, when the Court considered a right of access to documents in the 
possession of a court, it followed a path similar to some of the national security cases, 
focusing on textual analysis of congressional legislation, refusing to frame the case as 
dealing with the First Amendment.  
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 220 television networks appealed an 
                                                 
215 See, e.g., Press Enter. v. Riverside County Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press Enter. v. Riverside 
County Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).  In addition, some lower courts have ruled that there is at 
least a qualified First Amendment right to some types of judicial records.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574 (9th Cir. 1988); CBS v. United States District Court, 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).  But see, In re 
Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).  
 
216 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1966) (stating that the Supreme Court has 
traditionally been unwilling to place direct limitations on the freedom of the news media to report on 
courtroom proceedings); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965) (discussing the importance of public 
trials); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948) (discussing the “Anglo-American distrust for secret 
trails”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court 
room is public property.”). 
 
217 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-68 (discussing the purpose of the Sixth Amendment).  
 
218 443 U.S. 368 (1979).  
 
219 Id. at 379-80. 
 
220 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
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order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that held that the networks 
could not make copies of tape recordings made by the Nixon administration and 
introduced into evidence at the Watergate criminal trials.  The networks framed the case 
as involving two access issues, a common law and First Amendment right of access to 
judicial records.  Although the Court acknowledge a common law right of access to 
documents in the possession of the judiciary,221 instead of framing the question in terms 
of access and deciding the case by weighing the pros and cons of access under a common 
law right as it normally would have, the Court engaged in issue discovery, taking a 
position that was not argued by either side or contained in any brief.222  The Court ruled 
that release of the records would ultimately be controlled by the Presidential Recordings 
Act.223  Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis Powell justified this rationale by relying on 
textual analysis of the Act without a great deal of explanation224 and very briefly stating 
that the courts were not as well equipped to handle the details of access to presidential 
records as the other two branches of government.225  The Court failed to address any of 
the major legal issues raised by either side in a meaningful way.  In addition, the Court 
                                                 
221 Id. at 597. 
 
222 Id. at 602-03 (“At this point, we normally would be faced with the task of weighing the interests 
advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the courts. . . .  We need not decide 
how the balance would be struck if the case were resolved only on the basis of the facts and arguments 
reviewed above. There is in this case an additional, unique element that was neither advanced by the parties 
nor given appropriate consideration by the courts below.”). 
 
223 Id. at 603.  
 
224 Id. at 603 n.15.  Both sides argued that the Act did not apply to the records.  The Court quoted from the 
text of the Act to support its ruling that it did. 
 
225 Id. at 606.  The Court spent so little time framing the case, it is difficult to say it identified the major 
legal principle as a separation of powers issue.  The only time the majority addressed the issue was in 
response to the network’s claims that immediate release by the Court would advance the intent of the Act.  
The Court did not agree, writing, “The Executive and Legislative Branches . . . possess superior resources 
for assessing the proper implementation of public access and the competing rights, if any, of the persons 
whose voices are recorded on the tapes.”  Id. 
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refused to frame the issue as involving either a First Amendment freedom of the press 
claim or a Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial claim, dismissing these 
arguments in one short section by citing precedents that found the press had no greater 
rights of access than the public.226   
In Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale,227 the Court once again dismissed the First 
Amendment claims of the press, focusing on the Sixth Amendment instead.  Gannett 
involved the closure of a courtroom during a pretrial hearing to suppress evidence in a 
murder case.228  Although the trial judge indicated there was a constitutional right of 
access to judicial proceedings, he concluded that such a right had to be balanced with the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.  As noted, the Supreme Court focused on the Sixth 
Amendment, not the First, as the core legal issue.  Relying upon In re Oliver229 and Estes 
v. Texas230 to support its argument, the Court ruled that the “constitutional guarantee of a 
public trial is for the benefit of the accused.”231  Although Justice Potter Stewart’s 
opinion  invoked democratic theory232 as well as framers’ intent233 when discussing the 
public benefits of the Sixth Amendment, ultimately Stewart concluded, “Recognition of 
                                                 
226 Id. at 608-10 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Saxbe v. 
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)). 
 
227 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
 
228 Id. at 375. 
 
229 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
 
230 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
 
231 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381. 
 
232 Id. at 383. 
 
233 Id. at 385-86. 
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an independent public interest in the enforcement of Sixth Amendment guarantees is a far 
cry, however, from the creation of a constitutional right on the part of the public.”234  
Stewart avoided discussing Gannett’s claim that the order violated the First Amendment 
by noting even if there was such a right,235 the trial judge had already dealt with the issue 
by weighing the competing societal interests involved.236 
Despite these rulings, in 1980—just one year after Gannett—the Court limited the 
ability of judges to bar the public from attending trials based on the First Amendment in 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.237  It is important to note from the outset that the 
Court has never discussed access to a court based on the First Amendment without 
acknowledging that the right is not absolute.  However, what sets these discussions apart 
from their national security/transparency counterparts is that since Richmond Newspapers 
there has been little effort to frame these cases as anything other than First Amendment 
right of access cases and the justices have typically carefully weighed competing interests 
instead of merely deferring to the executive branch or debating how much deference to 
give.  In many of the cases, as the trial judge had done in Gannett, the justices weigh how 
a right of access might affect other important societal concerns and equate the rights of 
the press with the rights of the general public.  Indeed, as will be discussed below, some 
justices have ruled both for and against courtroom closures based on their interpretation 
                                                 
234 Id. at 383.  Furthermore, the Court noted that even if there had been a common law right to attend trials 
that was intended to be incorporated by the Sixth Amendment, there was certainly no evidence there had 
ever been a common law right to attend pretrial hearings.  Id. at 389. 
 
235 Id. at 392.  (“We need not decide in the abstract, however, whether there is any such constitutional right. 
For even assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments may guarantee such access in 
some situations, a question we do not decide, this putative right was given all appropriate deference by the 
state nisi prius court in the present case.”). 
 
236 Id. at 392-93. 
 
237 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
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of the strength of the government’s arguments or their use of divergent legal 
justifications, all the while acknowledging a First Amendment-based right of access.  
Therefore, the cases serve as a contrast to the national security cases, as well as examples 
of how selective use of key factors can be used to justify different conclusions, even 
when justices agree on the core legal issues or basic legal frames presented by the cases. 
 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia began when the attorney for John Paul 
Stevenson moved to have the courtroom closed for Stevenson’s fourth trial on the same 
murder charge.238  When the prosecution did not object to the closure, the trial judge 
ordered “that the Courtroom be kept clear of all parties except the witnesses when they 
testify.”239  After the judge ordered the courtroom closed, Richmond Newspapers asked 
for a hearing on a motion to vacate the order.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to continue the following morning 
“with the press and public excluded.”240  The next day, after dismissing the jury, the trial 
judge declared Stevenson not guilty in a two-sentence order.  Although the trial was now 
over, Richmond Newspapers appealed the closure order to the Virginia Supreme Court.  
When the state court denied the appeal, finding no reversible error, Richmond 
Newspapers appealed again.  In a 7-1 decision that produced seven different opinions,241 
                                                 
238 Id. at 559.  The Virginia Supreme Court reversed Stevenson’s first conviction, holding that a 
bloodstained shirt had been improperly admitted into evidence.  His second trial ended in a mistrial when a 
juror asked to be excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available.  A third trial also ended in a 
mistrial when “a prospective juror [who] had read about Stevenson’s previous trials in a newspaper . . . told 
other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial began.”  Id. 
 
239 Id. at 560. 
 
240 Id. at 561. 
 
241 No opinion was joined by more than three justices.  Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and 
Stevens, wrote the opinion of the Court.  Justices White and Stevens filed concurring opinions.  Justice 
Brennan filed an opinion concurring in judgment in which Justice Marshall joined, and Justices Stewart and 
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the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the order for closure, holding that the First Amendment 
prohibited closing a criminal trial to the public “[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated 
in findings.”242 
 The various opinions in Richmond Newspapers differed from the national 
security/transparency cases both in terms of how the justices framed the issues and the 
variety of legal factors used.  Most of the opinions in the case focused on some 
combination of historical analysis, First Amendment theory and democratic theory, 
specifically the role of transparency in an open society.  In part, this is explained by 
Gannett.  Because the Court had just ruled the previous term there was no constitutional 
right of access to trials under the Sixth Amendment, the justices had to distinguish 
Richmond Newspapers by framing their argument in terms of the First Amendment.  For 
example, after concluding the issue was “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’”243 
and, therefore, not moot, Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the Court, clearly 
framed the issue as dealing with a right to attend trials based on the First Amendment.244  
Although Burger also distinguished Richmond Newspapers from Gannett as dealing with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Blackmun also filed opinions concurring in the judgment.  Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion.  
Justice Powell did not participate. 
  
242 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581. 
 
243 Id. at 563 (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911)). 
  
244 Id. at 564 (stating that in Gannett the Court “did not decide whether the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee a right of the public to attend trials; nor did the dissenting opinion reach this 
issue”).  See also id. at 583-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing a general right of access to government 
information under the First Amendment and the Court’s previous refusals to find a right of access under the 
amendment); Id. at 585 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing differences between the right to a public 
trial found in the Sixth Amendment and the right of access to the judicial process found in the First 
Amendment); Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that in Gannett, although Powell “expressed the 
view” that the First Amendment extended “a limited right of access” to pretrial suppression hearings in 
criminal cases and Rehnquist “expressed a contrary view,” the “remaining Members of the Court were 
silent on the question.”). 
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trials as opposed to pretrial hearings,245 as Justice Harry Blackmun pointed out in his 
concurring opinion, the Gannett majority wrote twelve separate times that its opinion 
applied “to the trial itself.”246  Thus, although Burger did not acknowledge it, as Justice 
White noted in his concurring opinion, because of Gannett the Court was “required” to 
make Richmond Newspapers a First Amendment case.247  Of the seven opinions written, 
only Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent did not frame the issue as a First Amendment 
right of access case.  Instead, Rehnquist framed the case as involving core legal questions 
of federalism, the power of the Supreme Court and constitutional interpretation.248 
 The case also stands out for the variety of legal factors used and the depth of 
discussion of those factors.  A number of the opinions included long and detailed 
historical accounts of courtroom openness and discussion of democratic theory, focusing 
on the benefits of transparency.  Burger’s opinion, for example, focused on history, 
analysis of the framers’ understanding of access and democratic theory.  Burger spent ten 
pages discussing “the history of criminal trials being presumptively open” and the 
                                                 
245 Id. at 564. 
 
246 Id. at 601-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 
247 Id. at 582 (White, J., concurring) (“This case would have been unnecessary had [Gannett] construed the 
Sixth Amendment to forbid excluding the public from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined 
circumstances. But the Court there rejected the submission of four of us to this effect, thus requiring that 
the First Amendment issue involved here be addressed.”) (emphasis added). 
 
248 Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]o gradually rein in, as this Court has done over the past 
generation, all of the ultimate decision making power over how justice shall be administered, not merely in 
the federal system but in each of the 50 States, is a task that no Court consisting of nine persons, however 
gifted, is equal to.  Nor is it desirable that such authority be exercised by such a tiny numerical fragment of 
the 220 million people who compose the population of this country. . . .  The issue here is not whether the 
‘right’ to freedom of the press conferred by the First Amendment to the Constitution overrides the 
defendant's ‘right’ to a fair trial conferred by other Amendments to the Constitution; it is instead whether 
any provision in the Constitution may fairly be read to prohibit what the trial judge in the Virginia state-
court system did in this case.  Being unable to find any such prohibition in the First, Sixth, Ninth, or any 
other Amendment to the United States Constitution, or in the Constitution itself, I dissent.”). 
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benefits openness brings to society.249  Considering the benefits of transparency, Burger 
wrote, “People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it 
is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.”250  Brennan’s 
concurring opinion also delved deeply into historical analysis, examining the “legacy of 
open justice” to conclude, “As a matter of law and virtually immemorial custom, public 
trials have been the essentially unwavering rule in ancestral England and in our own 
Nation.”251   
 In addition to history and democratic theory, many of the opinions discussed 
textual analysis of the Constitution, framers’ intent and orginalism, as well as First 
Amendment theory.  Rejecting textualism in favor of a more flexible interpretation of the 
Constitution, the justices found a right of access in the First Amendment.  Because the 
text of the First Amendment does not explicitly discuss access or criminal trials, the 
justices spent a great deal of time explaining why the Amendment should be read to 
include a right to attend trials.  Burger discussed multiple sources of the right to attend 
trials, including the “right of access,” the “right to gather information,” and the “right to 
receive information and ideas,” all rights he found in the First Amendment.252  Burger 
went on to examine “constitutional structure” and the framers’ intent, reasoning that even 
though the Constitution contained no provision that explicitly guaranteed the right to 
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attend criminal trials, the Court had recognized that some unenumerated fundamental 
rights were “indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights.”253   
Both Brennan’s and Justice John Paul Stevens’ concurring opinions discussed a 
First Amendment right of access as well.  Brennan’s opinion included both a section 
discussing democratic theory and the structural benefits of openness to society254 and a 
section focused on a discussion of the extent of a First Amendment theory, namely how 
different First Amendment theories or values might support a right of access and the 
“countervailing interests” that might justify restricting access.255  While Stevens also 
discussed how to balance access and other interests,256 perhaps more so than any other 
justice, he avoided a straight balancing frame and instead framed the case as a landmark 
First Amendment decision that newsgathering was protected.  Stevens wrote: “This is a 
watershed case.  Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the 
dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the 
acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection 
whatsoever.”257  In fact, Stevens’ opinion suggested the case was about a broad right of 
access that included—but might not be limited to—access to the judiciary.  “I agree that 
the First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of their rights of 
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access to information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial 
Branch,” Stevens wrote.258 
 Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court continued to expand access to 
the judiciary based on the First Amendment.  In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court259 the Court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute260 that had been 
construed as requiring trial judges to exclude the press and public from trials for sexual 
offenses involving a victim under the age of 18 during the testimony of the victim.  
Writing for the 6-3 majority, Brennan held that a court could only deny the constitutional 
right of access to trials on a case-by-case basis when the denial was necessary to advance 
a compelling governmental interest and “was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”261  
Although Brennan’s opinion was similar to Burger’s opinion in Richmond Newspapers, it 
diverged in some important ways.  
Similar to Nation Magazine and Burger’s Richmond Newspapers opinion, 
Brennan’s opinion quickly dealt with mootness, holding that because the conflict was 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” the issue was a live controversy.262  Brennan 
then elaborated on the structural benefits transparency brings.  Brennan was quick to 
acknowledge that the right of access to the judiciary was not explicitly mentioned in the 
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259 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 
260 Massachusetts Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 278, § 16A (1981). “At the trial of a complaint or indictment for 
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First Amendment, but he relied on the framers’ intent as well as precedent, citing 
Richmond Newspapers, to support his claim that there was a broad constitutional right of 
access.  He wrote: 
[T]he Framers were concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a 
background of shared values and practices.  The First Amendment is thus 
broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously 
enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless 
necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.263   
 
Brennan went on to explain that a right of access was protected by the First Amendment 
because access was necessary to ensure the proper functioning of a democratic society.  
Turning to First Amendment theory and the role transparency plays in self-government, 
Brennan wrote that access was necessary to ensure the free flow of information about 
governmental affairs.   
Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the 
common understanding that “a major purpose of that Amendment was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”  By offering such 
protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual 
citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican 
system of self-government. . . .  Thus to the extent that the First 
Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure 
that this constitutionally protected “discussion of governmental affairs” is 
an informed one.264 
  
Concluding his discussion of First Amendment theory, Brennan emphasized 
democratic theory, writing that it was “particularly proper” a right of access to the 
judiciary was afforded protection by the First Amendment.265  Brennan wrote that the 
                                                 
263 Id. at 604. 
 
264 Id. at 604-05 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), and citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 
575 (plurality opinion) (the “expressly guaranteed freedoms” of the First Amendment “share a common 
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of 
government”)). 
 
265 Id. at 605. 
 264 
 
right was protected by the Amendment both because of the history of open judicial 
proceedings and the “particularly significant role” a right of access to the judiciary 
“play[ed] in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole.”266  
Thus, like Stevens’ concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Brennan’s language 
suggested that access to the judiciary was just one part of a broader constitutional right of 
access.   
While the Court’s opinion in Globe Newspaper Co. was very different from the 
opinions in the national security cases in terms of framing, legal factors and outcome, it is 
important to note that it would have been easy for the Court to follow a path similar to the 
national security cases.  Two dissenting opinions in Globe Newspaper Co. illustrate this 
point.  The first, authored by Burger and joined by Rehnquist, demonstrated the ease with 
which the Court could have used historical analysis and/or balancing to deny access.  
Although Burger’s opinion identified a First Amendment right of access as the key legal 
issue involved in the case, by relying on different factors than Brennan to reach a 
conclusion, Burger’s opinion demonstrated how judges can reach vastly different 
conclusions even while using the same frame.  In his dissent, Burger emphasized that the 
key legal factor that justified the Court’s decision in Richmond Newspapers was its focus 
on the historical tradition of open criminal trials.267  Such an emphasis could not support 
access here as there was a strong history of no access at all to sex trials. 
Although Brennan’s majority opinion in Globe Newspaper Co. was similar to 
Burger’s plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers in some ways, the differences 
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267 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 613-14 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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between the two opinions provide an excellent illustration of how the use of certain 
factors can justify a decision.  Brennan’s opinion included structural arguments that 
focused on democratic and First Amendment theory, yet strayed from the Chief Justice’s 
extensive focus on historical analysis.  The Chief Justice, dissenting because he didn’t 
think access should be granted in the case, eschewed a broad First Amendment-based 
right of access, arguing that because there was a long history of excluding the public from 
trials involving sexual assault, particularly those involving minors, there was no support 
for the majority’s decision that such trials could not be presumptively closed.268  In 
addition, Burger argued that because a transcript of the trial was available, the 
Massachusetts law had “a relatively minor incidental impact on First Amendment rights” 
while giving “effect to the overriding state interest in protecting child rape victims.”269  
Although both Burger and Brennan agreed that the main legal question was whether the 
First Amendment right of access to trials applied, they were able to support different 
conclusions by simply focusing on different factors.  Thus, the case demonstrates that 
both the ability to frame cases and to use selective legal factors makes the law extremely 
malleable.  Even when judges agree on how a question should be framed, the capacity to 
use a multitidue of legal factors beyond precedent allows them to support divergent 
conclusions.       
The second dissent in Globe Newspaper, written by Justice Stevens, relied on 
factors similar to those used by the Southern District of New York in Nation Magazine v. 
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Department of Defense.270  Although he argued for a broad constitutional right of access 
in Richmond Newspapers, Stevens’ Globe Newspaper Co. dissent argued that the case 
should be framed in terms of justiciability issues, noting the constitutional novelty of the 
access question presented in the case as well as the lack of facts presented by the case.271  
Stevens argued that the case should be dismissed as moot, an issue raised in Nation 
Magazine.272  Stevens wrote, “We have only recently recognized the First Amendment 
right of access to newsworthy matter.”273  Because the right was so recently recognized 
and the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute didn’t cover the facts 
as they actually occurred,274 Stevens counseled against deciding the case on its face. 
In developing constitutional jurisprudence, there is a special importance in 
deciding cases on concrete facts.  Only in specific controversies can the 
Court decide how this right of access to criminal trials can be 
accommodated with other societal interests, such as the protection of 
victims or defendants. . . . 
 
The question whether the Court should entertain a facial attack on a statute 
that bears on the right of access cannot be answered simply by noting that 
the right has its source in the First Amendment. 275 
 
Based on his conclusions, Stevens would have dismissed the appeal,276 a result similar to 
the Nation Magazine court’s decision that it was not pragmatic to decide a case with no 
concrete controversy.277   
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The Court continued to expand access to courtrooms in the 1980s, consistently 
framing the cases in terms of a First Amendment right to access or as a need to balance 
access with the proper functioning of the judicial system.  In 1984, in Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Riverside County Superior Court278—known as Press-Enterprise I to distinguish it 
from the 1986 case discussed below—the Court ruled that as an integral part of a criminal 
trial, jury selection was subject to the First Amendment presumption of openness.  In the 
opinion of the Court,279 Burger used both the historical arguments280 he articulated in 
previous cases and Brennan’s factors of democratic and First Amendment theories and 
the structural benefits openness brings to the justice system.281   
Although Burger clearly framed the case as a First Amendment issue, perhaps the 
most detailed First Amendment argument came in Stevens’ concurring opinion.  Once 
again, the language of Stevens’ opinion was not limited to the benefits of transparency in 
the judicial process.  Returning to his focus on democratic theory and the benefits of open 
government, Stevens wrote that access to the judiciary was simply a part of a greater right 
of access to information held by the government.   
                                                                                                                                                 
276 Globe Newspaper, Co., 457 U.S. at 623 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Normally, if the constitutional 
deficiency is the absence of findings to support a trial order, the Court would either remand for fact finding, 
or examine the record itself, before deciding whether the order measured up to constitutional standards. The 
infeasibility of this course of action—since no such order was entered in this case and since the order that 
was entered has expired—further demonstrates that the Court’s comment on the First Amendment issues 
implicated by the Massachusetts statute is advisory, hypothetical, and, at best, premature.  I would dismiss 
the appeal.”). 
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278 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
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The focus commanded by the First Amendment makes it appropriate 
to emphasize the fact that the underpinning of our holding today is not 
simply the interest in effective judicial administration; the First 
Amendment’s concerns are much broader. The “common core purpose of 
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning 
of government” that underlies the decision of cases of this kind provides 
protection to all members of the public “from abridgment of their rights of 
access to information about the operation of their government, including 
the Judicial Branch.”282 
 
In 1986, in Press Enterprise v. Riverside County Superior Court283—or Press-
Enterprise II—the Court held that a First Amendment-based presumption of openness 
extended to criminal pretrial hearings as well.  After quickly dealing with mootness in a 
manner similar to Richmond Newspapers,284  Burger returned to democratic theory to 
support the holding.  Writing for the majority once again, he used both history and the 
democratic theory-based structural value of openness to establish a test for deciding when 
a particular type of judicial proceeding was presumptively open.  Under the “experience 
and logic” test, if a court proceeding was traditionally open to the public and “public 
access play[ed] a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question,” the proceeding was presumptively open to the public.285 
Interestingly, using the factors of historical analysis and First Amendment theory 
to support his arguments, Stevens once again dissented.  Although Stevens again clearly 
stated his belief that “a proper construction of the First Amendment embraces a right of 
                                                 
282 Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 
(1980) (plurality opinion); id. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring)).  In addition, Stevens cited two cases in 
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access to information about the conduct of public affairs,”286 he disagreed that 
preliminary hearings in criminal trials should be open.  Citing his own dissent in Globe 
Newspaper Co. as well as his own concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 
Stevens wrote, “[T]he freedom to obtain information that the government has a legitimate 
interest in not disclosing is far narrower than the freedom to disseminate information, 
which is ‘virtually absolute’ in most contexts.”287  Stevens contended that the majority’s 
historical analysis did not support a constitutional right of access because Burger’s 
discussion focused on common law access288 while its structural analysis would go too 
far, requiring almost all judicial proceedings, including civil and grand jury proceedings, 
to be open to the public.289   
Although Stevens identified a First Amendment issue as being the principle legal 
issue in the case,290 his primary frame focused on balancing the competing claims of 
transparency and the defendant’s rights to a fair trial and his reputation.  Thus, although 
Stevens reaffirmed his belief in a constitutional right of access, he wrote that in the 
situation at hand “[t]he constitutionally grounded fair trial interests of the accused if he is 
bound over for trial, and the reputation interests of the accused if he is not, provide a 
substantial reason for delaying access to the transcript for at least the short time before 
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trial.”291  Although Stevens again wrote that the First Amendment should be read to 
include a broad right of access to governmental information, he also noted the right was 
not absolute and had to be weighed against the defendant’s rights.  Thus, more than the 
opinions that simply focused on the history of openness, Stevens’ opinion invoked the 
frame of how to weigh a defendant’s rights against the public’s rights.292  To support his 
conclusion, Stevens relied upon originalism, discussing common law at the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution and framers’ intent.293 
In sum, the Court has held that the courtrooms are presumptively open, although 
this presumption may be overcome by a compelling or overriding government interest so 
long as the restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  Interestingly enough, 
however, with the exception of Burger’s opinion in Globe and Stevens’ opinion in Press 
Enterprise II, the opinions did not use a clear balancing frame, often focusing on the First 
Amendment or the history of openness or “logic” of openness of a particular proceeding. 
As recently as 2004 the Court relied upon the experience and logic test to determine that 
Puerto Rico’s requirement of a private preliminary hearing unless the defendant 
requested otherwise was unconstitutional.294  This differs from many of the national 
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292 Id. at 20.  (“In this case, the risk of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial is perfectly obvious. 
For me, that risk is far more significant than the countervailing interest in publishing the transcript of the 
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293 Id. at 21. (“In this case . . . it is uncontroverted that a common-law right of access did not inhere in 
preliminary proceedings at the time the First Amendment was adopted, and that the Framers and ratifiers of 
that provision could not have intended such proceedings to remain open.”). 
 
294 El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean International News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (2004).  
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that “closed hearings [we]re compatible with the unique history 
and traditions of the Commonwealth, which display a special concern for the honor and reputation of the 
citizenry, and that open hearings would prejudice defendants’ ability to obtain fair trials because of Puerto 
Rico's small size and dense population.”  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the decision was 
“irreconcilable” with Press-Enterprise II.  Id. at 149.   
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security and judiciary cases discussed previously, in which the courts specifically 
emphasized the need to balance competing interests.  
In addition, it is important to note that in some of the opinions in these cases—
particularly a number of Stevens’ opinions—the justices suggested that there is at least a 
qualified First Amendment right of access to all information in the government’s 
possession.  Thus, the Court has firmly grounded a right of access to the judiciary in the 
Constitution and continues to do so despite multiple changes on the Court.  Since 
abandoning the Sixth Amendment issues presented in the early judicial access cases, the 
justices have consistently held that the core principle in these cases is a First Amendment 
right of access.  This contrasts with many of the national security/transparency cases that 
have discussed the First Amendment issues presented by the cases, only to focus on 
frames of justiciability in order to avoid deciding cases. 
Furthermore, cases involving access to the judiciary stand out from the national 
security cases discussed above for their in-depth discussions of multiple legal factors.  In 
contrast to cases involving national security and transparency, the cases discussed in this 
section have used a wide range of legal factors to reach their decisions, including 
historical analysis, framers’ intent, democratic theory, First Amendment values and 
precedent.  The opinions in the cases—including the dissents—contain detailed 
discussions of framers’ intent as well as First Amendment and democratic theory.  In 
contrast, although the national security/transparency cases include discussions of First 
Amendment theory, the courts have either relied on precedent to justify decisions, even 
when there was little precedent to guide these decisions or focused on the hypothetical 
nature of the facts of the case to decide not to decide.  Even the courts’ discussions of 
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First Amendment theory in the national security cases discussed in this chapter were tied 
to the precedents established by the judicial access cases. 
However, it is important to note that while the Court has established a strong line 
of cases supporting a right of access to the judiciary using a variety of arguments, it 
would have been easy to do otherwise, as evidenced by the dissents in the cases as well as 
the national security cases.  For example, although Burger eventually adopted Brennan’s 
focus on democratic structure, had Burger’s opinion in Globe Newspaper Co. attracted a 
majority of justices, judicial access cases might look very similar to national security 
access cases.  As noted, many of the cases demonstrate how justices are able to use 
different factors to reach divergent conclusions, even when they agree on the frame or 
key legal issue presented in the case.  Additionally, had a majority of the Court been 
drawn to Stevens’ focus on the lack of concrete facts available for analysis in Globe 
Newspapers, the Court would not have advanced a First Amendment right of access in 
the case.   
It is also important to note that there is one area of judicial access that might 
follow a different path than the judicial access cases discussed above.  After the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government claimed a need to conduct 
numerous judicial proceedings in secret.  Although the Supreme Court has yet to review 
any of these cases, it has denied certiorari in at least one terrorism-related case in which 
all pleadings were sealed, every hearing was conducted in a closed courtroom, and the 
case did not appear on any docket.295  In 2004, Mohamed Kamel Bellaouel, an Algerian 
man married to a U.S. citizen, was detained in Miami, Florida, for overstaying his student 
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visa.  Bellaouel was held for five months, during which time he was transferred to 
Virginia to testify at the trial of 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui.296  Bellahouel filed 
a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention, but there was no public record the 
case existed.297  The case was made public only after a clerk for the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals inadvertently listed the case on the public oral argument calendar, after 
which reporters published stories about the case.  When the Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
secret proceedings, Bellaouel appealed.  Although a coalition of twenty-three media 
organizations, including the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, moved for 
leave to intervene, the Supreme Court denied the motion, granted the government’s 
motion for leave to file a brief in opposition under seal, and denied Bellaouel’s petition 
for a writ of certiorari.298  Although, the Supreme Court has ruled that neither U.S. 
citizens nor aliens can be denied the right of habeas corpus,299 the scope of terrorists 
suspects’ constitutional rights and the First Amendment right  of access to these cases 
remain unclear.  It is possible that the combination of judicial access and national security 
concerns will lead to a new line of cases that differ from the other judicial access cases 
and more closely resemble the national security cases discussed above.   
To date, however, the Supreme Court has treated access to the judiciary 
fundamentally differently than other access cases.  While a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court has framed access to judiciary cases in terms of the First Amendment, few courts 
                                                 
296 See Meliah Thomas, The First Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1537 
(2006), for a discussion of the case. 
 
297 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23-24, M.K.B., 540 U.S. 1213 (No. 03-6747). 
 
298 M.K.B., 540 U.S. at 1213.  While the Court kept the government’s brief in opposition secret, it granted a 
motion to release a heavily redacted version of Bellaouel’s petition to the public.  
 
299 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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have found even a limited constitutional right of access when national security is 
involved.  Furthermore, many of the few courts that have found a limited right of access 
have decided the cases on other grounds.  Possible reasons for these differences and the 
overall framework these individual cases have created are addressed in the final chapter 
of this dissertation.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 As noted in the introductory chapter, although recent events have drawn attention to the 
conflict between national security, freedom of expression and transparency, the tension between 
these principles is nothing new.  As discussed, as early as 1644, John Locke’s writings advanced 
the idea that a democratic government’s central purpose is to protect each individual’s rights 
against invasion and to protect “the entire society from having the rights of its members robbed 
from them by another nation’s war-launching invasion.”1  Yet, despite this long history, it was 
not until the 1950s that a United States federal court first considered how to balance these two 
important interests when federal courts first reviewed the executive’s ability to classify national 
security information in Greene v. McElroy.2  Despite this late start, in the years following Greene 
federal courts have consistently and repeatedly been called upon to balance national security 
with freedom of expression and transparency.  As recently as 2007 a federal court examined the 
constitutionality of the non-disclosure provisions of the Patriot Act,3 and some commentators 
have called the federal government’s prosecution of the two former lobbyists for disseminating 
national security information in United States v. Rosen4  a dangerous attempt by the government 
                                                 
1 Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty 
Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (2007). 
 
2 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
 
3 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 
4 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).  
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to prosecute individuals who behave much like journalists who cover national security do.5  As 
Fred Kaplan noted, the individuals were charged with distributing information “not to foreign 
governments or spies but rather ‘to persons not entitled to receive it’” and “this is what 
journalists do routinely.”6  Thus, for almost fifty years, courts have relied on frameworks and 
factors to reach and justify decisions that have shaped the way this country controls national 
security information, and it is certain they will continue to do so long into the future.  
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine the legal, theoretical, and public 
policy arguments used by federal courts when they address the conflict between government 
secrecy and transparency in order to understand the overall structure that currently governs 
national security information in this country.  To achieve this, the dissertation examined a broad 
swath of cases dealing with prior restraints, post-publication punishments and access to national 
security information and locations.  By analyzing such a wide range of cases, an overall 
approach to national security information could be explored.  The goal was to move beyond the 
level of examining an individual legal complaint—or even a series of complaints about a 
particular aspect of national security information such as prior restraints or post-publication 
punishments or access—to begin to create a picture of the underlying relationships and power 
structures that govern the control of national security information across these categories.  In 
addition, in order to provide a contrast that would help illuminate any specific approaches courts 
are taking to national security cases, the dissertation compared national security cases to a group 
of “control” cases—the judiciary cases discussed at the end of each chapter.  By comparing prior 
restraint, post-publication punishment and access cases that have dealt with the judicial system to 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Jonathon H. Adler & Michael Berry, A Troubling Prosecution, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 21, 2006, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NjkyM2E5ZGE0ODdmNGViZjhhMDBiNWRlMWJmZTUxYTQ=; Fred 
Kaplan, You’re a Spy, SLATE, Feb. 15, 2006, at http://www.slate.com/id/2136324. 
 
6 Kaplan, supra note 5 (emphasis in original). 
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those dealing with national security information, the dissertation was able to explore when courts 
dealt with similar issues in a similar fashion and when they did not.  As noted, while it would be 
impossible to determine if national security cases are unique, this approach provided valuable 
insight into how national security is—and is not—different from other cases dealing with prior 
restraints, post-publication punishments and access.   
 
 National security and transparency frames 
 While the individual cases examined in this dissertation record a fascinating history of 
our courts’ national security jurisprudence, the issues they attempt to resolve and the way the 
courts’ have framed those issues are the truly interesting aspect.  As Kevin T. McGuire and 
Barbara Palmer wrote, individual cases simply provide the vehicle, framework or “legal 
architecture” for the principle of law they represent.7  By examining a large body of cases and 
looking for the underlying principles shared among them, it is possible to understand the broader, 
re-occurring legal issues the cases represent and see the social structures created by the rulings. 
In the national security and prior restraint cases, the major frames courts used were 
straight First Amendment or national security frames that did not analyze the strength of the 
other interest, frames that highlighted the need to balance freedom of expression with national 
security, and those that focused on separation of powers issues.  There were only three opinions 
that invoked freedom of expression without expressly stating it needed to be balanced with 
national security.  The opinions that focused on the First Amendment without discussing national 
security, such as Justice William Brennan’s opinion in New York Times v. United States,8 
                                                 
7 Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 692 
(1995). 
 
8 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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discussed the role freedom of expression plays in a democracy or emphasized the high standard 
the First Amendment places on the government to justify a prior restraint.  In addition to 
Brennan’s concurrence in Pentagon Papers, the only other opinions to frame a case in terms of 
the First Amendment without attempting to balance freedom of expression with national security 
were Justice Potter Stewart’s dissent in United States v. Snepp9 and Judge Janet C. Hall’s opinion 
in Doe II.10  Similarly, there were only two opinions that invoked the government’s need for 
secrecy without also discussing the First Amendment implications of a case.  Only the Supreme 
Court’s opinions in Snepp and the D.C. District Court’s opinion in Stillman v. CIA11 referenced 
the need to protect national security information without discussing the First Amendment, 
freedom of expression or government transparency.  The opinions issued in United States v. 
Progressive Magazine,12 United States v. Marchetti,13 McGehee v. Casey,14 National Federation 
of Federal Employees v. United States,15 Doe I,16Doe III,17 and Stewart’s concurrence,18 Chief 
Justice Warren Burger’s dissent19 and Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent20  in Pentagon Papers 
focused on balancing First Amendment or freedom of expressions claims with national security. 
                                                 
9 444 U.S. 507, 519-22 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 
10 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005) (hereinafter Doe II).   
 
11 517 F. Supp. 2d 32, 33 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 
12 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
 
13 446 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 
14 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 
15 695 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1988).  
 
16 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (hereinafter Doe I). 
 
17 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F.Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (hereinafter Doe III). 
 
18 New York Times, Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 
19 Id. at at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).   
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As noted in chapter two, in addition to freedom of expression and national security 
issues, the national security/prior restraint cases discussed focused extensively on separation of 
power issues.  There were two distinct frames related to separation of power concerns that 
emerged in a number of the opinions, as well as a third that was found only in Doe II.  The first 
framed focused on the relative powers of the courts and Congress.  The most prominent opinions 
to feature this frame were the concurring Pentagon Paper opinions by Justices Hugo Black,21 
William O. Douglas,22 Stewart,23 Byron White24 and Thurgood Marshall25 that discussed 
Congress’ role in creating laws that might be used to prevent the New York Times and 
Washington Post from publishing.  In addition, Doe III contained a long and detailed discussion 
of the limits of congressional power, taking the legislative branch to task for overstepping its 
authority.26  The second frame involving separation of powers issues focused on balancing the 
judiciary’s and executive’s power to control and/or review national security information 
decisions.  These opinions included Douglas’, Stewart’s, White’s and Marshall’s concurrences27 
and John Marshall Harlan II’s dissent in Pentagon Papers,28 Marchetti,  Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 
21 Id.at 718. (Black, J., concurring). 
 
22 Id. at 721 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
23 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 
24 Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring). 
 
25 Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 
26 500 F.Supp. 2d 379, 409-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 
27 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 728-30 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 732 
(White, J., concurring); id. at 741-42 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 
28 Id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Colby,29 McGehee and Stillman. The majority of the discussion about separation of powers in 
these opinions focused on the need to defer decisions to the executive branch or, in the case of 
McGehee, to the CIA.  A final frame dealing with the power of a branch of government was 
found in Doe II, which discussed the power of the courts to intervene in national security cases 
without explicitly referencing a balance of power with the executive branch.     
In the national security and post-publication punishment cases discussed in chapter three, 
similar frames were used by the courts.  As in chapter two, the two most frequently used frames 
were the need to balance national security with freedom of expression and separation of powers 
issues.  Separation of powers issues were discussed in every opinion except for the Fourth 
Circuit’s majority opinion in Morison v. United States,30 which framed the case entirely in terms 
of the government’s ability to punish employees for disseminating national security information, 
and Judge T.S. Ellis’ opinion in United States v. Rosen,31 which framed the case as a need to 
balance national security and freedom of expression.  The need to balance national security 
concerns with freedom of expression was discussed in every opinion except the Supreme Court’s 
majority opinion in Haig v. Agee,32 which framed the case entirely in terms of separation of 
powers, and Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion in the Agee33 and Judge James Phillips’ opinion 
in Morison,34 which both discussed the First Amendment without examining the need for 
national security, and the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion in Morison. 
                                                 
29 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 
30 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).  
  
31 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 
32 453 U.S. 280 (1980). 
 
33 Id. at 310 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 
34 Morison, 844 F.2d at1087 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
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In the access cases, not only was there a continued focus on separation of powers issues, 
the opinions discussed the power of courts at even greater length.  As noted, in the forty-four 
years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Greene v. McElroy35 and the D.C. District 
Court’s opinion in Flynt v. Rumsfeld,36 the courts consistently engaged in discussions of a First 
Amendment right of access, but ultimately most of the courts focused on the justiciability of the 
cases, the power of courts to intervene in national security information cases, or separation of 
powers issues.  While this trend was also seen in many of the opinions examined in chapters two 
and three, in chapter four cases many of the courts were reluctant to inject themselves into 
disputes about access and found other ways to decide the cases.  In many ways, this made the 
opinions in chapter four the most complex of those identified by the research, and it was often 
difficult to identify exactly how the opinions were framing the primary legal issues presented by 
the cases.  Many opinions discussed multiple frames, hinting at a First Amendment or national 
security frame only to decide the case on a frame related to separation of powers, the political 
question doctrine or practical considerations related to the specific facts of the case. 
The most frequently discussed frame in the national security and access cases was 
separation of powers.  Zemel v. Rusk,37 United States v. AT&T,38 both the majority opinion and 
White’s dissent in Department of Navy v. Egan,39 Stehney v. Perry,40 Nation Magazine v. 
                                                 
35 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
 
36 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 
37 318 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 
38 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
39 484 U.S. 518 (1988); id. at 534 (White, J., dissenting). 
 
40 907 F. Supp. 806 (D.N.J. 1995). 
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Department of Defense41 and Flynt all discussed the issue in one context or another.  While some 
of the cases specifically framed the issues in terms of justiciability, mootness or the political 
question doctrine, others engaged in discussions of the need to balance the powers of the separate 
branches of government that were similar to those in chapters two and three.   
While there was more discussion of separation of powers issues, there was less focus on 
the need to balance freedom of expression with national security.  Only three of the access 
opinions discussed in the chapter—the majority opinion and White’s dissent in Egan, and the 
Southern District of New York’s decision in Nation Magazine—specifically framed the cases as 
dealing with the need to balance national security with the First Amendment and transparency 
concerns.  As noted, the Nation Magazine court was particularly clear that the case was about 
balancing the two issues.  While Sherrill v. Knight,42 Getty Images v. Department of Defense,43 
and Flynt all balanced transparency with another factor, as discussed below, the opinions relied 
on practical considerations rather than on straight discussions of the importance of keeping 
national security information secret.  Two opinions discussed the First Amendment without 
explicitly also discussing a need to balance it with national security concerns or the 
government’s “right” to keep information secret.  These included Douglas’ dissent in Zemel44 
and the D.C. District Court’s opinion in Brunnenkant v. Laird.45  Furthermore, although he did 
not support such a right, Tom C. Clark’s dissent in Greene clearly framed the case as dealing 
                                                 
41 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 
42 569 F. 2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
43 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 
44 318 U.S. 1, 23 (1965). 
 
45 360 F.Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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with a constitutional right of access to information.46  It is important to note that the discussions 
of the First Amendment were often focused on whether there was a constitutionally based right 
of access or a “right to know.”   
In addition to separation of powers issues, a First Amendment-based right to know and 
the need to balance national security with transparency, a few frames unique to this line of cases 
were discussed.  Greene, Egan and Zemel focused extensively on due process and/or procedural 
questions, a frame that was not discussed at great length in the other cases in this dissertation 
with the exception of Morison and Rosen.  Second, because Sherrill, Nation Magazine, Getty 
Images and Flynt all discussed practical problems associated with making a decision in the case 
as factors that led to or supported their decisions, it was difficult to determine which legal issue 
the courts were truly focusing on.  While the Sherrill court discussed the practical needs of the 
Secret Service to keep the president safe, Nation Magazine, Getty and Flynt all discussed the 
practical problems related to a court considering largely hypothetical claims related to the 
undeveloped constitutional doctrine of the right to know.  Thus, as noted, it was not totally clear 
what frame the courts were most focused on. 
In sum, it appears as if the courts are framing the cases in a variety of ways.  While 
balancing national security and freedom of expression/transparency and balancing the roles of 
the different branches of government appear to be the most common frames, the courts have 
been able to frame similar cases in a variety of ways.  Unfortunately, because frames can be 
introduced during oral arguments, by the litigants in briefs, or by third parties in amici briefs, and 
these documents were not always readily available for the lower court cases identified by this 
research , it was difficult to determine the origin of some of these frames.  While some of the 
opinions clearly stated they were taking their frames from arguments presented by one of the 
                                                 
46 360 U.S. 474, 524 (1959). 
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litigants47 or were addressing issues not present at the lower court level or argued by either 
side,48 it was beyond the scope of this dissertation to track each individual frame through the 
litigation process to determine where the frame originated. 
  
National security and transparency factors 
 In addition to the different frames the opinions cited, there were a number of legal factors 
the courts used to reach and/or justify their conclusions.  As noted in chapter one, it is important 
to remember in any discussion of the law that judges and the lawyers who argue before them are 
trained to approach problems in a specific way and to find solutions to those problems by 
thinking about the law.  “Legalism” is the primary way courts structure and explain their 
opinions.  Thus, legal factors, such as precedent, original intent, and texualism exert a unique 
influence on the mindset of justices and work as a constraint on policy making as well as serve as 
a way to ex post facto justify their policy preferences.   
In the national security and prior restraint cases discussed in chapter two, the most 
frequently discussed factors were precedent (16 opinions), followed by originalism/framers’ 
intent (6), democratic theory (6), statutory textual analysis (5), First Amendment theory (5), 
legislative history/intent (5) and constitutional textualism (3).  The high number of references to 
democratic theory was primarily accounted for by opinions that discussed the important role 
national security played even in democratic systems of government.  In addition to these more 
                                                 
47 As noted in chapter two, in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), Alexander Bickel’s deliberate 
attempt to frame the case in terms of the First Amendment and separation of powers was adopted by the courts.  See 
supra pp. 73-74.  In addition, as discussed in chapter four, in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), although the 
majority credited Justice Tom Clark for framing the cases “colorfully,” Clark in fact took the frame directly from the 
solicitor general, while in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), the majority of the Court adopted a 
frame advanced by the solicitor general.  See supra pp. 207-08; supra pp. 218-19. 
 
48 In Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, 435 U.S. 589 (1978), discussed in chapter four, the Supreme Court clearly stated it 
was deciding the case based on a “element that was neither advanced by the parties nor given appropriate 
consideration by the courts below.” Id. at 602-03.  See supra pp. 247-48 for a discussion of the case. 
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common factors, two other factors were relied upon by courts to reach and/or justify their 
conclusions.  First, in Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby,49 Chief Judge Clement Haynsworth cited 
the practical problems associated with the judiciary and national security information as reasons 
the court should not exercise its right to review national security information decisions.  Rather 
than rely upon precedent or interpretations of the constitutional power of courts, Haynsworth 
simply concluded that courts were “ill-equipped” to deal with national security information.50  
Second, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Snepp relied upon a blend of the law of 
contracts and trusts to support its conclusion that Snepp had violated his confidentiality 
agreement and a trust could be set up for the government’s benefit.51 
 A majority of the cases relied upon multiple factors to support their conclusions.  Fifteen 
of the twenty-one opinions relied upon at least two factors.  Douglas’ opinion in Pentagon 
Papers relied upon the most, discussing six different factors—statutory textual analysis, 
legislative intent, precedent, constitutional text, framers’ intent and democratic theory.  
Interestingly, the six opinions that primarily relied upon one factor all relied upon precedent.  
They were a combination of Supreme Court and lower court decisions.  The Supreme Court 
opinions included Brennan’s, Blackmun’s and Burger’s opinions in Pentagon Papers and 
Stewart’s dissent in Snepp. 
  Although there were only a few cases identified by the research that considered post-
publication punishments and national security information, the opinions were notably complex, 
many relying on a multitude of factors.  In the cases discussed, precedent was relied on to reach a 
                                                 
49 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 
50 Id. at 1369. 
 
51 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
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decision in all seven opinions; however, only Blackmun’s concurrence in Agee focused 
exclusively on precedent, accusing the majority of diverting from precedent without expressly 
acknowledging it.52  All of the other opinions relied on a variety of factors to support their 
arguments.  In addition to precedent, the opinions relied on statutory textual analysis (4 
opinions), legislative history/intent (3), First Amendment theory (3), originalism/framers’ intent 
(2) and democratic theory (2).  Judge Ellis’ opinion in Rosen was particularly wide-ranging in 
the factors it discussed.53  Ellis cited democratic theory, First Amendment theory, original intent, 
statutory textual analysis, legislative history/intent and precedent. 
     In the national security and access cases discussed in chapter four, all thirteen opinions 
written in the ten cases relied heavily on precedent to justify or support their conclusions.  
Precedent was followed by First Amendment theory (5 opinions), constitutional textual analysis 
(4), practical or pragmatic reasons related to the undeveloped nature of a case (4), legislative 
history/intent (3), statutory textual analysis (3), and framers’ intent/originalism (1).  As noted, 
the cases that discussed pragmatic or practical concerns— Nation Magazine v. Department of 
Defense,54 Getty Images v. Department of Defense55 and Flynt v. Rumsfeld56—all focused on the 
undeveloped nature of the claims or on pragmatic concerns related to deciding an important 
constitutional question based on speculative claims without the clear guidance of a Supreme 
Court precedent.   
                                                 
52 453 U.S. 280, 310 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 
53 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 
54 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 
55 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 
56 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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The cases differed from those in chapters two and three in that First Amendment theory 
and constitutional textual analysis were relied upon more heavily.  This is perhaps because many 
of the cases were discussing a constitutionally based right of access or “right to know.”  Because 
the right to know has not been as well defined by the Supreme Court as the standards associated 
with prior restraints or post-publication punishments, the lower courts were left to define the 
existence or extent of a constitutional right to know through means other than precedent.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that this did not lead the judges to focus on framers’ 
intent/originalism.  It appears the judges did not look to historical evidence to shed light on the 
existence of a right to know.  The only case to discuss framers’ intent was United States v. 
AT&T,57 which did so to illuminate its discussion of separation of powers.  
As could be expected, in all three types of cases, precedent was the legal factor the 
opinions most frequently used to justify or reach decisions.  Precedent was cited in thirty-six 
opinions, followed by First Amendment theory (13), statutory textual analysis (12), legislative 
history/intent (11), originalism/framers intent (9), democratic theory (8), constitutional 
textualism (7), and pratical/pragmatic issues (5).  These findings are consistent with the writings 
of Jeffery A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth.  As discussed in chapter one, Segal and Spaeth argued 
that precedent is often a powerful predictor of judicial decisions and that the frequency with 
which courts base decisions on precedent far surpasses any other aspect of the legal model.58  
This was true of Supreme Court cases as well as lower court cases, a finding consistent with the 
writings of Erwin Chemerinsky.  While the Supreme Court is arguably less tied to precedent than 
lower courts, as Chemerinsky wrote, “A significant portion of almost every Supreme Court 
                                                 
57 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
58 JEFFERY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 76 
(2002). 
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opinion is about how the decisions fit within, and flow from, the earlier case.”59  As they do in 
many cases, the judges in the cases discussed in this dissertation often spent part of an opinion 
discussing why the present case was similar to or different from preceding cases or alternative 
lines of precedent.  It is important to note, however, that precedent included discussions of 
precedents being improperly used.  As discussed throughout the dissertation, concurring and/or 
dissenting opinions were often critical of the majorities’ uses of or reliance on precedent.  This 
finding is also consistent with the writings of Segal and Spaeth and Chemerinsky.   
 Significantly, although references did not reach the frequency of precedent, a number of 
opinions discussed First Amendment theory, and it appears that theory is an important way 
courts determine and/or justify exactly what conduct or actions are supported by the First 
Amendment.  In chapters two and three, these discussion most frequently focused on the role of a 
free press or freedom of expression in self-government or as a check on government abuse while 
in chapter four they often focused on the possible existence of a constitutional right to know.  It 
appears, then, that in addition to relying on precedent, many of the courts were also attempting to 
use First Amendment and democratic theory to determine for themselves and/or justify for others 
to what extent the Amendment protected a specific act or compelled the government to allow 
access to information or a location.  This suggests that First Amendment theory is an important 
component of a jurist’s toolbox of legal factors.  
 A final factor related to the time in which a decision was made—or the “context” of the 
decision—was referenced in several cases throughout the dissertation and deserves mention.  
This reference to time and/or events was found in a number of opinions and suggests that courts 
are aware of historical factors that may impact or limit the power of their decisions.  In both Doe 
                                                 
59 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2019 (2002). 
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I and Doe II Marrero’s opinions were careful to reference the temporal and geographic proximity 
of the events of 9/11.60   While the weight of 9/11 did not stop Marrero from ruling against the 
government, the “critical time of national emergency” brought about by the Cold War was 
clearly on Clark’s mind when he ruled for the government in Greene.61       
 
Comparison of national security and transparency cases to judiciary and transparency 
cases 
  
There were a number of significant similarities and differences between the national 
security cases and judiciary cases discussed in this dissertation.  As all the courts did in the 
national security cases, the Supreme Court often framed judiciary cases in terms of balancing the 
First Amendment with another important value, often the effective operation of the judicial 
system.  However, in the judiciary cases, there were a fair number of opinions that either 
emphasized that there was no conflict presented in the case or that any conflict was heavily 
outweighed by First Amendment concerns.  Justice William Brennan’s opinion in Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stewart is perhaps the best example of an argument that there was no 
conflict between the issues62 while Justice William Francis Murphy’s and Justice Wiley 
Rutledge, Jr.’s opinions in Pennekamp v. Florida were good examples of opinions that suggested 
balance but stressed the importance of the First Amendment, the need for transparency in a 
democracy and the immediate nature of the danger needed to justify a post-publication 
punishment under the clear and present danger standard.63     
                                                 
60 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Doe III, 500 F.Supp. 2d 379, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 
61 360 U.S. 474, 515 (1959) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 
62 427 U.S. 539, 572-73 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).   
 
63 328 U.S. 331, 376 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); id. at 372 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
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 As in the national security cases, the most frequently relied upon legal factor was 
precedent.  Twenty-one of the opinions focused at least partially on precedent to reach or justify 
a decision.  Precedent was followed by originalism/framers’ intent and First Amendment theory, 
both of which were discussed in thirteen of the opinions, and democratic theory, which was 
discussed in six of the opinions. A number of the originalist arguments, though, were in the 
context of discussions of the history of judicial proceedings, rather than discussions of framers’ 
intent.  Interestingly the Court did not rely upon constitutional or statutory textualism (1 opinion 
each), or legislative intent (1 opinion) nearly as much as in the national security cases.   
As noted above, while it is no surprise that the Court relied heavily on precedent, perhaps 
the most interesting finding is the extent to which the justices discussed the role of freedom of 
expression in self-government, the checking function and the right to know.  Although, as noted 
above, the national security courts used First Amendment theory quite a bit, in comparison, it 
appears as if the Court has spent an even greater deal of time discussing First Amendment theory 
and the role of transparency in the judicial process.  In several of the chapter four access to the 
judiciary opinions, such as Burger’s opinion in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,64 the justices 
specifically rejected constitutional textualism in favor of originalism, framers’ intent and/or First 
Amendment theory to find a right of access, which was obviously not specifically mentioned in 
the text of the Constitution.  These cases were then relied on as precedents by the national 
security and access courts in their exploration of the existence of a right of access.65 
Overall, the national security and judiciary opinions involving prior restrains were the 
most similar to each other.  As noted, the most significant difference between the two categories 
                                                 
64 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 
65 As mentioned in chapter four, Nation Magazine v. Dep’t of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), 
specifically relied upon Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), 
to determine there was a right to know based on the checking function of the First Amendment.    
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of cases was the focus in the national security cases on what level of deference the courts should 
give the executive when determining if publication of classified information would be harmful.  
The vast majority of opinions in both categories of cases framed the key legal issue as the need 
to balance the First Amendment with some other constitutional mandate.  As discussed, many of 
the cases relied on similar precedents to reach or justify their conclusions.  Indeed, many of the 
national security cases cited the judiciary cases and vice versa. 
  The national security and judiciary cases involving post-publication punishment were 
somewhat similar in that almost every opinion spent at least some time discussing the cases in 
terms of the First Amendment.  As noted, however, the two sets of cases relied on different 
factors.  While the national security cases tended to focus on textualism, legislative intent and 
history and a variety of factors, the judicial cases primarily relied on the clear and present danger 
precedents and First Amendment theory to support their conclusions.  Interestingly, in the 
judiciary cases, even justices who issued dissenting opinions did not deviate from using the same 
precedents as the majority opinion.  They merely disagreed with the application of the 
precedents.  In addition, unlike the prior restraint cases, there was very little intersection between 
the two sets of cases in chapter three, and the national security cases rarely cited the judiciary 
cases.  
In many ways, the two categories of access cases discussed in chapter four provided the 
most interesting comparisons.  While the two sets of cases were very similar in terms of how the 
courts framed and discussed the key legal issues, they showed a many differences in terms of 
outcomes.  Although some justices have ruled against courtroom closures based on their 
interpretation of the strength of the government’s arguments or their use of divergent legal 
justifications, the vast majority of justices have acknowledged a First Amendment-based right of 
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access to the judiciary.  This stands in contrast to the national security cases where, at best, the 
courts have found a qualified or tentative right of access.  Interestingly, however, as opposed to 
the cases discussed in chapter three, those discussed in chapter four did cite each other.  In the 
national security cases, the opinions often turned to the judiciary cases to look for evidence of a 
constitutionally based right to know or right of access.  While they were unwilling to totally 
embrace the notion that a right of access exists outside of the judicial context, the opinions 
certainly used the judiciary precedents to support their arguments that there might be some sort 
of universal qualified right of access guaranteed by the First Amendment.  Much of this can be 
explained by the courts’ focus on separation of power issues and, as discussed below, lead to 
interesting conclusions about the judiciary’s willingness to exert power over another branch of 
government.   
Perhaps the starkest difference between the two categories of cases was the heavy 
reliance on separation of powers frames in the national security cases across prior restraint, post-
publication punishment and access national security cases.  Although some of the judiciary cases 
mentioned peripheral issues, such as federalism or the inherent power of courts,66 the only 
judiciary case to explicitly frame a case in terms of a separation of powers concern was Justice 
Lewis Powell’s opinion for the Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.67 Of course, that 
is not surprising given the facts of that case, which involved a request to copy the White House 
tapes of a former President.  In the other judiciary cases, there simply was no separation of 
                                                 
66 As noted, Justice Felix Frankfurter discussed federalism issues in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 280 (1941) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 385 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 
67 435 U.S. 589 (1978).  In addition to using a separation of powers frame, the Nixon Court also discussed the 
judiciary’s lack of practical ability to deal with the dispute at hand, an argument used by several of the national 
security and transparency opinions. 
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powers issue because they involved the Supreme Court reaching decisions that affected only the 
judicial branch.   
In contrast, the national security cases are as much—if not more—about separation of 
powers and balancing powers as they are about balancing the First Amendment with national 
security.  As noted, a great number of the opinions discussed the inherent power of the courts 
vis-à-vis the executive or legislative branch or grappled with how much deference the courts 
should give to the executive branch in determining what information should be classified.  There 
are a number of explanations for this.  First, it is possible that this emphasis is related to 
constitutional questions and concerns.  Several of the cases outlined in the research focused on 
which branch of government was given the power to control national security information by the 
Constitution or focused on framers’ intent to determine who should have the power.  For 
example, in Department of Navy v. Egan, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote that the authority to 
protect national security information flowed directly from the Constitution and fell on the 
President “as head of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief.” 68  Second, it could be 
related to practical concerns with the ability and/or expertise of the courts to deal with national 
security information.  Several of the opinions focused on the judiciary’s inability to know what 
information might be dangerous to national security or the inability of courts to properly control 
and house national security information.69  Finally, it is possible that it is related to inter-
institutional constraints placed on the judiciary.  As noted in chapter one, scholars who advance 
the “strategic account” of judicial decision making have argued that justices are strategic actors 
                                                 
68 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). 
 
69 See, e.g., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir. 1975). 
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who must consider the preferences of other actors and institutions and the institutional and 
historical context in which they act.70       
Regardless of why the focus on separation of powers, it is clear from this research that it 
remains a concern for judges at all levels of the judiciary. Citing a number of Supreme Court 
precedents, Blackmun concluded, “[U]nless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts 
traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and 
national security affairs.”71  In his concurring opinion in United States v. Morison, Judge 
Wilkinson summed up this idea: “In short, questions of national security and foreign affairs are 
‘of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has 
long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or 
inquiry.’”72   
 
Conclusion 
In addition to answering questions related to the frames and factors the courts used in 
these cases, one of the primary purposes of this dissertation was to catalog the overall structure 
created by the cases.  As Professor Cathy Packer wrote, it is only by studying the societal 
implications of a body of case law that scholars can “fully comprehend the impact of . . . 
                                                 
70 See, e.g, LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Robert Lowry Clinton, Game 
Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review: A Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v. Madison, 38 AM. J. 
POLI. SCI. 285 (1994); Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme 
Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 162 (1999); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the 
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW & SOC. REV. 87 (1996). 
 
71 Id. at 530 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757-58 
(1975); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 144 (1953); Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)). 
 
72 844 F.2d 1057, 1083 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
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[individual] disputes on both individuals and society.”73  In addition to the conclusions outlined 
above related to the frames and factors used in these cases, a number of broader theoretical 
observations about the structure that the courts have created can be made. 
First, the analysis identified a great deal of similarity in the treatment of prior restraints 
across national security and judiciary cases, early signs of national security access cases adopting 
the approach of judiciary access cases, and a lack of similarity across post-publication 
punishment cases.  This indicates that while the courts have a well-developed approach to prior 
restraint cases, they are struggling to develop a consistent approach to post-publication 
punishment and access cases.  As noted in chapter one, Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer 
used the term “jurisprudential regime” to refer to a key precedent, or a set of related precedents, 
that structure the way courts evaluate key elements of cases in a particular legal area.74  This 
research suggests that the judiciary’s antipathy toward prior restraints—established in cases such 
as Near v. Minnesota,75 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,76 and New York Times Co. v. 
United States77—has become well enough established that lower courts are easily applying the 
standard, even when the governmental interest at stake is as important as national security.  The 
“right to know” appears at best to be a developing regime—well-established in the judicial 
access cases, but undeveloped elsewhere.  Thus, while the national security access courts 
frequently cited the key precedents that would establish a “right to know regime,” the lower 
                                                 
73 Cathy Packer, Don’t Even Ask! A Two-Level Analysis of Government Lawsuits Against Citizen and Media Access 
Requestors, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 29, 32 (2008). 
 
74 Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. 
POLI. SCI. REV. 305, 315-16 (2002). 
 
75 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 
76 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
 
77 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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courts are currently struggling to apply that regime outside the judicial context.  In contrast, post-
publication punishment cases, perhaps because of the limited number of cases the Supreme Court 
has considered, instead rely on a case-by-case determination.  While the Court has a regime for 
judiciary cases—consistently turning to the clear and present danger precedents78—this regime 
has not crossed over to other areas of the law.  This conclusion comes with an important caveat, 
however.  As noted in the discussion of prior restraint cases in chapter two, the ability to 
selectively frame cases and use factors does allow judges and litigants to find ways around 
jurisprudential regimes.79  That is, while the jurists were more constrained by the strength of the 
Court’s prior restraint jurisprudential regime, the ability to frame cases and selectively use some 
factors over others left them with at least some room to maneuver.   
Second, the research demonstrates that First Amendment and democratic theory are 
important rhetorical tools that can be used in conjunction with legal factors such as precedent or 
originalism to help jurists reach and justify conclusions.  In addition, it appears as if there was a 
heavy reliance on First Amendment and democratic theory when breaking new legal ground.  
That is, jurists can rely on First Amendment or democratic theory to establish new 
jurisprudential regimes or in combination with precedent to justify a decision that might not be 
specifically supported by the precedent, textualism or orginalism.  For example, it is noteworthy 
that the court access cases relied heavily on theory, both First Amendment and democratic, when 
establishing a constitutional right to attend and report on trials.  The justices certainly could not 
turn to textualism or precedent and instead needed to justify why a right to attend trials was 
                                                 
78 As noted, the main difference in the post-publication punishment cases was not whether the clear and present 
danger test applied, but rather what kind of expression qualified as a “clear and present danger.”  See supra pp. 180-
97. 
 
79 For example, as discussed in chapter two, the dissenting justices in the Pentagon Papers case retained the ability to 
selectively argue the case was about the power of the executive branch, whereas the government in the Patriot Act 
cases had the ability to argue the restrictions were not truly prior restraints.  See supra pp. 71-96; supra pp. 121-38.  
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inherent in the First Amendment.  Future research would be greatly informed by looking for such 
rhetorical devices in opinions in addition to textualism, orginialism, and precedent. 
Third, the research both does and does not support the contention that national security is 
a different area of the law.  While some of the opinions treated national security information in a 
very different way than other types of information, it appears that national security is not a 
“trump card” that can be used by the government to achieve its objectives while avoiding judicial 
scrutiny.  While some opinions, such as Clark’s dissent in Greene80 or Haynsworth’s opinion in 
Marchetti,81 went to great lengths to express the need to defer almost entirely to the executive 
branch in matters of national security, the majority of judges were unwilling to abdicate their 
judicial function and took their duty to protect civil liberties seriously, often attempting to 
balance the two competing concerns.  There are, however, at least two ways in which national 
security cases are very different from the judiciary cases identified by this research.  
As noted, one area that is different in national security information cases is that they 
consistently invoke separation of powers concerns.  The national security cases thus serve as an 
important reminder that the judiciary is but one part of our governmental structure that must take 
into account the desires and powers of the other branches of government.  While the ratification 
of the Constitution set out the powers of each branch, as scholars have noted, this was only the 
beginning of a long process by which political institutions take shape.82  Rather than being static, 
the powers of our political institutions are defined through “sequences of events . . . either 
unanticipated by the framers or unspecified in the [Constitution].”83  Under this analysis, it is 
                                                 
80 360 U.S. 474, 510 (1959) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 
81 446 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 
82 Knight & Epstein, supra note 70, at 88. 
 
83 Id. 
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clear that in national security cases the courts are being mindful of the desires and powers of 
other political institutions.  Such a finding should not come as a surprise to observers of the court 
system.  The courts of today are not far removed from the constitutional battles between 
President Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, which resulted in the President’s Court-
packing plan and cast doubt on the future of the Court as a powerful political institution.84  
Undoubtedly, all of the jurists who issued opinions analyzed in this dissertation were well aware 
of Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan and other battles.85  Thus, it is totally understandable that 
separation of powers would play a key role in national security cases but simply are not relevant 
in the judicial cases when judges are effectively making rules to govern their own house.  In the 
judicial cases, the justices were free to rely upon First Amendment and democratic theory to 
create a system of access and dissemination without worrying about overextending their power. 
An additional factor in the national security cases that is unlikely to been seen elsewhere 
was the consideration the courts gave to the dangers of making a “wrong” decision involving 
national security information.  Although few of the opinions stated the stakes as bluntly as 
District Judge Robert Willis Warren’s opinion in United States v. Progressive Magazine,86 all of 
the jurists had to be aware of the potential results of allowing national security information to be 
disseminated.  As Warren wrote: 
A mistake in ruling against The Progressive will seriously infringe cherished 
First Amendment rights. . . .  It will curtail defendants’ First Amendment rights in 
a drastic and substantial fashion. It will infringe upon our right to know and to be 
informed as well. 
                                                 
84 See generally Gregory Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court Packing Plan, 81 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1139 (1987), for an analysis of the battles between FDR and the Supreme Court. 
 
85 The first—and one of the most widely written about—confrontations between the executive and the Supreme 
Court was, of course, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 
86 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
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A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear 
annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to 
publish becomes moot.87  
 
Taking these two issues together—separation of power frames and the consequences of 
making a “wrong decision”—it is no surprise that the question courts have not answered is just 
how much deference to the executive branch is appropriate.  Cases currently working their way 
through the judicial system, such as Doe III and United States v. Rosen, will certainly have to 
deal with the question in one form or another.  This, of course, is true of all cases involving 
national security, not simply those that deal with information policy.  Any case that calls for 
balancing national security with a civil liberty, be it privacy, habeas corpus, or the right to a 
public trial of terrorists suspects, will have to focus on what level of deference to give the 
executive branch.  Yet, as noted, some courts are willing to at least address the question.   As 
discussed throughout the dissertation, even after determining the judicial branch did indeed have 
some role to play in national security information cases, many of the opinions then spent a great 
deal of time attempting to determine what level of deference to give the executive branch.  As 
Judge Victor Marrero wrote in Doe III, the Constitution was designed so that even in dangerous 
times both civil liberties and “the judiciary’s unique role under our governmental system in 
protecting those liberties and upholding the rule of law” would not be circumscribed.88 
Finally, this research has demonstrated that the law concerning information—like all 
law—is malleable. Through their ability to focus on specific frames while ignoring others, as 
well as their capacity to reach or ex post facto justify decisions based on different legal factors, 
courts do more than just apply the law, they mold the law.  In the area of national security 
                                                 
87 Id. at 995-96. 
 
88 500 F.Supp. 2d 379, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citation and footnotes omitted). 
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information, it is apparent that through framing and the selective use of precedent, framers’ 
intent, First Amendment and democratic theory, or even practical issues related to the 
undeveloped nature of a case, judges have the ability to shape and manage the way our society 
controls information.  While this is certainly not a new finding—the legal realists first advanced 
the idea that the law is vague, internally inconsistent, and revisable in the early twentieth 
century—the area of information control is a particularly important place to study it.  As Packer 
wrote, disputes about the distribution of information are about “the fundamental relationship 
among the government, the media and the public” because “[i]nformation is power, and the 
proper sharing of this power source is critical to the proper operation of a democratic 
government.”89  In addition, because the courts must strike a balance between national security 
and transparency as well as between the separate branches of government in national security 
information cases, it is obvious that although opinions are written in the legal formalist tradition, 
the law alone does not decide cases.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was one of the first jurists 
to suggest that law was not a formal process of neutral application or logical deduction but a 
process of choosing among competing values.90  This dissertation has demonstrated that when 
courts are asked to balance national security with freedom of expression, they not only must 
apply the law but also choose among competing core democratic values, always a difficult task.   
                                                 
89 Packer, supra note 71 at 33. 
 
90 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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